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ABSTRACT
Christopher Caudwell and His C ritics:
A Study o f Caudwell's Philosophy o f Art and the C ritical Response
by Thomas Riggins
This thesis deals with the philosophy o f art o f the British Marxist, Christo
pher Caudwell. It begins with a general discussion o f th e in tellectu al
environm ent of Caudwell's day — i.e ., the 1920s and 30s in Europe and
esp ecially in England. It then procedes to a presentation o f Caudwell's
basic philosophical position with major em phasis on his work Illusion
and R eality. This is follow ed by a review o f the cr itic a l assessm ent
Caudwell's ideas evoked and a number o f d etractors and supporters are
discussed. Special a tten tion is then placed on a review o f the a esth etic
theory o f Socialist Realism and Caudwell's relation to it. Following
this discussion the a esth etics o f G.W.F. H egel are analysed and compared
to those o f Marxism. Caudwell is seen to be in fundam ental agreem ent
with the Hegelian and Marxist d ia le ctica l approach to the understanding
o f reality while y et differing on som e sp ecific judgments concerning
the nature o f poetry and a rtistic creation. Caudwell's relationship to
Freud is next taken up, and by concentrating on Herbert Marcuse's Eros
and C ivilization, as w ell as Caudwell's critique o f Freud, it is determ ined
th at Caudwell cannot be cla ssified within the Freudian tradition, but
also that that tradition has a more progressive and revolutionary p otential
than it is usually given credit for. Finally, contem porary critics o f Caud
w ell are discussed, critics dating from the 1970s, and it is established
th at Caudwell's positions are usually misunderstood and m islabeled due
to unfam iliarity with the m ethods o f d ia le ctica l thinking on the part
o f many o f the authors who have attem p ted to cla ssify Caudwell as
eith er a non-Marxist or an inconsistent one.
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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

This work is primarily about the philosophy o f art developed by
the British Marxist, Christopher St. John Sprigg (Christopher Caudwell,
1907-1937). Caudwell and his thought becam e w ell known in the late
1930s by means o f a series o f posthumously published works - - Illusion
and R eality, Studies in a Dying Culture, The Crisis in P hysics, and Further
Studies in a Dying C ulture. I w ill focus m ost o f my a tten tio n on his
first major th eoretical work, Illusion and R eality, b ecause, although
published first, it represents the m ost mature expression o f his thinking
on the philosophy o f art.
Over the years since they were first published, Caudwell's writings
have been variously interpreted and evaluated but no consensus has
been reached regarding their sign ificance or im portance.
I intent to defend th e th esis that C audw ell’s works represent a
forceful, original contribution to the Marxist philosophy o f art, th at
they represent an exam ple o f Marxist d ia le ctica l thinking (and have
consequently often been m isinterpreted), and that they fa ll into the
mainstream o f the Marxist in tellectu a l tradition. I am not however
engaging in a w holesale d efen se o f Caudwell's interpretation o f Marxism.
Caudwell's view s w ill be defended against m isinterpretation in order
that we can have set clearly before us just what his positions really
w ere. My purpose is to provide an appreciative interpretation o f Caud-
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w ell's philosophy o f art as it rela tes to the so cia l co n tex t o f the 1930s
and to clear up m isconceptions regarding his thought that have been
all too evident in the criticism s directed a t it. Thus the detailed defen se
of this or that Caudwellean position or doctrine is not my intention,
but rather it is to fix him as a thinker firm ly com m itted to Marxism
and its philosophical m ethodology, a contention, as w e shall see, all
too readily denied by many o f the critics I shall exam ine later on.
At this point, I think it is im portant to make som e preliminary
remarks a t the o u tset about what I mean by a "Marxist" philosophy o f
art, while reserving a more d etailed discussion for my second chapter.
This is the more necessary as the problem o f constituting a Marxist
philosophy o f art rem ains unclear since there seem s to be no accepted
definition o f just what such a philosophy o f art would really be. Marx
and Engels, it is true, developed their own particular philosophical outlook
on the world but aside from scattered referen ces they did not provide
us with a w ell thought out sp ecific philosophy o f art. In my chapters
on Socialist Realism and H egel this problem is taken up and a proposed
solution to the problem is offered .
Here I give a prelim inary remark based on the view s o f David
N. Margolies (The Function o f Literature) whose thought w ill be more
fully discussed in the body o f my treatm en t of Caudwell. Margolies
points out that a Marxist philosophy o f art begins with the general idea
that "social being determ ines consciousness." On this basis d ifferent
Marxist approaches to art have been constructed — three o f which,
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Margolies notes, are those o f Lukacs, Plekhanov and Caudwell. What
is con stitu tive o f Caudwell's originality as a Marxists is his theory of
the function o f poetry (and by extension, o f literature and art in general)
and how it works to educate and reshape our em otions.
We shall discover in the course o f this study that the key to under
standing Caudwell is the com prehension o f his use of the d ia lectic m e
thod. He absorbs from Freud, Jung, Richards and others their major
contributions, points out what he thinks are the necessary contradictions
that they are driven to by their sta tic "metaphysical" approach to reality,
and attem p ts to reconcile th ese contradictions on a higher lev el in a
new unity. In accom plishing this, Caudwell shows us that Freud is no
longer Freud or Richards Richards - - but their insights have been unified
on a higher critica l terrain staked out by Caudwell h im self and stem m ing
from the use o f the method first delineated by H egel and p erfected
by Marx.

4

CHAPTER I
The Caudwell Generation:
Literary Background and Milieu

I w ill attem p t in this chapter to give a picture of the literary back
ground in which Caudwell's book Illusion and R eality first appeared.
The first part of the chapter w ill rely heavily on tw o recen t works: May
nard Solomon's Marxism and Art and Samuel Hynes' The Auden Genera
tion . Towards the end of th e chapter I w ill try to assess the influence
on Caudwell o f the th eories o f I.A. Richards, esp ecia lly as contained
in the latter's Principles o f Literary C riticism .
According to Maynard Solomon no sp ecifica lly Marxist a esth etic
writings were produced in England betw een the period o f William Morris
in the 1880's and the Popular Front in the 1930's.* However, the 1930's
produced som e important a ttem p ts to apply Marxism to the arts. N ote
worthy exam ples are, Solomon points out, John Strachey's Literature
and D ialectical M aterialism (1934) and parts o f The Coming Struggle
for Power (1933); a rticles appearing in The L eft R eview ; Ralph Fox's
A spects o f D ia lectica l M aterialism (1934) and The N ovel and the People
(1937), as w ell as Jack Lindsay's a ttem p t to com bine Marxism and Freudianism in his Anatomy of Spirit (1937).

* Maynard Solomon, Editor, Marxism and A rt: Essays C lassic and Con
tem porary (N.Y.: Vintage Books, 1974). The discussion which follow s
is based primarily on Solomon's com m ents.
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This is the m ilieu in which Illusion and R eality made its appearance
— the work in which Caudwell's "theory o f p o etic creation" - - perhaps
his most important contribution, makes its debut. The three major in
fluences on Caudwell, not all o f equal im portance, w ere Marxism-Lenin
ism, the Cambridge School o f anthropology, and Freud. Besides the
works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin (and Stalin, esp ecia lly his Leninism),
Solomon says "Caudwell absorbed Marxism through the framework that
Plekhanov and Bukharin had erected ."

2

Caudwell was apparently more
3
influenced by the form er — a view reinforced by P eter D em etz. It
is probably that he was com p letely ignorant of w riters such as Ernst
Bloch, Walter Benjamin, Max Raphael and Georg Lukacs.
If the above m entioned Marxist w riters are the first in im portance
to Caudwell's developm ent, w e should not overlook, Solomon stresses,
the anthropological influences of Tylor, Frazer, Lang, F.M. Cornford,
Gilbert Murray, Jane Harrison, Durkheim and Bronislow Malinowski
— to name a few o f the authors who Caudwell used to develop his view s
and whom he adapted to his purposes. We find, for exam ple, Harrison's
Themis and A ncient Art and R itual, Corn ford's From Religion to Philo
sophy and Durkheim's The Elem entary Forms o f R eligious Life included
in his bibliography. Caudwell's view s on m agic as w ell as som e o f his

^ Ibid., page 310.
3

Peter D em etz, Marx, Engels and the P o ets; Origins o f Marxist Literary
C riticism (Chicago & London: U niversity o f Chicago Press, 1976), page
179. "... Plekhanov turned to the study o f ethnology and sketched the
foundations o f an anthropological theory o f a rtistic developm ent in
which the young English Marxist Christopher Caudwell was to support
him a generation later."
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criticism s o f Freud cam e from Malinowski's Sex, Culture and Myth

if.

and Sex and Repression in Savage Society as w ell as other works.
Perhaps the most n eg lected major influence on Caudwell, accord
ing to Solomon, has been th at o f Freud. Although Caudwell mounts
an attack on Freud in Illusion and R eality, Corn forth, in his Modern
Quarterly assault on Caudwell, accu ses him o f follow ing Freud too closely
to be considered a Marxist a t all. N evertheless, Caudwell rejects Freud's
view o f the instincts as being repressed to our detrim ent by the d eve
lopment o f culture — just the opposite happens for Caudwell - - and
in so saying Caudwell a n ticip a tes Marcuse's arguem ent in Eros and C ivili
zation and, indeed, in many resp ects makes the later work less original
than many who are unfam iliar with Caudwell may think. We w ill return
to these them es in the chapter on Caudwell and Freud.
Earlier, while discussing the m ilieu in which Caudwell's writings
first appeared, the impression may have been given th at only Communists
or Marxists were taking a p o litica l approach to art in the 1930's. This
would be a mistaken im pression. Caudwell's generation and its relation
to literature has been ex ten siv ely analysed by Sam uel Hynes o f Princeton
University in his The Auden G eneration: L iterature and P olitics in England
in the 1930's.^ Hynes points out th at English literature is essen tially
middle class in its origins — and this is esp ecially true o f the th irties.
"Virtually no writing o f literary im portance cam e out o f the working

^ Though cited by Solomon, I do not find this work listed in the Biblio
graphy o f Illusion and R ea lity .
^ Samuel Hynes, The Auden G eneration; L iterature and P o litics in Eng
land in the 1930's (New York: The Viking Press, 1977).
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class during the decade."*’ Caudwell was middle class and his approach
to Marxism, Hynes m aintains, was middle class — i.e . he was a convert
on in tellectu a l grounds. The problems later associated with Illusion
and R eality (Cf. The Modern Quarterly debate o f the early 50's) stem
mainly from the circum stance, according to Hynes, that when Caudwell
was writing there was not as y e t an "orthodox" line in Marxism, in the
7
sense used by Raymond W illiams, which could be applied rigidly to
separate the sheep from th e goats ~ but this was no longer true in the
40's and 50's.^
Hynes w rites:
The whole question o f what a British Communist
would be ~ how he would behave, what he would
think about art and literature, and what kind
he would h im self produce if he w ere an artist
— all th ese questions were unanswered, even
unasked in 1930. The th irties was not a tim e
o f p olitical orthodoxy, but a tim e when orthodoxy
was being worked out. 9
Hynes then presents a b rief background sketch o f this period.
Caudwell, he w rites, was not the only one moved by the apparant con tra
dictions betw een art and life . Day Lewis's Transitional Poem (1929)
reveals the contem porary sta te o f mind ~ i.e . "loss o f faith, scien tific

Ibid., page 11. Cf. Caudwell's "Modern poetry is cap italist poetry"
- - Illusion and R ea lity : A Study o f the Sources o f Poetry (N.Y.: Interna
tional Publishers, 1970), page 55.
^ Cf. Raymond Williams, Marxism and L iterature (Oxford: Oxford Uni
versity Press, 1977).

g

Y et Solomon, og. c it., ca lls Caudwell's essay published as Romance
and Realism (Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press, 1970) an exam ple
o f "proto-Zhdanovism" for supporting so cia list realism , econom ic d eter
minism, and control o f th e arts in the U.S.S.R.
9
Hynes, og. c it., page 12.
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ideas, im ages o f the urban, industrial world"*** and its problem s, e tc .
Hynes also finds this in Auden's Paid on Both Sides (1929) ~ "The them e
o f entropy, the old life running down, em erges again and again in chorus
speeches."* * This them e, "a world that seem ed to be running down,
and entering it w ithout the support o f inherited values"

12

is crucial

for our understanding o f th e th irties - - for this widespread feelin g en ter
tained by middle class in tellectu a ls brought many o f them to the study
o f Marxism. Even decidedly n o n -leftists such as Evelyn Waugh in his
Vile Bodies envisioned "the a ccid en tal and aim less nature o f modern
life."

13

That art might have a role to play in making a b etter world

becam e a widespread idea. Day Lewis, according to Hynes, saw poetry
functioning to expose the dead life o f the past and to support the future
14.
life. The revolutionary w ill cre a te the world, the poet w ill "record it."
However, the "radical" response was not the only option, as Hynes
points out. In Science and Poetry, I.A. Richards defended tw o basic
propostions - - the poet had to function in a world b ereft o f b elief, and
hence form becam e a ll im portant for the artist. Thus traditional ap-

*** Ibid., page k3.
* * Ibid., page 53.
*^ Ibid., page 5k.
*^ Ibid., page 58.

14

C. Day Lewis, "The P oet and Revolution," Adelphi k, Septem ber,
1932, page 863, quoted in Hynes, op. c it.
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proaches to art w ere superior to radical avan t-garde a p p ro a ch es.^
Auden in "Psychology and Art To-day" (The Arts To-day, 1935,
edited by G. Grigson) saw art as basically did actic with the artist individualistically com m unicating his vision o f the truth to the public.
Here, as Hynes notes, art takes the lead and can in no way be subjected
to p olitical ends. N everth eless, however individualistic, art still has
a role to play in changing the world. ^
By 1936 the view o f p o litica l action as a necessary concom itant
for art was already beginning to fade — the independence o f the artist
— maintained by w riters like Stephen Spender, Auden and even Day
Lewis (who had joined th e CP as Spender would do later) was still fo rce
fully upheld:
The swing in the early th irties toward p olitical
com m itm ent and away from 'individualism' had
been a deviation from the main thrust o f the
modern m ovem ent, and by 1936 the results o f
that swing w ere apparent: p olitical com m itm ent
had produced no art o f any im portance, no a e s
th etic that seem ed adequate to a generation
raised on Eliot's essays and the books of Richards;
everything o f im portance in those )[^ars had
been heterodox and individualistic.
And, Hynes adds, 1937 is noted for the last shots in the war against
individualism and for p o litica l com m itm en t among the Auden generation
— th e b a ttle is last heard in

Hynes, op. c it ., page 163. This work by Richards is not cited by
Caudwell in his Bibliography, but Principles o f Literary C riticism is
— a work which strongly influenced Caudwell and which I w ill discuss
a t the end o f this chapter as a prelude to the discussion o f Illusion and
R eality in Chapter Two.
^

Hynes, op. c it., page 169.

^

Ibid., page 206.
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Fox's The N ovel and the People, in West's Crisis
and C riticism , in Upward's essay in The Mind
in Chains, and m ost elaborately in Caudwell's
Illusion and R eality ... and with that burst it
cam e to an end ... the whole art versus prpgaganda, p o litics versus poetry debate died.
However, it seem s to me that Hynes m isrepresents the whole issue
o f "art versus propaganda," esp ecially in putting forth Caudwell as a
w riter who supported the "propaganda" side o f the so-called controversy.
Caudwell was com m ited to the integrity of art every bit as much as
Auden, Spender or Day Lew is. The real issue is more fundam ental - i.e ., whether art is solely an individual expression o f a unique genius,
or whether it has a so cia l role to perform and has a basically c o llectiv e
origin. In Illusion and R eality Caudwell w rites:
It is im portant to understand that art is no more
propaganda than scien ce. That does not mean
that neither has a so cia l role to perform . On
the contraty, their role is one which is as it
w ere primary to and more fundam ental than
that o f propaganda: th at o f changing m en’s minds
... The w hole feelin g com plex o f the poem or
the play or th e novel is injected into our subjec
tiv e world. We fe e l so-an-so and such-and-such.
We are no more persuaded o f their truth than
o f the truth o f a toothache: but the vividness
or so cia l universality o f th e em otional pattern
is announced by the poignancy o f the sensation
w e ca ll Beauty. 19
As a m atter o f fa c t, Caudwell m aintained that it was precisely
bourgeois w riters, not Marxist w riters, who tended to view art as having
a p olitical and propagandistic role to play - - a com p lete reversal of
the conception which Hynes elaborates. What is even more astounding

^
19

Ibid., pages 267-68.

Christopher Caudwell, Illusion and R eality: A Study o f the Sources
o f Poetry (N.Y.: International Publishers, 1970), pages 155-56.
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is that Caudwell's argum ent appears in a posthumously published essay
which Hynes him self edited before he w rote The Auden Generation.

20

In this work, Rom ance and R ealism , Caudwell rejects art for art's
sake and individualism as bourgeois con cep ts. It is, according to Caud
w ell, a bourgeois notion th at the artist is som e sort o f superlative trend
setter with a special individualistically unique contribution to make.
He w rites:
The conception of poet as agitator springs from
this view . Such a man co n ceiv es the artist, quite
in the bourgeois manner, to be a free source
o f energy, helping to bring about the revolution
by imposing ideas upon it in a ttra ctiv e dress,
according to his own view o f Utopia and his own
private values.
Such agitational poetry cannot be great poetry
because it springs from a divided w orld-view .
It has an obscure bourgeois basis, on which is
imposed a m |^ hanical pseudo-M arxist revolution
ary formula.
Furthermore, Caudwell n otes that using poetry for propagandist
purposes is "a perversion o f poetry."

22

Both Solomon and Hynes give us a fairly good view o f th e in tellectu a l
life and tim es in which Caudwell found h im self. But just who was Christo
pher Caudwell? He was born on 20 October 1907 in Putney, England

20

Christopher Caudwell, Rom ance and Realism : A Study in English
Bourgeois Literature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970),
edited by Samuel Hynes.
21 Ibid., page 135.

22

Ibid., page 136. "Agitation is necessary certainly, so is propaganda,
but let the poet be a genuine propagandist, not a blank verse propagandist.
Is the proletariat made conscious o f its goal by rhymed econom ics?
No, verse is not, and never was, the instrum ent o f propaganda in this
sense." Ibid., pages 135-36.
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as Christopher St. 3ohn Sprigg. In 1916, when he was nine years old,
his mother (3esse Caudwell) died. In November o f 1922, a t th e age of
fifteen , he withdrew from the Roman C atholic Ealing Priory School
and becam e a reporter for the Yorkshire Observer (a paper his father
was also working for). Three years later, in 1925, he moved to London
where he made his living as a w riter and editor. He helped to support
him self by writing a number o f d etectiv e novels. In the years 192628 he was editor o f a trade m agazine, British Malaya. In 1927 he and
his brother (T. Stanhope Sprigg) bought Airways Publications, Ltd. and
Caudwell w rote on aviation, eventually publishing several books in this
tech n ical field. His father died at the age o f 66 in 1932, and tw o years
later Airways Publications, Ltd. folded for want of cap ital. In 1935
he published his only serious novel (as opposed to his d e te c tiv e fiction ),
This My Hand, and used for the first tim e the name "Christopher Caudwell."
In the summer o f 1935 he moved to Cornwall to study Marxism and there
he wrote the first draft o f Illusion and R eality - - he also began work
on the essays which have com e down to us in Studies in a Dying Culture,
Further Studies in a Dying Culture, The Crisis in Physics, and Romance
and R ealism . A major work in g en etics rem ains to be published. A
volum e o f poetry, Poem s, was also published in 1939. In November of
1935 he moved back to London, to a working cla ss neighborhood, and
joined the Poplar branch o f the Communist Party o f Great Britain.
In 3uly o f 1936 MacMillan agreed to publish Illusion and R ea lity . In
Decem ber, Caudwell delivered an am bulance, donated by the Poplar
branch, to the Spanish Loyalist Army, and he rem ained in Spain a fter
joining the International Brigade. On 12 February 1937, his first day
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in action , he was killed a t the B attle o f the Jarama River in the defen se
o f Madrid.

23

A few months later Illusion and R eality was published.

Illusion and R eality, the major th eoretical points of which are
outlined in Chapter II o f this th esis, has led to Caudwell's reputation
as the m ost im portant M arxist-Leninist (or second most im portant a fter
Lukacs

7 h.

) th eoretician on the arts. The work itse lf has been, and still

is, subject to widely divergent appraisals. David D aiches, for exam ple,
considered it only an "historical phenomenon" o f the th irties.

25

However,

it now seem s that the consensus on Caudwell's works is b etter represented
by an author such as George Moberg who w rote "Caudwell was the most
original and farsighted o f the English Marxists o f the 1930's. There
are obscurities and m istakes, o f course ... But this is real crea tiv e Marxist

23

For the b a ttle o f Jarama and Caudwell's death, c f. Hugh Thomas,
The Spanish Civil War, (New York: 1961).

2u

"After George Lukacs, Caudwell is often cited as the forem ost Marxist
critic, although sp ecific discussion o f his work alm ost never goes beyond
the m ere mention o f it." — Andrew Hawley, "Art for Man's Sake: Christopher
Caudwell as Communist A esthetician," C ollege English, Vol. 30, No.
1, October 1968, pages 1-19, page 7.
25

David D aiches, The Present Age in British Literature (Bloomington
& London: Indiana U niversity Press, 1958). "In the L eft-w ing 1930's,
the so ciological and econ om ic kind o f causal explanation often cam e
togeth er in a rather vague Marxist way, but England produced no perman
en tly valuable Marxist criticism . Even Christopher Caudwell's Illusion
and R eality, which created such a stir when it first appeared in 1937,
is im m ature and fragm entary, and it is now more often regarded as
a historical phenomenon than as an illum inating work o f g en etic criticism ."
Page 134. The sam e author's C ritical Approaches to Literature (Englewood
C liffs, New Jersey: P rentice-H all, 1956) gives a slightly more p ositive
evaluation, granting that "some valuable g en etic insights have been
provided" by Caudwell. C f. pages 374-75.
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thinking, full o f ideas relevan t to our problem s today."

26

Before we com e to those ideas, in Chapter II, we should briefly
turn our attention to I.A. Richards' book Principles o f L iteratary C riticism

27

since Caudwell's own view on the nature and function o f poetry

"although it is clearly his own, is greatly indebted"

28

to Richards.

"We pass as a rule from a ch aotic to a b etter organised sta te by
ways which we know nothing about. Typically through the influence
o f other minds. Literature and the arts are the ch ie f means by which
th ese influences are diffused.

29

The above quotation is from Richards' Chapter VIII, "A Psychologi
ca l Theory o f Value." The gist o f his theory, as it pertains to Caudwell,
is as follows.
We know from the above quotation th at the arts w ill function
to give us a b etter "organized state." How so? Richards m aintains
that we have tw o basic typ es o f im pulses a ffe c tin g us - - which he calls
"appetencies" and "aversions." A ppetencies can be conscious or uncon
scious, but whichever they are, they are a "seeking after" and w e value
those things in life which lead to the sa tisfa ctio n o f our ap p etencies.

26

George Moberg, "Christopher Caudwell: An Introduction to his Life
and Work," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia U niversity, 1968.
page 40.
27

I.A. Richards, Principles o f Literary C riticism (N.Y.: Harvest Books,
n.d.), first published in England in 1925.
28

David N. Margolies, The Function o f L iterature: A Study o f Christo
pher Caudwell's A esth etics (N .Y .: Harvest Books, n.d.), first published
in England in 1925.
29

Richards, og. c it ., page 57.
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The only objection to fu lfillin g an appetency is that another, more impor
tan t, appetency would thereby be denied. "Thus m orals becom e purely
prudential and eth ica l cod es m erely the expression o f the most general
schem e o f expedency to which an individual or a race has attained."

30

We are dealing here with a m aterialist and psychological analysis
which impressed Caudwell a great deal.

31

This type o f U tilitarian approach,

clearly influenced by Bentham , had its roots in what Marxists ca ll "Mechanical
M aterialism," but it was certain ly more appealing to Caudwell than
many rom antic or m ystical notions o ften associated with art.

32

Richards also n otes that:
Too great in sisten ce upon the quality o f the
m om entary consciousness which the arts occasion
has in recent tim es been a prevalent critica l
blunder ... The a fte r -e ffe c ts , the perm anent
m odifications in the structure o f the mind, which
works o f art can produce, have been overlooked.
No one is ever quite the sam e again a fter any
experience; his p ossib ilities have altered in
som e degree. And among a ll the agents by which
'the widening o f the sphere o f human sensibility'
may be brought about, the arts are the most
powerful, sin ce it is through them that men
may m ost coop erate and in th ese exp eriences
that the mind m ost e ^ l y and with least in terfer
en ce organizes itse lf.

Ibid., page 48.
31

Cf. Margolies, oj). c it., page 27.
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"Richards is a m aterialist and sees a m aterial function for literature,
but he is not d ia le ctica l and does not see a social function for literature
— and that social function, is prescisely Caudwell's contribution to Marxist
aesth etics." Ibid., page 28.
33

Richards, og. c it ., pages 132-33. C f. also the follow ing from I.A.
Richards, Poetry and Sciences: A Reissue o f Science and Poetry (1926,
1935) With Commentary (N .Y .: W.W.Norton, 1970), page 47. "Poetry
is failing us, or w e it, if a fter our reading w e do not find ourselves changed;
Footnote continued on follow ing page.
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In Chapter XXI of Principles, Richards outlines his theory o f com 
m unication. Isolated minds can only have sim ilar types o f exp eriences.
In order for com m unication to take place one mind has to a c t in som e
way to bring about an exp erien ce in another mind sim ilar to the original
mind's experience and in som e way also dependent upon it.

34

This can

only occur in so far as the minds already share a common environm ent
and a whole range of sim ilar exp eriences. "Without such sim ilarities
com m unication is impossible."

35

Richards also distinguishes (Chapter XXXIV, "The Two Uses of
Language") betw een the sc ie n tific use o f words (the use as referen ces
to true and false conditions) and the use w e find in poetry and elsew here
- - the em otive use o f words.
These ideas w ill find their ech oes in Illusion and R eality — in Caud
w ell's use o f the term "feeling tone," in his division o f the world and
our reactions to it into the world of art and the world of scien ce, and
also in his contention th at poetry, unlike scien ce, is non-cognitive and

Footnote continued from previous page.
not with a temporary change, such as luncheon or slumber w ill produce,from
which we inevitably work back to the status quo ante, but with a permanent
alteration o f our possibilities as responsive individuals in good or bad
adjustm ent to an all but overwhelm ing concourse o f stim ulations."
34
See also Richards' Poetry and Sciences, page 33: "The experience
its e lf, the tide o f im pulses sweeping through the mind, is the source
and the sanction o f the words. They represent this exp erien ce itself,
not any se t o f perceptions or reflection s,, though often to a reader who
approaches the poem wrongly they w ill seem to be only a series o f remarks
about other things. But to a suitable reader the words ... w ill reproduce
in his mind a sim ilar play o f in terests putting him for the while into
a sim ilar situation and leading to the sam e response."
35

Richards, Principles, page 178.
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a ffe c ts only an em otional, although perm anent, reorganization in man's
psyche.
While it is clear th at Richards had an im m ense influence on him,
Caudwell was far from u n critically accepting Richards' position. Richards'
brand o f m aterialism , Caudwell m aintained, was too m echanical and
led to formalism in the arts. Form alism , he says, upholds the view "that
when the d evices, technique and 'abstract' q u alities o f the art which
can be exam ined independently o f the artist have a ll been extracted
and reduced to theory, art w ill have been described in its own terms."

36

This leads to subjective co n cep ts, rules, e t c ., for art. Richards' view s
lead to what Caudwell ca lls "a phantom m aterialism " — thus "ultim ately
the a esth etic em otion is reduced to coen aesth esia and this in turn is
the excitation o f certain nerves."
been stim ulated by Richards,

38

37

Thus, w hile Caudwell may have

and indeed indebted to him for being

able to work out his own view s in fuller d etail, he was not simply a follow er
o f the older man, but radically transform ed th ese ideas into a dynamic
vision o f art as socially functional rather than, as in Richards, functioning
m erely to adjust the individual to his life situation.
In this chapter we have discussed the literary background in which
Caudwell's work first appeared as w ell as som e o f the major influences
which conditioned it, esp ecia lly the influence ex erted by I.A. Richards

36

Christopher Caudwell, Illusion and R eality, page 9.

37

Ibid., page 10. As Hawley n otes with referen ce to Richards, "A
poem becam e not a beautiful assertion, but a com plex structure o f nervous
stim uli whose e f f e c t was to organize one's im pulses in th e way m ost
e ffic ie n t and hence m ost satisfyin g way." Hawley, o£. c it., page 3.
38 Caudwell "without Richards ... might not have arrived, or a t least
would not have arrived so quickly" a t his own theory. Margolies, o£.
c it ., page 27.
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book The Principles o f Literary C riticism . We can now turn our atten tion
more sp ecifically to Illusion and R eality and give a fuller treatm en t
of Caudwell's view s on art and poetry.
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CHAPTER H
Caudwell's Theory in Illusion and R eality

Before outlining Caudwell's main ideas, as presented in Illusion
and R eality, a few preliminary remarks are in order regarding what
I take to be the minimum requirem ents for a Marxist philosophy o f art.
Since many o f the issues raised in this work are based, in one way or
another, on interpretations o f Caudwell which revolve about the seem 
ingly uninteresting question o f w hether or not his philosophy was "Marx
ist," it is appropriate to begin this chapter with the following observa
tions.
First, it is w ell known that neither Marx nor Engels consciously
worked out a philosophy o f art as part of their general worldview. N ever
th eless, they made particular judgments on art and their overall positions
on historical m aterialism (in conjunction with th ese judgments) have
been appealed to by their follow ers in order to support a esth etic theories
which were developed later within the co n tex t o f the Marxist worldview.
Second, based on the general notions o f historical m aterialism ,
the social co n tex t o f art takes on the m ost im portant a sp ect in any
Marxist a esth etics. That is to say, approaching art in a m aterialist
spirit, a Marxist philosophy o f art bases its e lf on the social, cultural,
and biological factors o f man's life as the foundation upon which art
arises. This, o f course, does not distinguish a Marxist approach from
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a m aterialist approach in gen eral. This further determ ination can be
made when we consider th e follow ing.
Third, the d ia le ctica l logic inspired by H egel, as developed by
Marx, and the notions o f struggle, contradiction, and the overcom ing
o f such at higher developm ental levels which still incorporate the basic
featu res o f the lower le v els are necessarily linked to the basic m aterialist
approach fundam ental to a Marxist a e sth e tic . In this w e find the main
d ifferen ce betw een traditional philosophical m aterialism and Marxist
historical m aterialism . Traditional m aterialism , while recognizing the
primacy o f m atter in m otion, tended to interpret the world in unchanging
m echanistic ca teg o ries. The m aterialist philosophers o f the French
Enlightenm ent, while disposing o f religious, spiritual and m ystical e x 
planations for the ev en ts o f the natural world, had no real theory o f
historical or natural change and developm ent. The m aterialist philosophy
developed by Marx and Engels on the other hand, by adapting the Hegelian
d ia lectic to m aterialistically inspired ca teg o ries o f explanation, was
able to provide a non-m echanistic explanation o f natural and historical
change, developm ent and progress. In this com bination o f m aterialist
philosophy and d ia le ctica l method can be found the d ifferen ce betw een
"materialism" and "historical m aterialism ."
The co rrect application, as w ell as understanding, o f this d ia lectica l
method is one o f the m ost vexing problem s in the history o f modern
philosophy. I do not intend to go into a ll o f the different interpretations
which have been given to Hegel's view s on this subject. I w ill, rather,
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briefly outline what I consider a useful way of looking a t the d ia lectic
as used by H egel and Marx and Engels and relate this to my claim that
Caudwell is a d ia lectica l thinker.
What happens when one m akes a m istake in philosophical reasoning?
One o f the m ost common occurrances is that we have been guilty of
over-generalization or have d ealt with our subject without su fficien t
knowledge which might have a ffe c te d the outcom e o f our reasoning.
It is the presence o f a contradiction in our reasoning which signals that
this faulty way o f reasoning has occurred. The function o f philosophy
is to deepen the analysis, make it less general, and overcom e the contra
diction while a t the sam e tim e preserving what is true and valuable
in the previous view . This method is then repeated on the new view s,
and on the view s that replace them and is continued as long as we can
— this is the Hegelian aufheben which means "to lift up," "to cancel"
and "to preserve." C ontradictions are not th erefore mutually exclusive
a fter all. "It is o f the g rea test im portance," H egel w rites, "to perceive
and to bear in mind this nature o f the r e fle c tiv e determ inations we
have just considered (i.e., p ositive and n egative, virtue and v ice, truth
and error, and one could add, illusion and reality^ nam ely, that their
truth consists only in their relation to one another; w ithout this know
ledge, not a single step can really be taken in philosophy." * Ivan Soil
in his book on Hegel's m etaphysics describes Hegel's method in the following

G.W.F. H egel, W issenschaft der Logik, translated by A.V. Miller as
Hegel's Science o f Logic (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. and
New York: Humanities Press, 1969), page 438.
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term s: "The d ia lectic preserves parts o f p u tatively opposed categories
as the necessary elem en ts (M omente) o f more co n crete categories.
But as necessary elem en ts o f a more co n crete category their mutually
exclu sive character is rem oved or negated. These ca teg o ries are both
preserved and negated — they are aufgehoben."

2

This method was taken over by Marx and Engels and applied to
the analysis o f history as w ell as to natural phenom ena. The d ifferen ce
in their m aterialist, as opposed to Hegelian application, is that, as Engels
points out, in the former th e d ia lectica l oppositions are derived from
the actual study of history and nature while in the latter they "are foisted
3
on nature and history as laws o f thought."
When it com es to Caudwell, we see his use o f d ia lectics throughout
all the major discussions o f Illusion and R ea lity . Indeed, as Margolies
points out, "Caudwell had to take a fully d ia le ctica l view o f literature,
seeing literature not as sta tic works but as a process. L iterature and
so ciety ex ist in a d ia lectica l unity and thus not only does social ex isten ce
n
determ ine literature, but literature also influences society."
But Caudwell uses d ia lectica l thinking in other realm s besides
literature. We shall see in the chapter on Freud and Marcuse how Caudwell

2

Ivan Soil, An Introduction to Hegel's M etaphysics (Chicago and London:
The University o f Chicago Press, 1969), page 139.
3
Frederick Engels, D ia lectics o f Nature (Moscow: Progress Publishers,
1972), page 62.

^ David N. Margolies, The Function o f L iterature: A Study of Christo
pher Caudwell's A esth etics (New York: International Publishers, 1969),
page 11.
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takes Freud's category of "the instincts" (the source o f man's free natural
existen ce) and contrasts it with th e category o f "the environment" (the
source o f the repression and crippling o f th e instincts) and derives the
higher category o f "civilization" which, Caudwell says, was evolved
"precisely to m oderate and lessen" the c o n flic t b etw een the other tw o
antagonistic conceptions.^
We should futher note that illusion and reality, which we crea te
and study by means o f art and scien ce are not for Caudwell absolutely
contradictory conceptions. It is true, he notes, that in many theories
th ese con cep ts "play contradictory" even if interm ingled roles but they
are really unified and r e fle c t d ifferen t (but equally important) asp ects
of our common world. "The genotype and the ex tern a l reality ex ist separ
a tely in theory, but it is an ab stract separation." Caudwell continues,
"The greater the separation, the greater the unconsciousness o f each."*’
The d ia lectica l method, as used by Caudwell, con sists in the refusal
to isolate the world into a system o f m utally exclu sive ca teg o ries. What
appears on one lev el o f analysis as contradictory or exclu sive is seen,
on a higher lev el o f analysis, to be com plem entary. We shall see him
use this method o f argum entation and discussion when he deals with
poetry, psychology, epistem ology, language, com m unism , and in virtually

5

Christopher Caudwell, Illusion and R eality: A Study o f the Sources
o f Poetry (New York: International Publishers, 1970), page 167.
^ Ibid., page 264. Caudwell's use o f the term 'genotype' w ill be clarified
in the sequel. For our purposes here we can think of it as the biological
foundation o f any organism which is both acted on and in turn a c ts on
its environm ent.
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every asp ect o f his philosophy. It is for this reason that I locate him
in the d ia lectica l tradition o f cla ssica l and contem porary Marxism.
Fourth, one last featu re seem s to me to be necessary for a Marxist
philosophy o f art. The fundam ental purpose, the raison d'etre o f Marxism
is to be the leading philosophy o f the workers' m ovem ent in the class
struggle to overthrow the econom ic system o f cap italism . Therefore,
a Marxist philosophy o f art m ust, as I d efine it, link up with the class
struggle, directly or indirectly, and, w hatever e lse it may seek to do
or explain, provide insights and guidance in that struggle.
These rather general observations should help us to keep our bear
ings when we deal w ith Caudwell's c ritics, esp ecia lly in the third and
seventh chapters.
Caudwell h im self is located in a tradition o f Marxist philosophers
which stem s from Plekhanov, Lenin and B u k h arin / The most important
o f th ese three, as far as sp ecific works devoted to the philosophy of
art is concerned, is Georgi Plekhanov (1856-1918). I propose, in the
following few pages, to outline som e o f Plekhanov's more important
ideas in the philosophy o f art, esp ecia lly as regards its origins and func
tions, as this w ill make Caudwell more in telligible (by prior fam iliarity
with certain Marxist a e sth e tic ca tegories). By comparing Caudwell

^ Cf. Maynard Solomon, Marxism and Art; Essays C lassic and C ontem 
porary (N.Y.: Vintage Books, 1974), page 310.
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with Plekhanov we w ill b etter appreciate Caudwell's originality and
g
contributions to the developm ent o f Marxist art theory.
Q
According to Maynard Solomon, only Franz Mehring (1846-1919)
preceded Plekhanov in the application o f historical m aterialism to the
problems o f the origins and functions o f art. Perhaps his m ost im portant
pronouncem ents are to be found in such works as Fundamental Problems
o f Marxism and Art and Social L ife, as w ell as the essay "The Role o f
the Individual in History." One o f Plekhanov's major th eses on art is
contained in this essay. This is the view , as expressed by Solomon, "that
art arises as a virtually arutom atic process from the m ovem ent o f his
to r y ." ^ In this essay Plenhanov h im self maintains that for any given
school, m ovem ent or "trend" in art to develop and be su ccessfu l it must
first represent the in terests o f som e cla ss or stratum in so ciety and
furtherm ore, the role o f th at class or statum w ill be the major determ inate
o f the the im portance or non-im portance o f the school, m ovem ent or
"trend" in question. Plekhanov w rites, "the depth of any given trend
in literature or art is determ ined by its im portance for the class or stra
tum whose ta ste s it expresses, and by the social role o f this class or

g

This presentation o f Plekhanov's philosophy is based on his "The Role
o f the Individual in History," Art and Social L ife, L etters w ithout Address,
and Solomon's observations in Marxism and Art, op. c it .
9

Solomon, o£. c it ., page 120.
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stratum , here again in the fin al analysis everything depends upon the
course of social developm ent and the relations o f so cia l fo rce s." ^
In his com m entary on Plekhanov's view s, Solomon further points
out that for Plekhanov the mode o f production in its historical develop
m ent crea tes, on the lev el o f the superstructure, many problems and
contradictions to which art addresses itse lf and a ttem p ts to resolve.
This view Solomon con trasts to that o f Marx for whom "art is a means
by which mankind sets tasks for itse lf to aid it in its progress toward
freedom ."

12

The con trast, however, d esp ite Solomon's stress upon it,

is illusory. The underlined "for its e lf" is not really an independent c a te 
gory o f human action as Solomon would su ggest. Mankind's settin g o f
tasks for itself is alw ays, for Marx, conditioned by th e h istorically spe
c ific environm ent - - th erefore th ese tasks, which mankind se ts for itse lf,
are the result o f both the historical process o f the mode o f production
and mankind's conscious in teractions with it. We have only to recall
the words o f Plekhanov quoted above — i.e ., "in th e final analysis every
thing depends upon the course o f so cia l developm ent and the relation
o f social forces" — to see that there is no fundam ental contradiction
betw een Marx and Plekhanov. That is to say, the tasks that mankind
sets itse lf as a result o f the conscious interaction with the mode of
production (Marx) and th ese tasks as revealed and r eflected in art based
on the relation betw een so cia l forces and so cia l developm ent (Plekhanov)

^

Ibid., page 127.

^

Ibid., page 121.

27

are the sam e. Thus the assumed contradiction betw een Plekhanov's
approach and that o f Marx is "sublated" — i.e ., shown to be but two
different asp ects o f a progressive d ia le ctica l unity. As for mankind's
*

"progress toward freedom ," this in its m ost fundam ental sense, for Marx,
boils down to mankind's greater and greater developm ental extension
of, as w ell as control over, the means o f production. We shall see this
notion further developed by Caudwell, esp ecia lly when we com e to trea t
o f his criticism s of Freudianism and the view that the free instincts
are repressed by the requirem ents o f the developm ent o f civilization .
We shall see that Caudwell's view an ticip ates som e o f those o f Marcuse,
esp ecially his (Marcuse's) ideas concerning "surplus repression."
Another important a sp ect o f Plekhanov's philosophy o f art is his
view that since history and so ciety c r e a te the problems which art a t 
tem pts to resolve, art is consequently itse lf a social phenomenon which
can be scien tifica lly studied — hence, as Solomon remarks, "Plekhanov
would prescribe nothing for art or the artist."

13

Solomon's judgment, if unqualifiedly accep ted , would actually
force me to classify Plekhanov's as a non-M arxist art theory since my
fourth qualification above, for a Marxist philosophy o f art, insists that
art explain and provide guidance to the class struggle. When Solomon
w rites that Plekhanov's "objective" approach to art "was repudiated
from the late 1920s onward by S oviet Marxists who ... attem p ted to

^

Ibid., page 122.
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n egate Plekhanov's so ciological laws by imposing the utilitarian view
upon"^ art, he is in danger of accep tin g a one sided interpretation o f
the import o f Plekhanov's view s. In Art and Social L ife, Plekhanov does
not, it is true, take sides b etw een tw o opposite view s on the nature
of art - - the "art for art's sake" view and the "utilitarian" view ~ i.e.,
the view that art must serve som e socially u seful purpose or function.
Instead, Plekhanov describes the type o f so cia l environm ent, historically
produced, which gives rise to one or the other View. In this sense, Plekhanov
has no in terest in "prescribing" anything to a rtists - - he is only interested
in delineating the types o f s o c ie tie s in which th ese two outlooks on the
nature o f art occur and predom inate. This is what Plekhanov concludes:
"The tendency o f a rtists and o f those who have a lively in terest
in art, toward art for art's sake, arises when they are in hopeless dis
accord with the so cia l environm ent in which they liv e."
"... the so-called utilitarian view o f art, that is to say, the inclin
ation to attribute works o f art the sign ificance o f judgement on the
phenomena of life, and its constant accom panim ent o f glad readiness
to participate in social struggles, arises and becom es stronger wherever
a mutual sympathy ex ists betw een the individuals more or less activ ely
interested in a rtistic creation and som e considerable part o f so c ie ty ."*'*
Now, if on the one hand Plekhanov would only describe and not
prescribe, neither would he be able to fau lt those who did prescribe

Ibid.
15 Ibid., pages 138-39.
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since the prescriptive utilitarian approach to art is just as much the
result of the sp ecific historical and so ciological factors o f a given so ciety
as the approach which esch ew s such prescription ~ as he him self pointed
out. R ecall above where Solomon says that for Plekhanov "art arises
as a virtually autom atic process from the m ovem ent o f history." We
have seen that this "autom atic process" takes tw o forms depending upon
the social forces a t play a t any given tim e ~ i.e ., the art for art's sake
and the utilitarian form. Plekhanov's works are to this day still published
in the Soviet Union and studied. I think Solomon may here have confused
what may be his own an ti-u tilitarian p reference with the idea that Plek
hanov too was, a fter all, prescribing and not just describing. What would
con stitu te a "repudiation" o f Plekhanov's view s would be a theory o f
art which denied that there w ere so cia l causes (or that there were d if
ferent social causes than those proposed by Plekhanov) for the art for
art's sake view as opposed to the utilitarian view . But Solomon makes
neither claim . He instead bases his view s on th e utilitarian theories
o f art that he finds developing in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and con
tinuing to this day. But this is not a "repudiation" o f Plekhanov, it is
the result o f the "autom atic process" o f historical developm ent. Thus
Solomon's notion that Plekhanov's view s w ere "repudiated" must be re
jected as unwarranted. A further consideration is the Plekhanov's "ob
jective" observations d elin eate m ovem ents and a ttitu d es and trends
within the philosophy o f art applied to his discussions o f nineteenth
century bourgeois culture. Both o f th e approaches to art which he de
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scribes w ere within the co n tex t of the analysis he made o f tendencies
within European nineteenth century civ iliza tio n , and refer, in fa c t, to
d ifferen t stages o f the developm ent o f that civ iliza tio n and to the re
lations betw een artists and in tellectu a ls on the one hand and the dominant
bourgeois p olitical and econ om ic structures and their functioning on
the other. It is problem atical that any conclusions regarding the "nega
tion" o f Plekhanov's view s, or the "objectivity" which he stressed, can
be drawn when the ca teg o ries o f Plekhanov's philosophy o f art are m ech
anically applied to a tw en tieth century working class s ta te in which
bourgeois social and econom ic relations have been eith er to ta lly abolished
or radically transform ed. In any ev en t, we shall se e th ese them es taken
up again in Illusion and R eality when Caudwell discusses the function
o f art in both its th eo retica l and applied senses.
I conclude, a t any rate, that my four criteria for a Marxist art
theory are broad enough to include Plekhanov as w ell as Caudwell.
N evertheless, I do not claim that my definition is the only possible one.
I do think it is applicable to so called "orthodox Marxism." We shall
see, in the next chapter, that the problem o f Marxist "orthodoxy" seri
ously exercised the first c r itic s o f Illusion and R ea lity . To many con
temporary philosophers with an in terest in Marxism this question of
"orthodoxy" — so cen tral to many o f the discussions o f thirty or forty
years ago — may seem today philosophically uninteresting. Escaping
from the whole concept o f "orthodoxy" or th at o f "unorthodoxy" is som e
tim es seen as a prerequisite for any new crea tiv e advance in Marxist
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a esth etics. Raymond W illiams, for one, in a recen t work has detailed
how he cam e to overcom e th e polarity of this distinction in his own
evolution as a thinker influenced by Marxism. He te lls us that in his
reading and study in the history o f Marxism and Marxist thought he
cam e to the opinion that th ere is more than one possible form ulation
o f Marxism.
According to W illiams, the Marxism with which we are most fam i
liar, Soviet Marxism, the so-called o ffic ia l form or orthodox version,
is based on the work o f Engels and Plekhanov as w ell as "hybridization
with a strong n ative radical populism ."^ Upon realizing that there
are altern ative form s o f Marxism, Williams was led to reevaluate many
o f th e w riters, and the positions held by them , that he had form erly
interpreted only in the light of so-called orthodox tradition. He singles
out Christopher Caudwell for sp ecial m ention, writing:
It is ch a ra cteristic that the argum ent about
Caudwell, which I had follow ed very carefully
in the late fo rties and early fiftie s , had centered
on the question ch a ra cteristic o f the sty le o f
that orthodox tradition: are his ideas Marxist
or not? It is a sty le that has persisted, in som e
corners, w ith confident assertions that this
or that is or is not a Marxist position. But now
that I knew more o f the history o f Marxism,
and o f the variety o f se le c tiv e and altern a tiv e
traditions within it, I could a t last g e t free of
the m odel which had been such an o b stacle,
whether in certain ty or in doubt: th e model
o f fixed and known Marxist positions, which
in general had only to be applied, and the co r-

^ Rayond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1977), page 3.
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responding dism issal o f a ll other kinds o f thinking
as non-M arxist, revisionist, neo-H egelian, or
bourgeois.
Much of Williams' ch aracterization o f the discussion o f Caudwell's
work is p erfectly true. In term s o f Williams' outlook, Caudwell him self
would have to be placed within the so-called "orthodox" tradition. The
early debate, however, over whether Caudwell was or was not a Marxist,
was not, I think, the dreary dogm atic ex ercise seem ingly suggested by
Williams. It was its e lf an exam ple o f the dynam ics o f Marxism, o f that
"central body of thinking seen as a ctiv e , developing, unfinished, and
persistently contentious."

18

Although the above words are used by Wil

liam s to characterize other traditions than the so-called "orthodox"
one, it w ill becom e apparent when we discuss the "Caudwell Debate"
th at they fully apply to the participants in this discussion — the vast
majority o f whom would be accounted so-called "orthodox" Marxists
in William's term s.
It is now tim e to turn to Caudwell h im self and the major ideas
o f Illusion and R eality — which "represents Caudwell's la test th eo retica l
developm ent."

19

A fter review ing Caudwell's ideas we w ill be in a b etter
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Ibid. An exam ple o f this is J.D . Bernal's com m ents in the "Caudwell
Debate" — i.e ., "... there is only too am ple evidence o f the truth o f
Cornforth's thesis, that their (i.e., Caudwell's) form ulations are those
o f contem porary bourgeois scien tific philosophy, Einsteinean - - Morganist
-- Freudian, and not those o f Marxism." "The Caudwell Debate," The
Modern Quarterly, Volume 6, number 4, 1951, page 340. We w ill return
to this them e later when discussing Cornforth's critique o f Caudwell.
^
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David N. Margolies, The Function o f Literature: A Study o f Christ
opher Caudwell's A esth etics (New York: International Publishers, 1969),
page 14.
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position to discuss some o f his cen tra l contentions, his relation to other
thinkers, and finally, his contribution to Marxist a esth etics.
According to Caudwell, man's so cia l consciousness is directly pro
portional to the interaction he has with his fellow men and with nature
— and this social consciousness is the main to o l by which associated
mankind attain s freedom : freedom being seen as a relation o f the degree
o f control over, rather than subjection to , the environm ent.
Caudwell sees the origin o f poetry as directly related to the way
in which associated men first struggled to se t th em selves upon the road
to freedom . He points out th at even the m ost prim itive group o f men
cannot rely on a purely instinctual life ~ such as w e find in anim als
-- but must cooperate togeth er in order to secure the survival o f the
group - - that is, the individual in stin cts o f th e members must be made
to flow together and to harm onize and be directed to group survival
— i.e ., to som e form o f econ om ic cooperation such as hunting, fishing,
or food gathering.
As one exam ple of to what he is refering, Caudwell points to the
role o f art (poetry, m usic, dance) in relation to the harvest festivals
o f prim itive so cieties. He says that the group festiv a l with its music,
verse, and dance functions to free and c o lle c tiv iz e the em otions o f the
group — to direct them towards the future harvest (or hunt). In this
way the prim itive is led to envision the not y et existing harvest (or game)
- - he is thrust into a world o f illusion which seem s, for a tim e, as real,
or even more real, than his everyday ex isten ce . In this way the social

goals o f the group are reinforced em otionally in every member, and
the festiv a l directly functions to help bring about the socially necessary
labor upon which the group is depending for its survival and reproduction.
For this reason, Caudwell b eliev es th at art is basically econom ic in
both its origin and function. Nor, he points out, does this econom ic
function or role of art occur only during the group or individual c e r e 
monials, rather the e f f e c t s are long lasting. The individual is socialized
by participation in the cerm onials o f the group - - i.e ., he is educated.
As so ciety develops, increasing its organization and sp ecialization ,
th e old co llectiv ity breaks down and class so ciety begins to d ifferen tiate
the artist from the rest o f the group. Formerly we had tribal poetry
— now w e have individual p oets. Art is divorced from the n itty-gritty
o f everyday econom ic concerns. The ep ic is replaced by the lyric. (While
Homer's poem s functioned as veritable encyclopedias of the Greek tradi
tion ~ o f the c o lle c tiv e life o f G reece, the lyric poets expressed a more
individual and solitary view o f their subject m atter.)
Further, Caudwell refers to poetry (and by extension art in general)
as "the nascent self-con sciou sn ess o f man" — a thoroughly Hegelian
notion — not individual self-con sciou sn ess, but group consciousness - what Marx in the Econom ic and Philosophical Manuscripts would call
an historically determ inate sp ecies-being consciousness.
What, Caudwell asks, is the con ten t o f prim itive or tribal poetry
(art) — i.e., what is it reflectin g , reinforcing, and in a sense, helping
to crea te as w ell? This con ten t is neither ob jectiv e m aterial reality,
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nor simply an ideal, a wish — it is so cia l reality, and poetry's function
is to direct the individual em otions o f each tribal member towards a
common goal (harvest or hunt). Caudwell also expresses this by saying
art's role is to d om esticate the in stin cts — i.e ., to so cia lize them and
adapt them to group values. Thus he concludes "the fantasy o f poetry
is a social image."

20

In this vein Caudwell also discusses the relationship of art to the
developm ent o f early m ythology and religion — he has the Greeks in
mind primarily, but I would maintain that, in general, his position covers
all cases o f sim ilar so cia l developm ent (China, India, Egypt, e tc .) Caud
w ell m aintains th at m ythology is in a sense "true" - - i.e ., it reflects
the "collective em otional life" o f the group

21

and gives meaning to

the world as it can best be understood from the le v el o f interaction
betw een man and his environm ent that has thus far developed. Mythology
is the product o f undifferentiated tribal consciousness — as, long as it
lives and grows it r e fle c ts a unified group consciousness in relation to
th e world. It dies with th e com ing o f dogma and "true" religion — which,
according to Caudwell, represents the beginning o f class divisions. Whereas

20
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m ythology reflects the so cia l reality o f the group, religion r eflects only
part o f the group — the so cia l reality o f the nascent ruling class. Thought,
which was originally united with p ractice has now becom e separated
from it.
Caudwell holds th at originally thought separated itse lf from prac
tic e so as to be a "guide to action" but gradually the group whose function
was to guide (supervisors o f early irrigation projects in the Near East
and elsew here, coordinators o f hunting p ractices and m agical rites a s
sociated with them , e tc .) becam e dominant in the so ciety . Fellow work
ers with specialized functions ended up as exp loiters and rulers. The
new ruling class uses thought now to justify its domination - - it no longer
r e fle c ts the united tribal consciousness o f a socially undifferentiated
group. The phenomenon o f "two cultures," as it w ere, develops. The
o ffic ia l or higher culture representing the ruling circles, and the func
tionaries directly dependent upon them , and folk culture, or common
culture, which represents everyone e lse ~ this is the origin o f our dis
tinction betw een highbrow and lowbrow culture.
Caudwell m aintains that R eligion is a direct method o f class domin
ation (i.e., o fficia l or orthodox "true" religion) which even the ruling
class itse lf gradually com es to disb elieve because o f its "openly exp loi
ta tiv e character" - - thus a hardening o f the religious line, conjoined
to ruling class scep ticism , leads to an outpouring o f crea tiv e a ctiv ity
in the arts, for it is here that the free consciousness o f the ruling class
finds self-expression. Caudwell also m aintains that as the ruling class
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d eleg a tes more and more o f its supervisory functions to overseers, as
it becom es more rem ote its e lf from actu al co n ta cts with the means
o f social production, it no longer really understands so ciety and m echani
cally reproduces the a rtistic form ulae o f a bygone era when it was itse lf
growing and developing and directly involved with the crea tiv e econom ic
life o f its so ciety —the ruling class "is no longer truly conscious o f real22
ity "
thus its art perishes in form alism and conventions. Examples

o f what Caudwell has in mind, that is of m echanical reproduction of
past a rtistic forms by a faltering ruling cla ss, would be the copying
o f Greek art by the Roman ruling class during its decline or the court
art o f France before the revolution o f 1789. If we view "formalism
and conventions" as a kind o f ap ologetics for the status quo, then we
can ca ll upon Lukacs to support Caudwell's con ten tion s. Lukacs w rites,
"After the revolutions o f 1848, the dune rising and esp ecia lly the Paris
Commune, the ideology o f the European bourgeoisie entered upon a
period o f ap ologetics ... All in itia tiv e, independence and heroism disappeared
for a long tim e from the w estern European bourgeois world. The w riters
who attem pted to depict th e world in a spirit o f opposition, could depict
only the contem ptible baseness o f their own so cia l surroundings and
thus the reality which they mirrored drove them into the narrow triviality
o f naturalism ... If they attem p ted to d epict greatness the result was

22

Caudwell, o£. c it., page 43.
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an increasingly em pty, ab stractly Utopian, in the w orst sense rom antic
picture."

23

When this situation has developed — m erely form al art and rigidity
in religious dogma — a new class or so cia l group may challenge it for
authority - - culturally this is indicated by the growth o f h eresies, which
can either represent reactionary forces wishing a return to the past,
or genuine progressive fo rces representing the future ruling class. N ever
th eless, in a ll th ese changes Caudwell m aintains that the role and function
o f poetry (art) remains th e sam e — i.e ., to adapt the in stin cts to the
c o llectiv e so cia l needs o f the group, primarily econom ic or survival
needs.
Having d ealt with the origins o f art (poetry) and its function in
prim itive so ciety , Caudwell turns his a tten tion to the developm ent o f
modern poetry. "Modern poetry is ca p ita list poetry."

24

Why, he asks,

are Shakespeare, Galileo, M ichelangelo, Pope, Goethe and Voltaire co m 
parable to Valery, C ezanne, Joyce, Bergson and Einstein (in the sense
o f seem ing "modern") while Homer, Thales, Chaucer and Beowulf seem
rem ote and foreign to us? Caudwell b eliev es it is due to the fa ct that
the underlying econom ic base o f developing capitalism which the first
group represents - - the bourgeois foundation — is reflected in their
art. These artists are spokesm en o f their tim es, tim es when the feudal
w orld-view was under a tta ck due to the rising power of a new econom ic
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class whose values and world outlook are reflected by th ese artists,
and to the ex ten t that our contem porary culture still rests on this bourgeois foundation we can id en tify with th ese a rtistic products.

25

Recalling the so cia l function o f art already discussed, Caudwell
points out, again, that in cla ss so ciety art has separated itse lf from
religion "as the art o f a ruling class" and tends to be con servative, "acade
mic" and conventional. We se e , for instance, long periods o f tim e, com 
prising decades, som etim es cen tu ries, in which basic a rtistic representa
tional techniques remain unchanged (having minor tech n ical im prove
ments) such as the periods o f Egyptian, Indian, and Chinese art, the
classica l canon of G reece and Rom e, M edieval and Buyzantine art -y et
the art o f our own period is con stantly changing, developing, and seem 
ingly progressing — new and radical schools o f art flourish, peak, decline,
and make way for new schools and exp erim ental m ethods. How can
this be reconciled with Caudwell's th eses?
In order to answer this question, Caudwell inform s us that we
must grasp the "basic contradiction o f bourgeois society" — only then
can we understand "the w hole m ovem ent which secures the developm ent
o f ca p italist culture."

26

What is this basic contradiction? Caudwell

b elieves it to be the bourgeois con cep t o f freedom — th e basic bourgeois
illusion. Since feudalism determ ined the relations o f man to man by
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basically hereditary and restrictiv e m eans, the bourgeois con cep t o f
freedom developed as a counter-thrust — th e absence o f "directly coer
civ e relations" based on birth. The feudal notion was replaced by the
idea o f the nobility or aristocracy o f m erit (3efferson) rather than birth
--th is concept forms one o f the foundations o f the bourgeois concept
o f freedom . Every man is free and the foundation o f this freedom rests
on the right o f every man to own private property and to dispose of
his own life as he w ishes. If he lacks property he may freely dispose
o f his ability to work by hiring h im self out to those who do have property,
and if he be frugal and th rifty and honest he can accum ulate his savings
and eventually acquire property o f his own. The bourgeois sta te appears
as a m ediating agency over and above so ciety and functions as a referee
betw een the various com ponent parts o f the population. The basic con tra
diction is, then, that "seen from th e view point o f the bourgeois, bourgeois
society is a free so ciety whose freedom is due to its individualism, to
its com pletely free market and its absence o f d irect social relations,
o f which absence the free market is th e cause and expression. But to
the rest o f so ciety bourgeois so ciety is a co erciv e so ciety whose individualism and free market is the method o f coercion."

27

The worker

must enter the cap italist's market or starve.
Caudwell also points out that the basic precondition for capitalism 's
advancem ent is its constantly revolutionizing its means o f production
and the concom itant com p etition b etw een ca p ita lists. As capitalism
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develops the alternating cy c le s of boom and bust a f f e c t more and more
people and erode the econom ic foundations o f modern so ciety . Small
and medium business, and som etim es even giant corporations, fa il and
are elim inated from the scen e. The growth o f m onopolies also takes
its to ll on sm all and medium establishm ents. Modern art, as a product
o f this constantly changing so ciety , is not an exception to the general
rule expressed earlier. Modern art is not con servative and conventional
precisely because the bourgeois mode o f production is also non-conser
vative and non-conventional. The bourgeois falls v ictim to his own system
— the "free" market can elim in ate him and his business — his illusion
o f freedom w ill not save him from the ex ig en cies o f the real econom ic
functionings o f his m arket. In addition, the feelin g o f p etty bourgeois
pow erlessness is likew ise expressed in modern literature — an exam ple
is Kafka. "The bourgeois is alw ays talking about liberty because it is
alw ays slipping from his grasp."

28

The bourgeois looks upon freedom as the absence o f feudal restric
tions — dem ocratic freedom evolved h istorically out o f the anti-feudal
struggle. But the fa c t th at econom ic life runs wild and g ets out o f con
trol, destroying the bourgeois as w ell as the worker, is one o f the great
contradictions o f the bourgeois idea o f freedom — in reality he is unfree,
in theory free. Caudwell w rites, "The freedom o f so ciety as a whole

^

Ibid. page 61.
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con sists in its econom ic products. These represent the freedom man
has won in his struggle with Nature."

29

But this is only the form al condi

tion for the developm ent o f freedom . Freedom from natural n ecessity
(want) is the sine qua non for the developm ent of spiritual freedom .
In so far as the bourgeois econom y is expanding and developing man's
freedom from nature is growing — unfortunately this freedom gravitates
to th e pole o f the bourgeois leaving more and more unfreedom in so ciety
as a whole. "Thus," Caudwell concludes, "the bourgeois illusion regarding
freedom , which counterposes freedom and individualism to determ inism
and so ciety , overlooks th e fa c t th at so ciety is the instrum ent whereby
man, the unfree individual, in association realizes his freedom and that
the conditions o f such association are the conditions o f freedom."

30

Caudwell contends th at poetry (as art in general) in the bourgeois
period functions to strengthen those em otional a ttitu d es which reinforce
and have survival value in bourgeois so ciety . It is only because o f the
infinitely greater degree o f organizational com p lexity associated with
modern so ciety that d ifferen t and contradictory a rtistic m ovem ents
clash and contend, appealing as they do to d ifferen t cla sses and strata
within modern so ciety . The function o f poetry (art) in any age is, accord
ing to Caudwell, to adapt the in stin cts to the type o f social situation
men find th em selves in or are in th e a c t o f creatin g. Caudwell w rites,
near the conclusion o f his chapter on the developm ent o f modern poetry:

29
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"The bourgeois sees man's in stin cts — his 'heart,' source o f his desires
and aim s -- as the source o f his freedom . This is fa lse in as much as
the instincts unadapted are blind and unfree. But when adapted by the
relations o f so ciety they g iv e rise to em otions, and the adaptations of
which the em otions are the expression and mirror, are the means whereby
the instinctive energy o f man is diverted to drive the machine o f society:
the machine o f so ciety , revolving, enables man to fa ce nature and strug
gle with her, not as individual in stin ctive man but as associated , adapted
men. Thus the instincts drive on the m ovem ent which secures man's
freedom ."^
In his chapter "The World and the 'I'", Caudwell gives his view s
on the relations betw een art and scien ce in man's struggle with the e x te r 
nal world. Caudwell se e s the origin o f one o f philosophy's m ost ancient
problems - - the su bject-object relation — in man's m aterial struggle
to overcom e nature — i.e ., to harness nature and make nature work
for man. Caudwell believed that the cla ssic a l philosophical split betw een
the subject and the ob ject was due to the developm ent o f class so ciety
whereby the id eological and philosophical thinkers b ecam e, as members
o f the ruling class, isolated and rem oved from the laborers and toilers.
The modern history o f philosophy from D escartes through Kant and
Hegel to Marx is an a ttem p t to overcom e the su bject-object opposition.
Two ways in which this reconciliation can be e ffe c te d are by scien ce
and art. Art is an a ttem p t to ach ieve freedom in the world o f feelings
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and em otions, scien ce is that sam e a ttem p t in the world o f sense percep
tions - - i.e., tw o m ethods, one adapted to our inner, the other to our
outer reality. But in order to understand how th ese adaptations occur
we must turn out atten tion briefly to language and the function o f the
"word." Words, according to Caudwell, "are tied to percepts which are
photographic m em ory-im ages o f bits o f reality."
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The percepts are

further conjoined to cre a te con cep ts, language, and the possibility o f
com m unication betw een men. All this allow s men to share a common
world which is a sine qua non for non-instinctual cooperation. For men
to be able to work togeth er, Caudwell te lls us, they must have a common
changeable perceptual reality ("and by changeable I mean changeable
by their actions"
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). The world created by language and the word gives

us what Caudwell ca lls th e Common Perceptual World. Besides the
common perceptual world there is another, hidden world — this is the
world o f the ego, o f em otions — o f what Caudwell ca lls "feeling tones."
Feeling tones are the basis o f "the Common A ffe c tiv e World" just as
the "word" is the basis o f the com m on perceptual one. Caudwell maintains
th at cooperation and the associated life o f men in groups, interacting
with and working upon nature, brings about the ex isten ce o f a special
ego or mind so that individuals share feelin g tones just as they share
the meanings o f words.
We have, th erefore, tw o worlds — th e world of scien ce and the
world o f art. S cience has created what Caudwell ca lls a "Mock Ego"

Ibid., page 145.

— i.e ., a sort o f universal observer who could crea te and verify a ll the
laws o f chem istry, physics, e tc ., — th e "any right thinking person" to
whom the scien tist could appeal for verification o f his procedures.
Parallel to the "Mock Ego" o f scien ce we find an equivalent for the
world o f art to which feelin g tones and em otions can be attributed.
3ust as the Mock Ego o f scien ce tries to understand and integrate the
laws governing ob jective extern al reality, so the mock world o f art tires
to integrate the feelin g ton es and em otions o f associated men. They
both have a sim ilar function in doing this. They both arise from the
social interaction o f men and they both strive to ach ieve freedom for
men ~ for it is "freedom that man seeks in his struggle with Nature"

3^

— freedom from want (food, sh elter, e tc .) as w ell as the positive freedom s
leading to individual developm ent and expression. And this freedom
is the result o f hard labor — "science and art are guides to action."
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It is im portant to note that while scien ce gives man more control over
nature (external reality) "the other world o f art, o f organized em otion
attach ed to exp erience, the world o f the so cia l ego that endures all
and enjoys all and by its exp erien ce organizes all, makes available for
the individual a whole universe o f inner freedom and desire."
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One

o f the ways art accom plishes this in man is by changing "the em otional
con ten t o f his consciousness so that he can react more subtly and deeply

to the world."
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Finally, Caudwell declares: "Art is the consciousness

o f the necessity of the instincts."

3&

With referen ce to the social role o f art, we can see a solution
to the problem raised in our earlier discussion o f Plekhanov and his "ob
jective" approach to the understanding o f art. The problem we dealt
with concerned the "utilitarian" view o f art and whether or not it was
a violation o f Plekhanov's ob jective so ciological approach to give art
a utilitarian function. Caudwell's approach provides a solution. Art
and scien ce are tw o asp ects o f the sam e process by which associated
men try to com e to grips with their world. R ecall, above, that they
are both "guides to action." Thus scien ce and art have the sam e "utili
tarian" function which we arrive a t by means o f an ob jective sociological
study o f the nature o f th ese tw o modes o f human a ctiv ity . If, however,
"utilitarian" is confused with "propagandistic" functioning then it is
important to note that art is not propaganda —or a t lea st, Caudwell
remarks, no more so than scien ce. Both scien ce and art have a far more
important function than m ere propaganda —they must actu ally strive
to change the minds o f men, to assist in the b a ttle with the blind forces
o f n ecessity which we a sso cia te with the concept "Nature."
Caudwell further develops the con trasts betw een art and scien ce
in his chapter "The Psyche and Phantasy." He credits Freud with in itia t
ing a scien tific approach to the study o f phantasy, but com m ents that

the failure to have a com prehensive world view in which to integrate
the em pirical findings of the early Freud has led both Freud and his
follow ers to generate more confusion that clarity in the subsequent
discussions o f man's psychic make-up. A ctually, as Caudwell points
out, Freud has only rediscovered in the field o f psychology con cep ts
as old as philosophy its e lf — e.g ., the su bject-object split, contradictions
betw een mind and m atter, freedom and determ inism , e t c . These an cient
problems reappear in Freud as the contradictions generated betw een
the pleasure and reality principles, the in stin cts o f life and death, and
the ego and libido. Caudwell goes on to mount an intense criticism
o f what he regards as "... Freud's bourgeois approach to psychology."
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He traces back Freud's idea that the libido is the origin and source of
our "true psychic" reality and that its freedom is impaired by the restriction s
placed upon it by our physical and social environm ent. Clearly referring
to Freud's basic prem ises, Caudwell w rites: "the bourgeois philosopher
is unable to rise above the standpoint of the individual in civ il so ciety .
All a ctiv ity is the product o f the freew ill and dynamic urge o f the individual
as it em erges im m ediately in its own consciousness grappling direct
with nature. Since its in stin ctive cen ter is the source o f its freedom
any restrictions placed on it by so cia l relations cripple and distort its
range o f action."^® Herbert Marcuse has also remarked that for Freud

"if absence from repression is the archetype o f freedom , then civilization
is the struggle against this freedom."
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Caudwell, o f course, considers this view to be diam etrically opposed
to the truth. In so far as Freud's psychology is adequately characterized
by this conception, it perverts the truth about man's psyche and fails
to explain how man's instinctual life can actually attain to freedom .
Freedom, as Caudwell never tires o f reminding us, is achieved through
man's association "which makes it possible for him to acquire m astery
over Nature through becom ing a ctiv ely conscious o f its n ecessity and
his own. This association o f its e lf necessarily im poses certain restric
tions, conventions, and obligations, such as those o f behavior, language,
and mutual aid. But a ll th ese things are not fe tte r s on the free instincts
(libido); they are the instrum ents by which in stin ctive man realizes his
freedom."
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This further leads Caudwell to remark: "The construction

o f consciousness is the socialisin g o f the psyche."
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Now, Caudwell

grants that man has an "invariant psychic genotype" but he insists that
man's consciousness, a product o f the genotype's struggle with nature
in association with others, being h istorically conditioned can only be
understood if the laws o f h istorical developm ent are taken into considera
tion. Since, according to Caudwell, Freud leaves th ese laws out o f con -
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Freud (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), page 14.
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sideration, he is precluded from achieving a scien tific understanding
o f the origins o f neurotic co n flicts. If Freud's insights were adapted
to a consideration o f the en tire so cia l environm ent ~ not just fam ily
co n flicts, a conservative education, e tc ., - - then they would have a
revolutionary p otential. (See Chapter VI on Freud and Marcuse for a
further developm ent o f this them e.) The neurotic co n flicts o f modern
man, the cries o f alienation and m eaninglessness which are sym ptom atic
o f our contem porary Western industrial civ iliza tio n are the products
o f an incom plete integration b etw een the so cia l forces controlling our
society and the psychic reflectio n o f th at so ciety . Caudwell credits
this developm ent to the fa c t that w e live in a class so ciety where the
now useless and unproductive ruling bourgeoisie lim it the further free
developm ent o f the m asses o f people ~ where, as Caudwell em phasizes,
th e production relations are hindering man's possibilities o f attaining
freedom . But all this does not suggest, as Freud would have it, that
civilization is the cause o f a ll this distress - - rather, it only points out
th at new social arrangem ents m ust be generated which w ill correspond
to the new social rea lities. The human problem s associated with the
decay o f feudalism w ere allev ia ted by the overthrow o f that moribund
system and the establishm ent o f bourgeois so ciety - - not by overthrowing
"civilization" itse lf. Likew ise, th e problems o f today are not problems
o f "civilization" but o f a moribund dysfunctional bourgeois so ciety .
Its overthrow and replacem ent by socialism w ill bring about the solution
to th ese problems.
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Caudwell further a ccu ses Freud and other psychoanalysts 3ung,
Adler) o f being philosophical idealists and resem bling, in their outlooks,
the world's major religions rather than scien ce. He bases this judgment
on his analogy betw een sin (as seen by the religious) and com plexes (as
seen by psychoanalysts) — both con cep ts, according to Caudwell, empha
size the subjective cause o f misery and unhappiness and look to an inner
struggle o f the w ill rather than the transform ation o f extern al reality
as the prime method for achieving a resolution o f the co n flicts the a t
tem pted understanding o f which has resulted in the developm ent o f
th ese con cep ts. Caudwell is particularly upset with Freud's dism issal
o f art as childish and esca p ist, but sees this view as a necessary con 
sequence o f the psychoanalytic focus on the isolated individual and his
struggle with reality. The isolated individual tends to use art as an
escap e mechanism - - "it is this which makes Freudians trea t art, one
o f the instrum ents o f man's freedom , as som ething childish and escap ist
in tendency. They do not see that the human co n flict b etw een man
and Nature (of which the neurotic co n flict is only a sp ecial form) drives
men to free association, and that art is a n ecessity o f this association,
the means whereby it rem ains free, and because it is free reaches heights
and depths inaccessible to a coerced association."

This prem ise pre

vents Freud and his follow ers from seeing one o f the true functions
o f art -- i.e., to reinforce man in his free association s with others so
that a co lle c tiv e resolution o f the problems arising from the struggle

UU

Ibid., page 169.
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to dom inate nature can ev en tu a te. The g rea test to o l y e t devised by
man in this co llectiv e struggle is language. It is language "which makes
us capable o f appreciating truth and beauty: for truth is a relation betw een
a perception o f reality and the common perceptual world, and beauty
is a relation betw een a feelin g tone o f reality and the common ego."

^5

Art and scien ce are th e products o f man's a c tiv e struggle against
nature. Art represents man's struggle to so cia lize his instincts and to
be free from their blind operation. Caudwell se e s both scien ce and
art originating in, and then freeing th em selves from , religion — once
they have independently established th em selves, "religion no longer
plays a useful ro le ." ^ At the end o f the chapter Caudwell returns to
the function o f language. The function o f language is to allow man
to com m unciate a coherent world view based on com m on exp eriences
which allow for continual change, and associated response to this change,
in the world. Caudwell c r itic iz e s W ittgenstein's idea o f a "perfect"
language. Such a language would only mirror the world as it is, it would
not, according to Caudwell, have any use a t all. It would not be able
to express the feelings and em otional undercurrents o f associated men
in their inter-com m unication. W ittgenstein's language would be a dead
lifeless parody o f the original and continuing function o f language.
Caudwell ends his chapter on psyche and phantasy with th ese words:
"It is not plain that the error o f the philosophers regarding language

Ibid, page 171.
Ibid., page 192.
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springs from the sam e source as religion — the clea v a g e o f the subject
from object in a class so ciety ? Then thought com es to seem m erely
contem plation and is cu t o ff from the very a ctiv ity which crea tes, develops
and expresses it. Language and the phantasy which has generated it,
and the conscious psyche which is their off-spring, and the men whose
struggle with Nature in association , has created all three, are bound
together with a relation which MARX was the first to express in those
hastily scribbled eleven Theses on Feuerbach th at marked the beginning
o f a new era in human thought: 'the philosophers have only interpreted
the world in various ways; the point, how ever, is to change it.'"
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The function o f poetry is even more ex p licitly discussed in Caudwell's chapter "Poetry's Dream Work." The tw o conditions that a work
o f art must fu lfill if it is to live up to its function o f integrating the
individual ego into the so cial ego are 1) th at the work must be important
in dealing with the cru cial problems o f its age as sign ificant em otional
attitu d es, and 2) the work must be general - - i.e ., the average individual
must be able to relate his inchoate em otion al a ttitu d es to it in such
a way that it helps him to organize them in a way b en eficia l to his par
ticipation in, or understanding o f, the so cia l ego. Because o f these two
conditions, Caudwell thinks that only a m aterialist outlook w ill enable
us to com e to an understanding o f art - - i.e ., the understanding o f the
connection betw een the so cia l relations and their influences upon works
o f art. He w rites that "art lives in the so cia l world and can only be

^

Ibid., pages 196-97.
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o f value in integrating ex p erien ces general to men, it is plain that the
art o f any age can only express the general exp erien ces o f men in that
age."**8
N evertheless, Caudwell points out, art is subjective and linked
to the sources o f our em otional self-aw aren ess. This source he designates
as the "genotype." Thus, he w rites, "art cannot escap e its clo se relation
with the genotype whose secre t desire link in one endless series o f all
hQ
human culture."
He view s this genotype under tw o headings — the
"timeless" and the "timeful" one or, if you prefer, universal and particular.
The universal asp ect of the genotype leads to the follow ing com m ent:
"...on the whole the genotype is substantially constant in a ll so cieties
and all men. There is a substratum o f likeness. Man does not change
from Athenian to A ncient Briton and then to Londoner by innate d ifferen ces
stam ped in by natural selectio n , but by acquired changes derived form
social evolution.""^ Under the other a sp ect, however, w e see the tim efu l
or individual — i.e ., Caudwell holds th at individual d ifferen ces appear
within the basic universal genotype due to a g en etic "shuffle." Thus
individual d ifferen ces arise, personalities, ch aracters, e tc . On the basis
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Ibid., page 203. "For an account o f its nature, a t once m aterial
and individual, the work o f art issues essen tia lly from particular condi
tions o f the most varied sort, am ongst them esp ecia lly th e tim e and
place o f its origin, then the sp ecific individuality o f the artist, and above
all the tech n ical developm ent o f his art." H egel, op. c it., page 34.
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54

o f these observations, Caudwell m aintains th at poetry represents the
universal while the novel represents the individual a sp ect of the genotype.
But it is poetry, rather than th e novel, which is Caudwell's main
concern. Poetry helps us to adapt to the ob jectiv e world which surrounds
us. He calls it "an em otion al a ttitu d e towards the w orld ."^ Because
it adapts our em otions to extern al reality it "enriches" th at reality.
For exam ple, the poet gives em otional sign ificance to the con ten ts o f
the world - - to a part o f ex tern a l reality. "In life this p iece of external
reality is devoid o f em otion al tone, but described in those particular
words, and no others, it suddenly and m agically shim m ers with a ffe c tiv e
colouring. This a ffe c tiv e colouring represents an em otional organization
similar to that which the p oet h im self faced (in phantasy or actuality)
with that p iece o f external reality."
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Poetry develops with the developm ent o f so ciety and new poets
arise from whom we demand a new em otion al attitu d e towards out changing
and developing social reality. Great poem s, Caudwell m aintains, are
those which gather up the g rea te st am ounts o f the new so cia l realities
and place the proper em otion al responses upon them . Thus he thinks
great poems must necessarily be long ones (to cover the grea test amount
o f new content and em otion al response). But, it is im portant to note,
the purpose o f the poem is not to display its co n ten t but the em otional

^
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Ibid., page 214.

Ibid. "A poem's con ten t is not just em otion, it is organized em otion,
an organized em otional a ttitu d e to a p iece o f extern al reality." Ibid.,
page 216.
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or attitudinal structure which the poem organizes and directs towards
th at se lf sam e con ten t. P oetry is just as essen tia l as scien ce in man's
attem p t to dom inate nature and make for h im self a human world in
which to live. Poetry is th e weapon o f the genotype in its ongoing struggle
to subdue nature — "to mold n ecessity to its own likeness."
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Finally,

Caudwell suggests that poetry is esp ecia lly im portant for m aterialists
in so far as man and his longings can be easily overlooked in the scien tific
descriptions o f the world in which everything is u ltim ately reduced to
atom s, w aves, energy p articles, e tc . "Poetry," Caudwell affirm s, "restores
life and value to m atter, and puts back the genotype into the world
from which it was banished."
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Caudwell further con trasts the artist and the scien tist with the
schizophrenic. The growth o f cla ss so ciety , according to Caudwell,
is responsible for the sp lit in man's psyche betw een "thinking and being"
or "theory and practice," for the diremption betw een "social consciousness
and real life experience." Caught betw een th ese two extrem es and
their disparity the schizophrenic simply retreats into a private world
o f illusion whereas the scien tist and the artist attack the contradiction
a t hand and attem p t to in tegrate it into a public, so cia l response that
can be used by the com m unity.
My life experien ces o ften co n flict with my desires and my wants
- - it is the job o f both art and scien ce to overcom e th ese contradictions

^

Ibid., page 218.
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— either by changing the world (scien ce) or by changing m yself (art).
These two asp ects are of course interrelated and reciprocally interacting
— or d ialectically interpenetrating. Caudwell expresses this relationship
in the following manner: "... the method o f art is the method o f scien ce
turned inside out ... One changes him self in order to change outer reality;
the other changes outer reality in order to change him self ... Operating
with existing consciousness, men change reality to new forms. Operating
with existing forms, men change consciousness."
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Caudwell now once again turns his atten tion to the function o f
art. Art crea tes in us certain em otions. This leads Caudwell to ask
"... if poetry's em otional a ttitu d es pass, what is their value? It is this:
experience leaves behind it a trace in the memory. It is stored by the
organism and m odifies its action."'5*’ Science and art are again compared.
In the sam e way th at a scien tist in the laboratory sets up certain ideal
conditions (or projects certain em pirical data under ideal conditions
to arrive a t abstract general laws) so the artist concerns him self with
"affective experim enting with selec ted p ieces o f external reality" -this
ideal or a rtificia l world Caudwell, as w e know, ca lls the "Mock World."
"Here," Caudwell concludes, "science and art togeth er are able
to sym bolise a com p lete universe which includes the genotype itself.
Each alone is partial, but the tw o halves togeth er make a whole, not

^

Ibid., page 236.

56 Ibid., page 267.
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fitted together, but as they in terpenetrate man's struggle with Nature
in the process o f co n crete living."
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Caudwell's major propositions are, th erefore, the following:
1.

Art's origin and function is basically econom ic in so far

as it serves to so cia lize the human in stin cts in the direction o f c o llectiv e
behavior oriented towards the production o f food and the social reporduction
o f the group.
2.

As class so ciety develops, so-called o ffic ia l or "high" art

begins to reflect the in terests o f the ruling cla ss while folk art and folk
culture reflect the consciousness o f the m asses o f people.
3.

In present day ca p italist so ciety the in terests o f the ruling

class are fostered by the illusion o f freedom ~ i.e ., that an individual
is more or less free depending on whether or not he is subjected to more
or less social constraints. Freedom , how ever, is really attained through
association with others. Econom ic developm ent (and the constraints
needed to attain it) is the true m easure o f freedom .
4.

Art and scien ce are com plim entary ways by which we attem p t

to realize freedom — the former is directed to the world o f em otions
and feelings, the latter to the world o f sense perceptions. We thus arrive
at his conceptions o f the Common A ffe c tiv e World and the Common
Perceptual World.
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Ibid., page 269. I do not intend to discuss Caudwell's last chapter
— "The Future o f Poetry" - - which deals with discussions on the relations
betw een petty bourgeois in tellectu a ls, w riters, e tc ., and the proletariat.
All the major th eoretical points o f his system have already been covered.
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5.

Freud's a ttem p t to e le v a te the in stin cts to the position

of the sources o f human freedom is fundam entaliy misguided (see Chapter
VI).
6.

Poetry develops with so ciety and we demand from new

p oets a new em otional a ttitu d e to our changing so ciety (see Chapter
IV).
7.

Finally, the memory tra ces le ft behind in the mind o f the

em otional experience created by poetry (or any art) m odifies the future
behavior of a person. This explains, in part, how art can accom plish
the task se t for it in proposition six above.
In Caudwell w e have the first attem p t to cre a te a com p lete theory
o f poetry based on Marxism.
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He was the first Marxist to point out

that fantasy plays a major role in bringing about causal changes in both
human consciousness and history, and that through fantasy art changes
the world by means of individual works o f art whose production, by fo rc
ing into consciousness previously unarticulated and m ute feelin gs, changes
both the artist and the audience. These insights o f Caudwell helped
him to explain the enduring appeal o f the great art o f the past which
persists because it expresses, in addition to its h istorically sp ecific em o
tional articulations, certain basic and common genotypic featu res which
are universal in the human sp ecies. This answer to the problem o f how
the art o f one era could appeal to people in another era based on a d ifferen t
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The following remarks are based on Solomon, o£. c it ., pages 305308.

59

econom ic and class system (a problem raised by Marx in the introduction
to his Critique o f P o litica l Economy) was another o f Caudwell's contribu
tions to the philosophy o f Marxism.
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CHAPTER in
The C ritical Response to Illusion and R eality

A fter the appearance o f Illusion and R eality in 1937, it was given
b rief and very favorable review s in the le ft press. It was read then
seem ingly forgotten, as was so much o f English le ft literature o f the
1930's, in the m aelstrom o f World War II. Caudwell, however, had made
an impression. Well a fter the war was over, for exam ple, C. Day Lewis
— no longer a com m unist and w ell on his way to the poet laureateship,
singled out Caudwell for an appreciation in his Clark L ectures given
in 1946 a t Cambridge and published the follow ing year as The P oetic
Image.
Day Lewis, in fa ct, grants one o f Caudwell's principal contentions
- - that the function o f poetry, esp ecia lly prim itive poetry, is to edu cate
the instincts. N everth eless, he points out that modern man and prim itive
man live in qualitatively d ifferen t so cia l environm ents - - the close rela
tionship betw een in stin ct, p o etic im age, and human a c t is no longer
as obvious today as in the past.*

C. Day Lewis, The P o etic Image (London: 3onathan Cape, 1947).
"It was Caudwell's th esis th at prim itive poetry created im aginative
conditions favorable towards action: by forcibly presenting the harvest
in phantasy, for exam ple, it gave the unsown harvest a greater reality
and thus stim ulated the tribe to greater effo rts in working for a harvest.
Prim itive poetry was, in fa ct, education o f th e in stin cts through the
im agination, and we may agree th at this is still an im portant function
o f poetry. But there is clearly a much wider distance today betw een
the p oetic im age and the human a ct; th e links betw een the tw o are a t
tenuated and more subtle ..." Pages 30-31.
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Day Lewis was also greatly im pressed by Caudwell's dictum "emo
tions, generated co lle c tiv e ly , persist in solitude." That is, the c o llectiv e
social im ages created by poetry have a perm anent e f f e c t upon us. The
individual alone in his study reading poetry, or appreciating art, is actu al
ly participating in the great c o lle c tiv e world o f our com m on humanity.
Although appreciating Caudwell's view s, Day Lewis m anages to give
a very un-Marxian tw ist to them by maintaining this co lle c tiv e social
world reveals to us "general truths which have eternally bound mankind
together."

2

In January o f 1948 Alick West published the first major review
3
o f Caudwell's work. West credited Caudwell with a "profound under
standing of Marxism" (a view soon to be vigorously challenged by Maurice
Cornforth and others). West picks up on Caudwell's ideas concerning
th e slow and steady advance of human freedom based on man's ever
growing m astery o f his environm ent. Only by keeping this progressive
m ovem ent in mind, West m aintains, can we make sense o f Caudwell's
argum ent th at "Poetry is som ething econom ic." Keeping in mind Day
Lewis' contentions concerning the function of poetry, we can b etter
appreciate West's analysis o f Illusion and R eality when he sta tes that
Caudwell actu ally expressed tw o d ifferen t interpretations o f the function
o f poetry in class so ciety . The first interpretation sta te s that poetry

2

Ibid., page 144. "The individual is brought, however rem otely, into
touch with com m unal exp erien ce, general truths which have eternally
bound mankind togeth er. He is 'withdrawing from his fellow s into the
world o f art, only to en ter more clo sely into communion with humanity'
— words o f Caudwell which echo Goethe's 'we escap e the world through
art, and art is also our link with it.'"
3

Alick West, "On 'Illusion and Reality,"' Communist R eview , Vol. 3,
No. 1, January, 1948, pages 7-13.
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is m erely an expression o f the false con cep ts o f freedom developed
under bourgeois so ciety . The bourgeois p oet still strives a fter freedom ,
h
but it is the false freedom o f the "bourgeois illusion."
West thinks another interpretation is possible, one which is more
in harmony with other major ideas in Illusion and R eality. West w rites:
In another passage Caudwell says that the illusion
in bourgeois poetry is 'begotten o f the tension
betw een productive forces and productive rela
tions' (p. 104), the tension which drives on not
m erely the bourgeoisie, but the whole o f bour
geois so ciety to future reality ... Bourgeois
poetry is bourgeois in the sense that it is the
expression o f bourgeois so ciety ; not o f one class
only, but o f th e com m unity made up o f ja rrin g
cla sses, the cap ita lists and the workers.
This interpretation allow s us to view modern poetry in the sam e
light as we view prim itive, as a m eans o f projecting a future sta te of
so ciety . Under the first interpretation the only role o f poetry is to
express all the incorrect, phantastic notions o f the bourgeoisie. I agree
w ith West that the second interpretation gives a much broader scope
to Caudwell's a esth etics. Had he lived to revise Illusion and R eality
one can only hope he would have concen trated more on this second inter
pretation o f the relation b etw een bourgeois poetry and bourgeois society.
Now, rather than simply reflectin g false notions, poetry is seen as e x 
pressing all the tensions and co n flicts o f its so ciety and of holding out
the promise o f even tu al sa tisfa cto ry resolutions o f th ese co n flicts -indeed,

tf.

Ibid., pages 11-12: "According to the first and the more prominent,
poetry is still a means to freedom , but the freedom is illusory ... A ccord
ing to this interpretation, then, bourgeois poetry is the expression o f
the fa lse illusion o f the bourgeoisie and o f the reaction o f the bourgeoisie
to its falsity."
Ibid., page 12.
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in actually contributing to th ese resolutions in much the sam e way as
the prim itive poetry of tribal so ciety not only held out the promise o f
the harvest but, by creating and reinforcing a co lle c tiv e em otional a t t i
tude towards the harvest, also helped to bring about its realization.
The year 1948 also saw a major evaluation o f Caudwell published
in the United States. This is the chapter "Christopher Caudwell and
Marxist Criticism" in Stanley Edgar Hyman's The Armed Vision. For
som e reason, perhaps as a result o f the Cold War, the chapter on Caudwell
was le ft out o f the more easily attain ab le paperback edition o f this
book which cam e out in the 1930s.
Hyman makes two im portant observations - - which we should keep
in mind when we com e to the a tta ck s against Caudwell mounted by
Cornforth and others in The Modern Q uarterly. The first is that Caudwell
did not restrict him self to purely Marxist sources, but turned to , and
learned from , any d ifferen t field s o f knowledge.

6

Second, th at he was

one o f the strongest critics o f psychoanalysis —even while giving Freud
credit as "the founder o f sc ie n tific psychology."^ Hyman's final appraisal
was that Caudwell "was probably th e best Marxist critic we have ever
had."8

Stanley Edgar Hyman, The Armed Vision; A Study in the Methods
o f Modern Literary C riticism (N .Y .: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948). Hyman
w rites: "...in the course o f his discussion o f poetry Caudwell draws
upon alm ost every scien ce, discipline, or body o f theory. The th eo retica l
ju stification for this is his b elief, shared by Marx and Engels and taken
seriously by only a few contem porary Marxists, that Marxism is a fram e
work able to accom m odate and u tilize in d ia lectic interplay the most
advanced thought in any field." Page 174.
^ Ibid., page 206. "Caudwell has distinguished him self as perhaps the
most violent o f all Marxist opponents o f psychoanalysis..." Page 205.
8 Ibid., page 207.

One might w ell have thought then that by 1950 Caudwell was slow ly
on the way to securing for him self a solid, unfortunately posthumous,
reputation as a major Marxist critic. B esides Illusion and R eality, Studies
in a Dying Culture, The Crisis in Physics, and Further Studies in a Dying
Culture had a ll appeared and had been generally review ed and received
9
enthusiastically.
N evertheless, 1950 saw a major critique o f Caudwell claim ing
to dem onstrate that he was anything but a Marxist c r itic , but instead
had created a hodge-podge of e c le c tic ideas which placed him solidly
in the ranks o f bourgeois anti-M arxist philosophers and critics. While
this attack , as we shall presently show, was co m p letely unjustified and
nowadays has little intrinsic philosophical in terest, it is im portant to
review the issues it raised, both as an ex ercise in the h istorical back
ground o f present day Caudwell evaluations, and to give a fu ll picture
o f the negative, as w ell as the positive, responses which Caudwell's
works evoked.
One of the ironic asp ects o f this whole episode is th at Caudwell
was not taken to task by unsym pathetic diehard bourgeois critics, but
was assailed by one of the leading in tellectu a l fo rces within his own
party, who, rather than attem pting to salvage Caudwell from supposed
errors (and thus retain within Marxist criticism the m ost g ifted Marxist

9

H. Levy's appreciation in his "Introduction" to The Crisis in Physics
is typical: Caudwell "... le ft behind him a mass o f w ritten m aterial
o f such deep understanding as to make him out, had he but lived to enjoy
the so ciety for which he died, as one o f our m ost g ifted men (p.v)."
He had "a combined social and scien tific understanding th at would be
rare in a scien tist o f mature experience; to find them in this young
man is alm ost phenomenal." Cf. Christopher Caudwell, The Crisis in
Physics, edited with an introduction by Professor H. Levy (N.Y.: Dodd
Mead & Company, 1939).
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aesth etician to have w ritten in English) rather consigned him to the
outer darkness.
"It is very clear indeed," Cornforth w rote, "that Caudwell was
unable to reproduce for h im self the ideas o f historical m aterialism ,
because in trying to work them out for him self in his own way he intro
duced into them a whole se t o f confusions ... w e have to learn mainly
from his m ista k es." ^
Cornforth claim s that Caudwell follow ed Weismann's bifurcation
o f the body into the changeable and m ortal som a on the one hand, and
the everlasting germ plasm on the other, and, based on this rule, Freud's
theories o f the ego and th e id — the id being the unconscious, everlastin g,
instinctual basis upon which each individual ego was established. A c
cording to Cornforth, a ll this is un-M arxist and is the foundation upon
which Caudwell e r e c ts his whole theory o f poetry and his notions o f
the gen otype. Cornforth puts it thusly:
The whole idea o f the genotype and the instincts
is a p iece o f made up id ealist m etaphysics.
For it supposes that som ething ex ists within
the organism — the genotype and the instincts
- - which is not susceptible to change; which
is not born and m odified and developed in the
course o f the life o f the organism , but which
precedes it and stam ps its own pattern upon
it. Thus, however much th e outward ch aracteris
tics o f an organism may be m odified by external
influences, its innerm ost 'n^ure' rem ains un
changed and unchangeable.
Now, Cornforth's line o f reasoning continues, Caudwell's a esth etics
claim s that poetry functions only in the realm o f the instincts and is

Maurice Cornforth, "Caudwell and Marxism," The Modern Quarterly,
vol. 6, no. 1, 1950-51, pages 16-34, page 20.
* ^ Ibid., page 22.
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basically a tool by which they are adjusted to m atch so cia l reality.

12

Caudwell further, according to Cornforth, follow s with major
section s o f Illusion and R eality devoted to the m odel o f "two-worlds"
— that o f inner and that o f outer reality, or th at o f feelin g and that
o f perception. Cornforth sta te s th at this is nothing more than re-hashed
"m etaphysical dualism" and is a far cry from the non-dualistic categories
o f Marxist m aterialism . He continues:
So according to this theory o f poetry, poetry
expresses 'the world within us;' and in poetry
we pass from 'rational reality' to an inner world
o f em otion. O f course, this is no new theory,
it is simply th e id ealist as opposed to the m ateria
list theory o f a rt. .Y et in George Thompson's
Biographical N ote
prefixed to Illusion and
R eality we are asked to a ccep t it as 'the first
co m p reh en siv e^ ttem p t to work out a Marxist
theory o f art."

12

Ibid. page 24: "Poetry is then declared to be 'irrational.' Its 'con
gruence' has no connection with the extern al world, but is 'congruence
with inner reality.' So poetry does not, as Marxists had hitherto supposed,
portray in p o etic im ages th e reality o f the world and o f our own life
in it." Cornforth arrives a t such a non sequitur because he thinks that
"inner reality" has no relationship, according to Caudwell, to the "reality
o f the world" and our life in it. We shall presently see just how incorrect
is this view o f Cornforth's.
JO

Thompson was (like Cornforth) a leader o f the Communist Party
o f Great Britain. His reply to Cornforth w ill be discussed below.
14

Cornforth, og. c i t ., page 25. At this point Cornforth Quotes Belinsky,
but if we keep in mind Caudwell's "harvest model" and West's "second
interpretation" this appeal to Belinsky could w ell support Caudwell.
"'What is poetry and what does it con sist of?' Belinsky asked. 'Common
authors presume it to be contained in th e inventions o f the im agination,
but the dreams o f a sleeping man and the ravings o f an insane man are
also inventions o f the im agination, y e t they are not poetry. Poetry
is the crea tiv e reproduction o f reality as possibility. Therefore what
cannot ex ist in reality is fa lse in poetry too." Ibid., page 26.
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Cornforth counterposes his conception o f m aterialist a esth etics
to the so-called "idealist" th eories o f Caudwell. Marxism, he says, only
recognizes one m aterial world — not tw o — not a separate em otional
world based on inner energy derived from our instinctual nature. Poetry
cannot, therefore, sim ply rela te to a so-called "inner em otional world."
Rather, Cornforth stresses, consciousness o f external reality and feelin gs
and em otions are linked togeth er and represent a unitary structure which
is the subject o f poetry.*'5
Due to the fa c t that Caudwell took his con cep tion s from bourgeois
thinkers (m etaphysicians and id ealists, e tc .) he has failed , Cornforth
m aintains, in his a ttem p ts to crea te a Marxist theory o f art — "... the
Marxist theory o f art is not to be found in th e pages o f Illusion and R ea
lity." 16
While, as we shall presently see, none o f the above criticism s by
Cornforth w ill stand up to a ca refu l reading o f Caudwell, he does manage
to make a few points (below) which are not to ta lly unjustified. First,
he points out that Caudwell is en tirely too general in his talk about
th e so-called "bourgeois illusion" -- i.e ., th at man is seen as naturally
free and a ll so cia l restraints are a rtificia l lim itations to this freedom .
Cornforth accu ses Caudwell o f being too fa cile and in not seeing that
there is more than one cen tra l illusion which d irects bourgeois thinking.
Hegel, for exam ple, is considered a bourgeois thinker - - y e t his philosophy

Ibid., page 27.
16

Ibid., page 28. One wonders how Cornforth might have review ed
Capital — it would no doubt have been attack ed since Marx used ca teg o r
ies and conceptions borrowed from bourgeois thinkers (Adam Smith,
Ricardo, e tc .) and a method which he adm its was inspired by a bourgeois
idealist m etaphysician (H egel).
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view s sta te imposed social restraints as a guarantor o f freedom . How
can Caudwell's "bourgeois illusion" theory explain this? Second, he claim s
that rather than dealing with co n crete exam ples, Caudwell has a tendency
to crea te abstractions, give a th eoretical analysis o f the abstraction,
and then rest con ten t thinking that he has actually described som e asp ect
o f con crete reality.
He invents abstractions and tries to describe
and to account for what goes on in the real
world in term s o f those abstractions ... He is
forever saying 'the bourgeois does this' and 'the
bourgeois does that,' failing to take in account
the con crete conditions o f real life in bourgeois
so ciety and fo rgettin g that 'the bourgeois' has
no m or^ real e x isten ce than, say, 'the econom ic
man.'"
In defense o f Caudwell one could point out that for Marxists all
(or for the m ost part) sta tem en ts purporting to express general laws
or categorical statem en ts, are really generalized statem en ts o f tendencies,
and view ed in this light Caudwell's use o f abstractions ("the bourgeoisie")
to highlight general ten d en cies is unobjectionable.

18

Viewed as a general tendency Caudwell's position concerning the
"bourgeois illusion" is also unobjectionable. Caudwell did not sta te that

^

18

Ibid., page 29.

C f. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique o f P o litica l Economy, Volume
III: The Process o f C apitalist Production As A Whole, edited by Frederich
Engels, (N.Y.: International Publishers, 1967) - - first published in Hamburg,
1894. "Under cap italist production, the general law a cts as the prevailing
tendency only in a very com p licated and approxim ate manner, as a never
ascertainable average o f ce a se le ss fluctuations (page 161)." Marx w rote
the above with referen ce to his econom ic investigations, but in so far
as the super-structural a c tiv itie s o f art, philosophy, religion, e tc ., are
u ltim ately based on the econ om ic and productive foundations described
by C apital, it seem s to me even more obvious that this sort o f m ethodo
logical dictum is applicable to the description o f super-structural pheno
mena.
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each and every bourgeois thinker had to m anifest the sam e basic ideas
relative to freedom w ithout exception. He m erely characterized in
a general way the overall direction o f thought in a bourgeois period.
H egel too had individual liberty as the goal o f history. The fa ct that
he saw this as a developm ent out o f the higher organization o f the sta te
does not necessarily d ifferen tia te him from many natural law theorists
who th em selves recognized the n ecessity o f the sta te as a v eh icle for
mankind's realization o f a higher form o f freedom (Hobbes, Locke, Rous
seau).
It would be an error, however, to think th at Caudwell's explanations
o f general developm ental lines must cover every sp ecific ca se. If this
w ere Caudwell's intention, Cornforth's critique would have been more
than justified. However, an even greater error, it seem s to me, is Corn
forth's approach. It seem s to tally unjustified to reject Caudwell's thesis
in to to because a few counter exam ples su ggest th em selves. A detailed
comparison o f Caudwell's and Hegel's view s on a esth etics and freedom
has never, to my knowledge, been a ttem p ted . Even if such a study should
substantiate Cornforth's position, this would not rule out Caudwell's
a esth etics as a useful explanation o f the general developm ent o f art
— it would only require a more sophisticated approach to the idea o f
the "bourgeois illusion."
The appearance o f Cornforth's a rticle marked the beginning of
the so-called "Caudwell Debate." The editors o f The Modern Quarterly
had made Cornforth's a rticle available to a number o f prominent Marxists
prior to its publication. The responses, published in subsequent issues,
revealed that Caudwell supporters and opponents were about equally
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divided. I intend to con cen tra te on what I consider the tw o major rebut
tals to Cornforth and then present his closing remarks a t the end of
the debate.
George Thompson a ccu ses Cornforth o f misreading and misunder
standing Caudwell, and o f h im self exem plifying a m echanical approach
to Marxism rather than Caudwell's being a m etaphysical id ealist.

19

Thompson cred its Caudwell as a major influence on his own view s which
he developed in such works as The Prehistoric Aegean, A eschylus and
Athens, and Marxism and P oetry.

20

In order to defend Caudwell's position

as a Marxist critic and philosopher o f art, Thompson sets out to destroy
Cornforth's tw o m ost damaging assertions - - that Caudwell is a Freudian
a t heart, and that he b elieved in a gen otyp ical-in stinctual man who
basically remained unvaried ex ce p t for minor cultural d ifferen ces and
whose instincts, once given, are invariant and determ ine how w e react
to our cultural environm ent. In order to dem olish this Cornforthian

19

George Thompson, "In D efen se o f Poetry," The Modern Quarterly
Vol. 6, no. 2, 1951, pages 107-135. "... far from convicting Caudwell
o f m etaphysical idealism , Cornforth has exposed his own failure to free
him self from m echanical m aterialism (page 121)."

20

C f. George Thompson, Marxism and Poetry (London: 1946), AEschylus
and Athens (2nd Edition, London: 1946) and Studies in A ncient Greek
Society: The Prehistoric A egean (First American edition: N.Y.: The
C itadel Press, 1965 — se e esp. page 461). Thompson w rites concerning
Illusion and R eality: "Running through it are tw o leading ideas which
I have found extrem ely fe r tile . First, scien ce and art are com plem entary
and mutually indispensable a c tiv itie s o f the human mind, both concerned
with tth e extension o f man's understanding and control o f nature and
h im self, the one directly, through reason, by changing the external world,
the other indirectly, through the em otions, by changing his subjective
attitu d es to it. Secondly, neither can be understood w ithout referen ce
to their origin and developm ent, and the origin o f both is to be sought
in the em ergence o f those tw o interdependent ch a ra cteristics which
distinguish man from the anim als - - to o ls and speech." "In D efense of
Poetry," page 107.
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perversion o f Caudwell's ideas, Thompson presents a series o f passages
from Illusion and R eality and Further Studies in a Dying Culture to show
that Caudwell's position and Cornforth's presentation o f that position
are very d ifferen t. The follow ing is one o f the passages, slightly expanded,
cited by Thompson to show that Caudwell's view s on the genotype were
far from m echanical and did take n o tice o f the preem inent role o f the
environm ent:
We are born a genotype — m erely in stin ctive.
We becom e self-co n scio u s and, by interaction
with the environm ent, receiv e an adaptation
o f the in stin cts which determ ines our infantile
consciousness and our infantile hopes, aspirations
and aim s. Our growth to manhood is accom panied
by an enrichm ent o f consciousness - - th at is,
by a still more far-reaching adaptation o f our
childish desires to the environm ent. Our adult
consciousness is not determ ined by our infantile,
any more than our infantile consciousness is
determ ined by our in stin ctive genotype. There
is a d ifferen ce which con sists in the d ifferen ce
in exp erience, and this exp erien ce rests on a
deeper penetration o f the environm ent as a
result of living in so ciety . We have lived and
therefore are altered .
In Further Studies Caudwell refers to the in stin cts as "hypothetical
en titites" — (page 112), and Thompson quotes from pages 112 and 108
o f this work resp ectively as follow s: "Art, then, conditions the in sticts
to the environm ent, and in doing so changes the instincts." "In the evolu
tion o f consciousness in stin ct is exp erien ce, gives rise to memory and
a ffe c t, and is no longer the old instinct."

22

21

Christopher Caudwell, Illusion and R eality: A Study o f the Sources
o f Poetry (N.Y.: International Publishers, 1970), page 180.

22

Christopher Caudwell, "Beauty: A Study in Bourgeois A Esthetics,"
in Further Studies in a Dying Culture, edited with a p reface by Edgell
Rickworth and reprinted along with Studies in a Dying Culture by Monthly
R eview Press, New York and London, 1971, page 112.
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Thompson ends his d efen se o f Illusion and R eality by remarking
that Cornforth's interpretation is untenable and that his claim th at Caud
w ell "accepts a ll the main Freudian ideas as gospel" (Cornforth's words)
is totally unfounded.

23

G.M. Matthews, writing in the n ext issue o f The Modern Quarterly,
also takes Cornforth to task for not understanding Caudwell's position.

2*i

Matthews sees Caudwell's theory o f art as being derived from
man's interaction with the natural environm ent. Men and anim als both
in teract within this co n tex t, but the anim als do in fa ct only have blind
instinctual responses, the result o f evolutionary adaptations, with which
to carry on this interaction. The d ifferen ce in man is th at self-co n scio u s
ness has arisen as a result o f the human developm ent o f the productive
forces — and it has superceded the blind instinctual p rocesses common
to the anim al kingdom. N everth eless, the sam e basic needs for food
and shelter, econom ic needs in the w idest sense, must be m et by man
as w ell as the anim als. Man's a ttem p t to m aster nature has led to, in-

23

Thompson op. c it., page 120. In fa c t, Caudwell's discussion o f Freud
is "the b etter because he recognizes that there is a p lace in Marxism
for psychology subordinate to history, w hereas Cornforth seem s to e x 
clude it altogether."
7U

G.M. M atthews, "The Caudwell Debate," The Modern Quarterly,
Vol. 6, no. 3, 1951, pages 2 5 9 ff. "The genotype is only 'relatively un
changing' (Illusion and R eality, page 205); for the purposes o f discussing
poetry it is true that man has had a 'relatively constant biological makeup
during historical tim es' (Ibid., page 16). If this were not so, it would
make nonsense o f the reasons Marx suggested for the enduring appeal
o f the Greek epic ... Caudwell nowhere says that it is only the outward
ch aracteristics o f man th at are changed by the environm ent while his
innermost nature remains unchangeable. On the contrary, the instincts
do not blindly follow the n ecessitie s o f any germ plasm (Illusion, page
32), they are 'changed in action' (Ibid., page 170), and art, incidentally,
is among the things that change the in stin cts (Further Studies, page
112)." Ibid., page 269.
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evitably, the need to extend and heighten this con trol to ever higher
degrees o f m astery. Art has developed as one o f th e techniques used
to further this aim . For M atthews this is a thoroughly Marxian notion
and he too, like Thomspon, rejects Cornforth's presentation o f Caudwell's
a esth etic theories.

25

Cornforth, however, was not alone in his n egative appraisal of
Illusion and R eality. 3.D.Bernal, the noted British scien tist, maintained
that in the works o f Caudwell "there is only too am ple evidence of the
truth of Cornforth's th esis, that their form ulations are those o f con tem 
porary bourgeois scien tific philosophy, Einsteinean-M organist-Freudian,
and not those o f Marxism."

26

Margot Heinemann, the literary critic,

also rejected Caudwell's a esth etic, but seem s not to have had a very
thorough grasp o f it.

27

Werner Thierry, another literary c ritic, had

25

He also remarks, a propos the "bourgeois illusion" that: "Caudwell's
great w eakness as a Marxist literary critic is surely not that he invented
the bourgeois illusion within which all the modern English poets have
w ritten, but that he does not study th ese poets from any other angle
than that o f the illusion. This makes his criticism s o f th ese poets correct,
generally speaking, as far as it goes, but alm ost en tirely n eg a tiv e." Ibid.,
page 272.
96

3.D. Bernal, "The Caudwell Debate," The Modern Quarterly, vol.
6, no. 4, 1951, page 346. Time has presumably redeem ed a ll three "isms"
(with the possible exception o f Freudianism) from such negative stric
tures. "Morganism" was a referen ce to the fa c t that Caudwell accepted
the gene theory and was not, in 1937, aware o f the Lysenko ism which,
a t the tim e Bernal w rote, and for another fifte e n years a t lea st, distorted
Soviet b iological scien ces.
27

"Central to Caudwell's theory is the extrem ely sharp antithesis he
makes betw een perception and thought (investigating extern al reality)
on the one hand, and feelin g (derived from the 'instincts,' from 'inner
reality') on the other. This polar opposition is fa lse because feelin gs,
em otions, equally depend on man's exp erience o f the external world,
Footnote continued on n ext page.
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a more balanced opinion o f Caudwell's ach ievem en ts and recognized
in him, even with his fau lts, one o f the m ost im portant literary thinkers
o f the generation. "It cannot be," Thierry w rote, "the task o f Marxist
critics to conceal the fa c t, th at Caudwell, in sp ite o f his youthful ex a g 
gerations and his 'prevailing sin ... to prefer cut-and-dried schem es,'
has created one of the fin est instrum ents o f literary analysis in Western
Europe during the last tw en ty or thirty years."

28

Cornforth, a fter review ing all o f the contributions, esp ecially
Thompson's, remained unmoved. He com p letely rejected Thompson's
claim that Caudwell had created the first Marxist a ttem p t to construct
a theory o f a esth etics. Such a view , he thought, would prevent Marxists
from trying to crea te just such a theory sin ce they would be likely to
believe that they must build on Caudwellean foundations. Crucial to
Cornforth's ideas is the follow ing assertion: "The influence o f Caudwell's
theories has led not towards so cia list realism but away from it."

29

Footnote continued from previous page.
o f so ciety and o f nature, and not on unchanging (or even 'relatively un
changing') instincts in opposition to so ciety , which it is poetry's peculiar
task to adapt to social life . Hence thought and em otion reinforce one
another in poetry." Margot Heinemann, "The Caudwell Debate." The
Modern Quarterly, Vol. 6, no. 4, 1951, page 340. It has already been
shown how this is a misreading o f Illusion and R ea lity .
28

Werner Thierry, "The Caudwell Debate," The Modern Quarterly,
vol. 6, no. 4, 1951, pages 344-345. Also, "Cornforth does not show the
main idea always haunting Caudwell: the dem onstration that liberty
is a question o f social adaptation and conscious a ctiv ity , not, as proclaim ed
by all bourgeois post-w ar prophets, a question o f individual independence
and em otional spontaneity." Ibid., page 345.
29

Maurice Cornforth, "The Caudwell Debate," The Modern Quarterly,
vol. 6, no. 4, 1951, page 354.
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In this chapter we have discussed the initial cr itic a l responses
to Caudwell's work as w ell as the major debate over his theories in The
Modern Quarterly. We have seen that Caudwell has both strong defenders
and opponents. In the co n tex t o f the early 1950's the a ttack on Caudwellboiled down to Maurice Cornforth's final view s in the "Caudwell Debate"
claim ing that Caudwell's philosophy was un-Marxist and would not lend
support to "Socialist Realism ." In th e next chapter I propose to discuss
socialist realism as a Marxist theory o f art, and I w ill a ttem p t to evaluate
the cogency o f Cornforth's claim .
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CHAPTER IV
Caudwell and Socialist Realism

My intention in this chapter is not to give an exhaustive analysis
o f Socialist R ealism , but to present it in outline in order to evaluate
the justice or injustice o f Cornforth's claim that Caudwell's a esth etic
theories lead away from S ocialist Realism and are thus "un-Marxist."
Cornforth's implied assum ption that Socialist Realism is the only form
o f Marxist a esth etic w ill be discussed in a later chapter. We should
also bear in mind that the theory o f Socialist R ealism and what Cornforth
and others understood th at theory to be in 1950 are not necessarily the
sam e. It should be noted as w ell that if Caudwell's a esth etic was leading
away from a certain conception o f Socialist Realism held in the last
years o f Stalin it may have been leading not away from Marxism but
towards it.
B efore dealing with Caudwell's relations to S ocialist Realism ,
I want to present som e prelim inary discussion o f the origin and major
ten ets o f this doctrine.
In one o f the sam e issues o f The Modern Quarterly which carried
"The Caudwell Debate" w e find Erick Hartley w riting that "Socialist
Realism rests on (the) principle o f the crea tiv ity o f labour, on the prin
ciple that art is an extension and a reflection o f that crea tiv ity , both
mirroring and influencing d irectly or indirectly, th e le v el and character
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o f changing social relationships."*
How is the principle o f labor crea tiv ely applied in S ocialist Realism
— i.e ., just what is created ? Gorki, one o f the originators o f the term
"Socialist Realism," talks about the creation o f a myth which leads to
a revolutionary rom anticism . It w as, a fter all, from his paper read at
the First All Union Congress o f Soviet Writers in 1934 that m ost of
the conceptions about Socialism R ealism first arose.
At that tim e, Gorki said:
A myth is a product o f the im agination. To
produce such a myth means to ex tra ct from
the sum of real things their fundam ental meaning
and incarnate them in an im age. This is how
realism cam e into being. But if to this funda
m ental meaning ex tra cted from reality we add
som ething th at w e desire - - in the sam e way
as we use hypotheses to increase our knowledge
— and thus develop our im age further, then
we arrive a t that rom anticism which is the basis
o f ail myths and which is o f great value because
it favors the birth o f a revolutionary attitu d e
towards reality, i.e.,^>f an a ttitu d e that wants
to change th e world.
Gorki maintained th at progressive n ineteenth century bourgeois
literature ~ i.e ., c ritica l realism — devoted its e lf to revealing the pro3
gressive degeneration and alienation o f ca p ita list life.

Erick Hartley, "Socialist R ealism : One the Role and Character of
S oviet Literature," The Modern Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 3, Summer 1951,
pages 241-258, page 248.
2

Maxim Gorki, "Extracts From a Paper Read to the First All Union
Congress o f Soviet Writers - - 1934" in Literature and Life: A S election
from the Writings of Maxim Gorki — introduction by V.V.Mikhailovski,
translated by Edith Bone (London: Hutchenson International Authors,
1946), page 138.
3

"The basic and dom inate them e o f nineteenth century literature was
the p essim istic recognition by the individual o f the insecurity o f his
social tenure." Ibid., page 143 — "A Talk with Young People (1934)"
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Gorki noted:
The realism o f the 'prodigal sons' o f th e bourgeoi
sie was a cr itic a l realism . But although it e x 
posed the v ic es o f so ciety and showed up the
'life and adventures' o f the individual in the
grip o f fam ily tradition, religious dogma or
legal form s, it could not show men the way
out o f their cap tivity. It was easy to c riticize
everything, but the c r itic s had nothing positive
to say ex cep t that social life and 'existence'
in general were obviously devoid o f a ll meaning."
S ocialist R ealism , Gorki m aintained, id en tifies "being as doing"
and demands that a ll engage in the crea tiv e a ctiv ity o f restructuring
the world so that men can develop to their highest p otentials and unite
into one great fam ily - - art's function, by the Socialist R ealist method,
is to contribute to this goal.^

Gorki stated:
I am not a naturalist. I want literature to rise
above reality and to look down on reality from
above because literature has a greater purpose
than m erely to r e fle c t reality. It is not enough
m erely to d epict already existing things — we
must also bear in mind the things we desire
and the things which are possible o f ach ievem ent.

Ibid., page 144. Also he had noted in his paper a t the 1934 Congress
that "Without wishing to deny the scope and value o f the work done
by critica l realism and fully appreciating its form al ach ievem en ts in
the art o f word-painting, w e must understand a t the sam e tim e that
w e need this c ritica l realism m erely in order to throw a light on the
ev il heritage o f the past, m erely to help us com bat that ev il heritage
and com p letely elim in ate it." Ibid., page 140.
^ "Socialist Realism looks upon being as doing, and regards ex isten ce
as a crea tiv e a ctiv ity , the object o f which is the uninterrupted develop
ment o f the m ost valuable individual g ifts o f men in order that they
might conquer the forces o f nature, ach ieve health and long life, and
enjoy the great good fortune of living on an earth which man, in conform 
ity with the incessant growth of his needs, wants to exp loit in its en tirety
as the m agnificant dwelling place o f mankind united in one great family."
Ibid., page 140.
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Further, it is necessary to typify the phenomena
that w e observe.
Besides Gorki's version o f S ocialist Realism ~ which (as we shall
see) accords w ell with Caudwell's own ideas towards literature and art,
there was also a version o f Socialist Realism presented at the 1934 Con
gress o f Soviet Writers by Andrei A. Zhdanov. A version not so much
differentiated by any th eo retica l m otives, but by its p ractical applica
tions. Zhdanov’s view s have given rise to the term "Zhdanovism" to
refer to a ll "objectionalble" things about Socialist Realism — the Stalin
ism , the persecution o f artists, the p olitical in terferen ce in the creative
process, e tc . B esides his 1934 speech, Zhdanov circulated an essay in
1946 which had a great deal o f influence on the determ ination of the
standards o f Socialist R ealism . It w as, I b eliev e, Zhdanov's view s (and
a particular interpretation o f them ) which Cornforth had in mind (not
a broad interpretation o f th e view s o f Gorki) when he accused Caudwell
o f being un-Marxist and of leading away from S ocialist R ealism . What
then was "Zhdanovism"?

Ibid., page 145. "Talk With Young People" -- "Literature's task is
to mirror and d epict life and labour and to incarnate truth in im ages,
characters, types o f men." Ibid. Thus, Socialist Realism , as understood
by Gorki, was a continuation o f the best traditions o f past literature
(critica l realism ), it created im ages and myths which were to function
to inspire, ennoble and uplift mankind by furthering the developm ent
o f each person's unique individuality while a t the sam e tim e stressing
p ractical achieveable goals. Even as far back as 1914 Gorki was form ula
ting his version o f Socialist R ealism . "True art," he w rote then, "arises
where com p lete con fidence is established betw een w riter and reader.
The writer's job is to pour out into the world all th at fills th at recep tacle
for im pressions which men ca ll the soul. When a w riter speaks o f the
joys and sorrows o f our life , o f things ev il and good, ridiculous or vile,
if he speaks from his soul as if he w ere speaking to his best friend, he
w ill be understood by the reader and accep ted as a friend." Ibid., page
132 — P reface to an "Anthology o f Proletarian Writers" (1914).
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Maynard Solomon d evotes an entire section o f his m assive antho
logy, Marxism and Art, to "Zhdanovism" (w ithout, how ever, including
one word by Zhdanov him self) which, he sta tes, dom inated Soviet art
from the 1930's until 1956.
Solomon w rites:
Zhdanovism can be regarded as a temporary
aberration o f Marxist criticism peculiar to a
particular sta g e of developm ent o f the Soviet
Union and the world Communist parties. How
ever, its roots extend into the pre-Stalin era,
and its reverberations are still with us. It is
perhaps more helpful, th erefore, to exam ine
the possibility that elem en ts o f Zhdanovism
represent general ten d en cies in the a ttitu d es
towards art during post-revolutionary periods.
Several lines may be stressed: first, the insistence
by revolutionary m ovem ents on the creation
o f exem plary myths in art; second, th e rejection
o f com plex and advanced sty les in art; third,
the censorship of the arts and thei^r subjection
to repressive modes o f patronage.
Solomon stresses the fa ct that Marx and Engels never advocated
the creation o f a sp ecific type o f art whose function would be the crea 
tion o f role m odels or m echanically attem p tin g to inculcate a particular
se t o f ideas. N everth eless, according to Solomon, it has historically
been the case that in post-revolutionary situations the new so cieta l
leaders have used every means available to educate and propagandize
the population in order to strengthen and further the goals o f the revo
lution. According to Solomon, Zhdanov's method o f control o f the arts
was particularly brutal - - involving purges, im prisonm ents and worse,
as w ell as the banning and censorship o f a rtistic productions. We have
already seen Gorki calling for the creation o f "exemplary myths" and,

^ Maynard Solomon, Marxism and Art: Essays C lassic and Contemporary
(N.Y.: Vintage Books, 1974), page 235.
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as for the second ch a ra cteristic given by Solomon ~ "rejection o f com plex
and advanced styles" -- it is normal to ex p ect a post-revolutionary govern
m ent, esp ecially in a backward and largely illitera te country, to insist
O

upon a rtistic com prehensibility.

The problem o f Stalinist "overkill"

has been attacked in the S oviet Union its e lf — there is certainly no
excu se for killing and imprisoning dissident w riters on purely a rtistic
grounds. If, as Solomon su ggests, Zhdanovism is a m erely historically
transitional stage for any revolution entering successfully into the period
o f consolidation, no Marxist would be particularly upset with it once
it had passed away (except for its uncalled for abuses). The problem
seem s, rather, to be to a ssess its survivals in the next historic period
and attem p t to elim inate its n egative featu res. Cornforth's critique
o f Caudwell fe ll during Zhdanovism's hey-day and was its e lf a Zhdanovist
critique o f Caudwell's refusal to see in art a sp ecial role as a propaganda
instrum ent, and his crea tiv e adaptation o f non-Marxist sources in his
overall a esth etic theory. One o f the more n egative asp ects o f Zhdanov
ism has been its equation, as with Cornforth, with S ocialist Realism
its e lf. This leads Solomon to c r itic iz e Socialist Realism when he should,
even by his own lights, be attacking only its Zhdanovist incarnation.
He w rites for exam ple:
R evived, th erefore, in a d ia le ctica l reversal,
is a Utopian conception o f art; for Socialist
Realism is a picture o f man as he should be
(socialist man in the process o f 'becoming') rather
than as he is; it is a wish rather than a reality
g
"Our literature is not a private enterprise calcu lated to p lease the
varied ta stes o f a literary m arket. We are in no way obliged to provide
a place in our literature for ta ste s and tem pers that have nothing in
common with the eth ics and qualities o f Soviet people." Andrei A. Zhda
nov, Essays on Literature, Philosophy, and Music (N.Y.: International
Publishers, 1950), page 25.
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which S talin ist patronage ca lls upon the artist
to depict; art (in N ietzsche's phrase) is a 'con
secration o f th e lie,' and the Zhdanovists while
outwardly upholding the rep resentation-reflection
theory o f art as their m odel, secretly p ractice
the enforcem ent o f id eological d eception, o f
Utopian construct.
At this juncture, before dealing further with criticism s o f Zhdanov
ism, it would be illum inating to see how Zhdanov him self, in his own
words, thought o f the nature and function o f S ocialist R ealism .
Andrei A. Zhdanov (1896-1948) was born in the Ukraine. During
his career he becam e secretary to the Central C om m ittee o f CPSU,
was chairman o f the Supreme S oviet, Russian Soviet Republic and, as
a lieutenant general, was, during the sieg e o f Leningrad, in charge of
the d efen se o f the c ity . The follow ing view s are taken from his works
mentioned previously.
Zhdanov's basic view s can be summed up in this ex tra c t from his
-1934 speech:
Comrade Stalin has called our w riters engineers
o f human souls. What does this mean? What
duties does the title confer upon you?
In the first p lace, it means knowing life so as
to be able to d ep ict it truthfully in works o f
art, to depict it not in a dead, sch olastic way,
not simply as 'objective reality,' but to depict
reality in its revolutionary developm ent.
In addition to this, the truthfulness and historical
con creten ess o f the a rtistic portrayal should
be combined with the id eological rem olding
and education o f the working people in the spirit
o f socialism . This method in literature and
literary criticism is jv^hat we c a ll the method
o f socialist realism .

9

Solomon, o£. c it., page 241.

^ Zhdanov, o£. c it ., page 12. "Our Soviet literature is not afraid of
the charge o f being 'tendentious.' Y es, S oviet literatu re is tendentious,
(Footnote continued on n ext page.)
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Echoing Gorki, Zhdanov stresses that a new form o f rom anticism
('revolutionary rom anticism ') must be called forth - - but must also be
based on a solid m aterialist foundation — thus literature must not only
d epict the given m oment — describe the world as it really is (contra
Solomon) but also point to a b etter future.**
Although Solomon would like to divide Gorki from Zhdanov (he
maintains, for instance, th at Gorki's view s are not Zhdanovist in outlook

12

)

I find little or no contradiction b etw een Gorki's speech and Zhdanov's,
both given at the sam e tim e. This observation is not meant to lower
Gorki to Zhdanov's lev el (as seen by Solomon) but only to point out that
Zhdanov's th eo retica l articulation o f S ocialist Realism is not substantially
alien to Gorki's — however the tw o men may have d iffered in its practical
application.
Gorki died in 1936 — tw o years a fter this speech was given.
I want to look now a t Zhdanov's 1946 w ritings on S ocialist Realism .
The im m ediate reason for th ese writings was a decision o f the
C entral C om m ittee o f CPSU regarding what w ere considered to be errors

(Footnote continued from previous page.)
for in an epoch o f class struggle there is not and cannot be a literature
which is not class literature, is not tendentious, is allegedly non-political."
Ibid., page 13.
* * "Our literature, which stands with both fe e t firm ly planted on a
socia l m aterialist base, cannot be h ostile to rom anticism , but it must
be a rom anticism o f a new type, revolutionary rom anticism . We say
th at socialist realism is th e basic m ethod o f Soviet literature and literary
criticsim , and this presupposes th at revolutionary rom anticism should
enter into literary creation as a com ponent part, for the whole life of
our party, the whole life o f the working class and its struggle consist
in a com bination o f the m ost stern and sober p ractical work with a supreme
spirit o f heroic deeds and m agnificant future prospects." Ibid.
12

Solomon, og. c it., page 241.
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in the publishing p olicies o f som e Soviet journals devoted to literary
topics. Zhdanov called for self-criticism and, while not using the word
itse lf, censorship. My purpose, how ever, is not to look a t the im m ediate
concerns o f the debates of 1946 ~ but to ex tra c t from them the major
philosophical principles to which Zhdanov appealed in justifying his posi
tion. It is my contention that none o f th ese principles are fundam entally
a t variance with his own, or Gorki's, form ulations in 1934.
A fter review ing the course o f Soviet literature since the tim e
o f the revolution, Zhdanov demands that p olitics m ust be the guide in
the literary field as in a ll other asp ects of Soviet so ciety .

13

He sees

Marxist art theory (sp ecifica lly literary criticism ) as a continuation
o f the view s o f Belinsky (hence Cornforth's allusion to Belinsky in his
critique of Caudwell), Chernyshevsky, Dobroliubov and Plekhanov -th ese
men, with the exception o f Plekhanov an avowed Marxist, w ere all "revolutionary democrats" who championed "realistic, socially directed art."

14

By basing him self on an appeal to universally recognized nineteenth
century Russian scholars and critics, Zhdanov is pointing out that his

13

"We demand that our com rades, both those who give leadership in
the literary field and those who w rite, be guided by th at w ithout which
the Soviet order cannot live, i.e., by p olitics, so that our youth may
be brought up not in a devil-m ay-care non-ideological spirit, but in a
rigorous and revolutionary spirit." Zhdanov, op. c it ., page 31.
14

Ibid., page 32. The revolutionary dem ocrats w ere seen as a n ti-th etica l
to Hegelian approaches to understanding art and nature and to those
who like Henri Arvon want to base Marxist a esth etics on Hegel's, present
the major objection to considering Socialist Realism as a proper, or
the only, form o f Marxist philosophy o f art. The relation betw een Marx
ism and the Revolutionary D em ocrats on the one side and Hegelianism
on the other presents a form idable problem and form s the basis o f the
discussion in my chapter on Caudwell and Hegel.
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view s on the control and guidance o f literature are neither uniquely
Marxian nor alien to the b est traditions o f th e Russian people.
Zhdanov, like Plato, recognized the educational power o f art and
wanted only the sterner type o f poet to influence the m asses.

15

Guided by the method o f so cia list realism , con
scientiously and a tten tiv ely studying our reality,
striving to p en etrate deeper into the essen ce
o f the p rocesses o f our developm ent, the writer
must educate the people and arm them ideologi
cally. While selectin g the best feelin gs and
qualities o f th e Soviet man and revealing his
tomorrow, w e must a t the sam e tim e show our
people what they must not be, we must ca stig a te
the remnants o f yesterday, remnants that hinder
the Soviet people in their forward march. Soviet
w riters must help the people, th e sta te, and
the party to ed u cate our youth to be ch eerful
and confident o f th^ir own strength, unafraid
o f any d ifficu lties.
Maynard Solomon is not the only student o f Marxism to hold Zhda
novism anathem a. But, as pointed out above, his reasons are confused.
He wants to reject Zhdanov but not Gorki (although there are no funda
m ental d ifferen ces betw een the tw o men on the lev el o f theory), he
suggests that Zhdanovism is a normal post-revolutionary developm ent,
e tc . His attack only makes sense if lim ited to a critique o f Zhdanovist
remnants in a tim e of m ature so cia list advance and when directed against
the alleged abuses o f a rtistic policy by a bureaucratic s ta te apparatus.
I want now to look a t som e remarks made on the theory o f Socialist
Realism by Henri Arvon in his L'esthetique m arxiste (1970).

^

17

Arvon's

Cf. Plato's discussion o f art in The Republic.

^ Zhdanov, o£. c it., pages 42-43.
17
Henri Arvon, Marxist E sth etics (Ithaca & London: Cornell University
Press, 1973), trans. from th e French by Helen R. Lane, with an introduction
by Fredric Oameson.
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book is esp ecially im portant because its main th esis is th at Hegel's a esth e
tic s is the direct ancestor o f Marxist a esth etics. In this chapter, how ever,
I am only interested in his Chapter Six, "Socialist Realism ." While this
discussion may con stitu te a diversion from my main them e (Caudwell's
relation to Socialist Realism and Cornforth's a ttitu d e toward him) I
b elieve it is important to point out that view s such as Arvon's (and Solo
mon's) because they are both widely held and erroneous stand in the
way o f our understanding just what is m eant by "Socialist Realism" - i.e., is it a Marxist a esth etic, the Marxist a e sth e tic , or is it a perversion
o f Marxist aesth etics, and if so is this due to its basic th eo retica l ten ets
or to its relation to the Soviet Union as an o ffic ia l doctrine towards
the arts. Only if this confusion is cleared up can we appreciate b etter
Caudwell's own contributions to the Marxist philosophy o f art.
I want to again stress that the theory o f S ocialist Realism cannot
be understood it it is m aintained that Zhdanov has perverted its basic
th eoretical content and th at, as a result, Soviet w riters and Communist
aesth eticians are responsible for the creation o f a m ere d evice for the
political control o f the arts. This is the position that Arvon a ttem p ts
to establish (for whatever reason) and I w ill a ttem p t to dem onstrate
that his critique o f Zhdanov is based primarily on a m is-reading o f what
Zhdanov him self w rote and an a rtificia l separation o f his view s from
those of Lukacs, Gorki, and others who, along with him, helped to crea te
and extend the basic th eo retica l principles o f S ocialist R ealism . We
have, I think, already seen what those principles are from our remarks
on Gorki and Zhdanov above. What does Arvon have to say?
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Arvon refers sym pathetically to Gorki's 1934 speech at the Soviet
Writers' C onference. When it com es to Zhdanov's role in the Congress,
however, Arvon goes out o f his way to denigrate it as m erely that "of
spokesman for Stalin's essen tia lly p olitical views."

18

In an attem p t

to dem onstrate his th esis, Arvon m aintains that Zhdanov advocated
purely practical here-and-now functions for artists, rejected tradition,
and attem pted to confine literature to utilitarian ends coinciding with
Party d icta tes. Arvon uses words like "however" and "despite this" in
an attem p t to divide Zhdanov's speech from the a ttitu d es o f both Gorki
and Western writers at the con ference (a division unremarked by the
participants at the tim e). Thus he w rites, with referen ce to the 1934
Congress, "... a great many speakers, follow ing the exam ple o f Marx
and Engels, attem p t to preserve the cultural heritage o f the past by
viewing Socialist Realism as the continuation o f a progressivist literary
tradition rather than a reflectio n o f the current p olitical situation."

19

But is this so different from what Zhdanov him self said? Arvon points
to Louis Aragon (from France) who stated th at Socialist Realism had
roots in Balzac, Zola, P ottier, Valles, Stendhal, Barbusse, Rimbaud,
and Peguy and to Johannes R. Becher (Germany) who claim ed to find
the roots o f Socialist Realism in G oethe, Schiller, Weerth and Freiligrath.
But we have already seen th at Zhdanov, just as the representatives at
the Congress from France and Germany saw their national literature
as providing sources for S ocialist R ealism , sought to establish the roots
o f Socialist Realism in "the continuation o f a progressivist literary tradi

18 Ibid., page 85.
^

Ibid., page 86.
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tion," nam ely that o f Belinsky, Dobroliubov, and Chernyshevsky. Thus,
contrary to Arvon's intent, he has not on this point established an essen tia l
d ifferen ce betw een Zhdanov and the other participants a t the Congress.
In further attem pting to discredit Zhdanov, Arvon sta tes that
the "Congress sides with Gorky's view th at the 'revolutionary Roman
ticism ' o f many writers in the first years o f the R evolution was 'only
a pseudonym for Socialist Realism'" — this "despite the pronounced
anti-R om anticism implied by the notion o f realism ..."

?0

But the Congress

certainly was not, despite Arvon's a ttem p ts to portray it as having done
so, siding with Gorki against Zhdanov - - who, as we saw in note 11, him self
defended the notion o f "revolutionary Rom anticism ."
Finally, Arvon m aintains, a fter 1946 Socialist Realism and "Zhda
novism" becam e identical. "During th ese dark days o f Zhdanovism,
one o f the very few Marxists to speak out against this propagandistic
literature trapped in the stiflin g cage o f an o ffic ia l p o litica l doctrine
and a series o f monotonous clich es is George Lukacs."

21

How, according to Arvon, does Lukacs accom plish this? Lukacs
explains the backward condition o f S oviet literatu re, as he sees it, as
a result o f cultural lag b etw een the advanced econ om ic system of so cia l
ism and the failure o f Soviet a rtists to free th em selv es from "the lingering traditions o f the decadent bourgeoisie ..."

In arriving at this

view , Arvon asserts, Lukacs took "precisely the opposite view from
Marx and Engels" ~ i.e., "Lukacs m aintains that it is cultural evolution

^

Ibid., page 87.

^

Ibid., page 92.

22

Quoted in Arvon, op. c i t ., page 93.
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that lags behind econom ic evolution rather than vice-versa."

23

To ca ll

this "the opposite view from Marx and Engels" is certain ly an oversim plifi
cation. Lukacs' position, how ever, is not a ll th at new. Zhdanov him self,
not a likely source for Lukacs' view s, had already sta ted the following:
"our literature does not y e t com e up to the requirem ents o f our era.
The w eaknesses o f our literatu re are a reflectio n o f the fa c t that people's
consciousness lags behind econ om ic life — a d e fe c t from which our w riters
are not, o f course, fr e e ." ^
Thus, I think, Arvon's a ttem p t to discredit the theory o f Socialist
Realism by discrediting Zhdanov fails. On the le v e l o f theory Zhdanov
here is in no way d ifferen t from Gorki or Lukacs.

25

Where Zhdanovism

fails is on the le v el o f p ra ctica l application. In so far as Zhdanov func
tioned as an overly zealous p olitical censor he betrayed not only his
own stated ideals, but also those o f Gorki, Lenin, Marx, Engels and others
who contributed to the th eo retica l developm ent o f Socialist Realism .
What the practice o f Zhdanovism produced was
a crude fa lsifica tio n o f contem porary life: it
had no basis in the interplay o f previous con
ditions, nor in the m a tte r -o f-fa c t am bitions
and doings o f ordinary people, but was determ ined
in every ca se, in form and con ten t alike, by
the appropriate d irectiv es o f the Party apparatus.
Since this 'illustrative literature' did not grow
out of life, but out o f glosses on o ffic ia l d irec
tiv es, the puppets contrived for the purpose

^
24
25

Ibid., pages 92-93.
Zhdanov, o£. c i t ., page 14.

"Lukacs ... largely (though am bivalently) a ccep ted Zhdanovism ..."
Solomon, oj3. c it., page 239.
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could not have — could not be allow ed to have
— any past, like human beings. Instead they
had only o ffic ia l dossiers, which w ere filled
in accordance with how they w ere intended
to ve view ed, eith er as 'positive heroes' or as
'vermin.'
The abuse o f Socialist R ealism in the Stalin Era is a n egative re
flection o f that era, not a com pelling th eo retica l refutation o f a philo
sophy o f art in itse lf. The relation o f Zhdanov to S ocialist Realism
is much like that o f Stalin to the U .S.S.R. — w hile condemning his e x 
c e sse s and crim es, there is still a certain resp ect for som e of his th eore
tic a l contributions and his p olitive p ractical accom plishm ent. We remain
am bivalent.
My purpose is not to render a judgem ent, how ever, on the overall
m erits or dem erits o f S ocialist R ealism , but to lo c a te Caudwell's th eore
tic a l contribution in relation to it. In its broadest outlines, the theory
o f Socialist Realism points to an a esth etic that
1.

Functions to change reality in a progressive direction

2.

R ealistically d ep icts the typ ical exp erien ces o f people and
even ts in the past and present.

3.

Continues the great a rtistic traditions o f the past

4.

Holds forth the m odel o f socialism as the end toward which
so ciety is moving.

According to Cornforth, the a esth etic in Caudwell's Illusion and
R eality would lead us away from th ese four principles o f the Marxist

26

Georg Lukacs, "Solzhenitsyn and the New Realism ," in Marxism
and Human Liberation: Essays on History, Culture and Revolution by
Georg Lukacs, edited with an introduction by E. San Juan, Jr. (New
York: D elta Books, 1973), pages 203-204.
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philosophy o f art. Let us turn to Illusion and R eality, th erefore, to find
out how Caudwell stands in relation to each o f th ese four statem en ts.

27

We have already, in Chapter II, becom e fanjiliar with the over
a ll thrust of Caudwell's view s. What conclusion can we draw from th ese
view s (with supplem entations in this chapter) regarding S ocialist Realism ?
First, it is obvious that one o f the major functions accorded to art by
Caudwell was its ability to change reality ~ not d irectly, o f course,
but by m otivating us to strive to bring into ex isten ce those things re
vealed to us in the presense o f great art. "In making external reality
glow with our expression, art tells us about ourselves. No man can look
directly at him self, but art makes o f the Universe a mirror in which
we catch glim pses o f ourselves, not as we are, but as w e are in a ctiv e
p otentiality o f becom ing in relation to reality through society."

28

When,

for exam ple, we exp erien ce poetry the em otional attitu d es w e

27

In a manuscript that Cornforth was probably unaware of a t the tim e
o f the "Caudwell Debate," Caudwell w rote: "Freedom is obtained, not
by the elim ination o f the observer or by supressing his role, but by re
cognising it, by understanding o f the determ ining power o f so cia l rela
tions. The world o f art is then not closed; it is open in the sense that
it includes the observor, because its so cia l relations in a ll their d eter
minism are overt. This o f itse lf makes it ob jective, b ecause, on the
one hand there is a d efin ite world view , and, on the other hand, the
sources o f this world view are not concealed but recognised. This fa ct
does not lead to rigidity and stagnation, for this world view recognises
the relativity of a ll values and change o f a ll being. It asserts that the
very ingression o f n ovelty, which is the stu ff o f art, is perpetual, and
refuses to recognise and form tradition, dream, hope, moral, aim , illusion,
or truth as perm anent. This, then, is th e proletarian novel which it
is the task fo the n ovelist to cre a te. This is what has been se t by Russian
n ovelists as their conscious aim : so cia list realism ." - - Christopher Caud
w ell, Romance and R ealism : A Study in English Bourgeois Literature,
edited by Samual Hynes (Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press, 1970),
page 119.
28

Christopher Caudwell, Illusion and R eality, op. c i t ., page 262.
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experience "leaves behind it a trace in th e m em ory. It is stored by the
organism and m odifies its action."

29

Thus art can function to influence

the developm ent o f reality in a progressive direction. Of course, it
doesn't have to do this, but Cornforth is wrong if he thinks this major
contention o f Socialist Realism is alien to Caudwell's view s.
Second, the realistic depiction o f ty p ica l exp erien ces is exa ctly
what Caudwell has in mind throughout his en tire discussion o f "The Com
mon Perceptual World" — i.e ., "all th e percepts of reality m obilized
for action."

30

It is only by having com m on exp erien ces and depicting

them to one another through their association s with com m only agreed
upon words that art, or any type o f com m unication, is possible. A rea listic
depiction, as opposed to a phantastic, reified , alienated depiction is
the common goal for both Caudwell and the S ocialist R ealists.
Third, Caudwell had nothing but resp ect for the great a rtistic
creations o f the past. His discussions o f past artists is in no way dissim i
lar to that o f Gorki which recognises their a rtistic contributions in the
social con text in which they worked.
Fourth, Caudwell held the position th at under socialism human
cap a cities would develop to hitherto unknown heights — "This expansion
w ill be evidenced in the fuller con ten t o f the new consciousness, which
w ill now be fed by the whole process o f human reality and can therefore
blossom as organically as a flow er, just as it did in tribal so ciety , but

Ibid., page 267.
30 Ibid., page 146.
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with a il the tech n ical elaboration evolved sin ce then. Proletarian art
in realising itse lf w ill becom e com m unist art."

31

Where Caudwell d iffered fundam entally from what I take to be
Cornforth's idea of Socialist Realism is in his in sisten ce that art is not
propaganda and should never be confused with it, as w ell as his attitu d e
to the individual artist's right to syn th esize a personal expression —i.e .,
"to express by means o f language a peculiar exp erien ce he has had in
life."

32

This is the road to a true S ocialist Realism rather than to a

p olitically expedient form o f art.
Thus, none o f the im portant criticism s leveled a t Caudwell by
Cornforth bear substantiation a fter a study o f Caudwell's te x t. We
can now leave the "Caudwell Debate" and progress to more fruitful
topics in relation to the problem s o f Caudwell's "contemporaneity."
The next chapter w ill deal with so-called "Hegelian Marxist" ap
proaches to art — or n on -Socialist R ealist Marxist th eories o f art. The
theory to be discussed m aintains that while S ocialist R ealism , in which
school I have located Caudwell, may be one form o f Marxist a esth etics
(although som e theorists m aintain it is not even that) there are other
equally valid Marxist approaches to art. I intend to com pare this position
to Caudwell's and attem p t to determ ine what relation, if any, Illusion
and R eality bears to Hegel's L ectures on A esth etics and to the Hegelian
Marxists who have attem p ted to syn th esize Marx and Hegel.

Ibid., page 282.
32

Caudwell, Romance and R ealism , page 34.
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CHAPTER V
Caudwell and H egel

In the previous chapter we saw th at Caudwell's view s w ere basically
harmonious with the major ideas o f S ocialist R ealism . In this sense
he could, perhaps, even be called a S ocialist R ealist theorist. It should
be stressed, however, th at while no basic disagreem ents ex ist betw een
Caudwell and Socialist R ealism , his own th eories, as w e have seen them
developed in Illusion and R eality, covered more ground and had a slightly
d ifferen t focus than did those o f the so cia list realists we have discussed
— e .g ., his discussion o f th e function o f art and the contrast as w ell
as the sim ilarities betw een the mock world o f scien ce and the common
perceptual world. I also pointed out, in the last chapter, that, so far
as I know, no d etailed com parison o f Caudwell's and Hegel's view s on
a esth etics and freedom had ever been a ttem p ted .
Besides the intrinsic in terest o f such a study, the need for this
comparison fairly w ell forced its e lf upon me when Cornforth suggested
H egel as a counter-exam ple to Caudwell's view s on the cen trality o f
the "Bourgeois Illusion" in modern a esth etics. If th e "Bourgeois Illusion"
o f unrestricted individual freedom is so cen tra l why don't we find it
in H egel?
Perhaps Caudwell should have drawn th e sam e distinction betw een
bourgeois philosophers th at Marx drew b etw een bourgeois econom ists
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- - i.e ., betw een the really sc ie n tific thinkers (Smith, Ricardo, Mill) and
th ose considered to be "vulgar" unoriginal apologists. Armed with this
type o f distinction, the "Bourgeois Illusion" may w ell be more pronounced
in the "vulgar" and relatively in the background in the "non-vulgar."
In any ev en t, the case o f H egel is ex cep tio n a l insofar as Marxism has
alw ays (or alm ost always) pointed to him as a thinker who was able in
many resp ects to se e beyond his own im m ediate h istorical surroundings.
By his developm ent o f the d ia le ctica l method he is also seen, as it w ere,
as th e Godfather o f Marxism its e lf. It should not then surprise us to
discover th at H egel does not fit the mold o f the "typical" bourgeois
thinker th at Caudwell w ishes to d ep ict.
I, a t lea st, have found that th e more one studies Marxism the more
one com es to see that the real heart o f it a ll boils down to the use o f
d ia le ctica l thinking -- and that, th erefore, H egel can be profitably read
on alm ost any subject o f in terest to Marxists — a fa c t long ago pointed
out by Lenin in his Philosophical N otebooks (Volume 38 o f the C ollected
Works).
I now propose to g iv e an outline o f Hegel's major ideas on the
philosophy o f art, to show that Caudwell's ideas are not out o f harmony
with th ese ideas — that they indeed com plem ent and extend them -and
finally to show that contem porary H egelizing Marxists, while perhaps
unfam iliar with Caudwell, neverth eless arrive at basically the same
view s on H egel and his relations to Marxism as I have arrived at with
the help o f Caudwell.
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I think it is im portant to estab lish basic points o f continuity betw een
Caudwell and H egel for tw o reasons — it allow s me to situ ate Caudwell's
view s within the m ainstream o f N ineteenth and T w entieth Century thought
thus enhancing my contention concerning the im portance o f Illusion
and R eality to Marxist thought. C orrelatively, it focu ses attention
on Hegel's Lectures on A esth etics — in many ways a much more a ccessab le
way to com e to grips with Hegel's thought than eith er the Phenomenology
or the Logic.
Let me now turn my a tten tio n to Hegel's A esth e tics. In his "Intro
duction" to the Lectures on Fine Art, H egel inform s us that the beauty
o f art is higher than mere natural beuaty since it is a product o f the
human spirit - - i.e ., insofar as humanity values its e lf and its products
over those o f nature, just so far is a rtistic beauty and creation to be
valued over natural.
Art has its own role and function to play in human life ~ it is
not a means to be used for som e other end. While not denying the possibi
lity o f art being so misappropriated, Hegel's position is that art can
attain to its true end only when it is free o f such m isdirected applications
and is thus at liberty to follow its own intrinsic ends.
These ends are, for H egel, the sam e as those o f religion and philo
sophy - - he means that o f bringing to our fin ite minds the recognition
and com prehension o f the D ivine, the highest in terests o f the spirit
and humanity. Expressed in a more modern way, w e can say that art,
like religion and philosophy, functions to reveal to us the true and d eep est
in terests we as human beings have. Art's sp ecific m ethod o f accom plish-
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ing this aim is to attem p t through sensuously created media to reveal
th ese interests to us. Religion and philosophy use other methods to
ach ieve this end but we a r e vnow only interested in the general asp ects
o f art and w ill not deal with th ese other realm s o f the "spirit" or their
relations to art.
How does art proceed to accom plish its aim ? H egel maintains
that the artistic vision ca tch es a glim pse o f a supra-sensuous reality
— a beyond in contrast to the im m ediately given here and now and a t
tem pts by means o f in tellectu a l reflectio n to cre a te sensuous reproduc
tions o f what was glim psed. Art's function is sim ilar to that o f scien tific
theorizing which a ttem p ts to discern laws and regularities behind the
transitory events o f the phenomenal world - - th e d ifferen ce being that
the reality beyond the world o f appearance which art seek s can only
be expressed in the m aterial media o f sensuous reproductions and not
by the constructions o f con cep ts, m athem atical form ulas, and the like.
At least as far as the Idea o f our human spiritual nature and in terests
are concerned, we find that: "The hard shell o f nature and the ordinary
world make it more d ifficu lt for the spirit to pen etrate through them
to the Idea than works o f art do."^
Art was mankind's first approach to an understanding beyond that
o f the purely physically given — a first a ttem p t to discern the universal
in the manifold o f particulars. However, the progress o f civilization
has destroyed the com m unity o f consciousness based on a feelin g o f

^ G.W.F. Hegel, A esth etics: Lectures on Fine Art, translated by T.M.
Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), Volume I, page 9.
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oneness with nature and th e sensuous creations o f a rtistic endeavor.
The developm ent o f reflectio n and ab stract thinking have replaced the
feelin gs and the senses as the guides o f the understanding and, as a result,
H egel maintains that "the conditions o f our present tim e are not favourable to art."

We no longer relate to art with a sim ple experience o f

enjoym ent, but subject a rtistic works to in tellectu a l consideration as
w ell. Thus we arrive a t the philosophy o f art, a t the need for "knowing
philosophically what art is."
To know what art is philosophically is, a t th e sam e tim e, to know
what it is scien tifica lly since for H egel scien tific procedure is "insepar
able" from philosophy. By this he means that w e are not to project
our own view points or subjective consideratons on to the subject m atter
o f art but to arrive at our understanding o f it "according to the n ecessity
o f its own inner nature."

ii

Hegel discounts the objection that one cannot scien tifica lly study
art since it is the product o f feelin g and fancy and the capriciousness
o f human im agination. In his view a ll th e works o f art are an expression
o f the human spirit — i.e. o f a thinking consciousness whose very nature
(thinking) allow s it to r e fle c t upon the sign ificance o f its products, since
art is a product o f this spirit, and this spirit its e lf operates according

^ Ibid., page 10.
3

Ibid., page 11.

U Ibid.
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to its own essen tia l logic or nature, it follow s that art is capable o f
being understood by thought.^
At this point, H egel reminds us o f two im portant considerations.
The first being that art products are relative to d ifferen t peoples and
d ifferen t historical co n tex ts - - th ey thus have d ifferen t functions ("pur
poses") and we should not try to subsume th ese im portant d ifferences
under too general theories as a way to avoid the d ifficu lt tasks involved
in analyzing a ll o f the d ifferen t form s under which a rtistic production
has m anifested its e lf. The second consideration is th at it is not the
job o f the philosopher o f art to w rite "prescriptions for artists." Rather,
he must "determine what the b eautiful is as such, and how it has displayed
itse lf in reality, in works o f art w ithout wishing to provide rules for
their production.
Thus far, H egel has established the three major ch aracteristics
o f art - - i.e ., it is a human not a natural project, it is a sensuous product
but created for human apprehension, and it has its end in itse lf.
Art results from a human need based on the fa c t that man is a
thinking anim al - - "i.e., th at man draws out o f h im self and puts before

"Thus the work o f art too, in which thought exp resses its e lf, belongs
to the sphere o f con cep tu al thinking, and the spirit, by subjecting it
to philosophical trea tm en t, is thereby m erely satisfyin g the need o f
the spirit's inm ost nature. For since thinking is the essen ce o f the Con
cep t o f spirit, the spirit in the last resort is only sa tisfied when it has
perm eated a ll products o f its a ctiv ity with thought too and so only then
has made them genuinely its own. But art, far rem oved ... from being
the highest form o f spirit, acquires its real ra tification only in philo
sophy." Ibid., page 13.
^ Ibid., page 18.
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him self what is and w hatever e lse is."^ H egel says th at unlike natural
ob jects, man's being is tw ofold ~ like natural ob jects man is a being
in the world, but he is also for h im self. He is for h im self due to the
developm ent o f his consciousness which com es about in tw o ways —by
th eoretica l a ctiv ity and by p ractical a ctiv ity . Man discovers him self,
th erefore, through the in tellectu a l apprehension o f the results o f p ractical
a ctiv ity directed towards th e creation o f art from sensuous forms and
m aterials. "But n everth eless the work o f art, as a sensuous object, is
not m erely for sensuous apprehension; its standing is o f such a kind that,
though sensuous, it is essen tially at the sam e tim e for spiritual apprehen
sion; the spirit is meant to be a ffe c te d by it and to find som e sa tisfaction
g
in it." The work o f art occu p ies a position midway b etw een brute sen
suous intuitions on the one hand and the abstractions o f con cep tu al thinking
on the other. Ideas which properly only ex ist in the realm o f pure thought
are trying to express th em selves (if I may use this way o f expressing
it) through objects o f sense ~ "In this way the sensuous a sp ect o f art
9
is spiritualized, since the spirit appears in art as made sensuous." Now,
what according to H egel is the aim (function, end) o f art?
The im portant thing to remark a t this point is that for H egel,
art's function is in no-w ise utilitarian - - i.e ., its aim and end is related
solely to itse lf — it is not a means for the accom plishm ent o f som e
other end extrinsic to art its e lf — (such as moral im provem ent, education,

^ Ibid., page 31.
g
Ibid., page 35.
^ Ibid., page 39.
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e tc .). This is not, how ever, to deny that th ese extrinsic ends may not
be furthered by art, th at art may not point to them and reinforce them,
but they remain extrinsic and as such are at m ost utilitarian by-products
o f art. The function o f art is not to bring about the furthering or the
accom plishm ent o f th ese n on -artistic ends.
Modern man, according to H egel, is an "amphibious animal" —living
in tw o d ifferen t and mutually ex clu siv e worlds. He lives in the everyday
world o f "earthly tem porality, borne down by need and poverty, hard
pressed by nature, enm eshed in m atter, sensuous ends and their enjoym ent,
m astered and carried away by natural im pulses and p assion s." ^ He
also lives in tellectu ally in a world which denies the primacy o f the everyday
world — in a world which human w ill demands be run by logical rules,
by laws and moral principles and universal maxims — this is the realm
"of thought and freedom." It is the task o f philosophy to reconcile the
everyday wold with that o f the realm o f thought — not by denying their
contradiction, but by showing how they are to be 'mediated' on a higher
level. This reconciliation and m ediation is not som ething imposed upon
th ese tw o realm s — but rather som ething that they th em selves bring
forth. Philosophy m erely "affords a r e fle c tiv e insight" into this process.
This is the task o f philosophy in any age. It is also the aim and end (func
tion) o f art. Art, how ever, does not proceed by way o f "reflective insight"
into essen ses — but by m eans o f "sensuous a rtistic con figuration."^

^

Ibid., page 5k.

* * Ibid., page 55.
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The aim or end (function) o f art is thus, according to H egel, "to unveil
the truth ... to se t forth th e reconciled opposition just m entioned, and
to have its end and aim in its e lf, in this very settin g forth and unveiling."

12

The work of art has no ex isten ce (or rather purpose) independent
o f the com m unity o f consciousnesses for which it is intended. Hegel
says that the work o f art is a question addressed to other minds. It
is an attem p t to lead us to the Idea by means o f the perception o f sensu
ous forms. This pursuit takes p lace in historically delim ited stages cor
responding to the developm ent o f hum anity. The more art corresponds
to the Idea, the b etter — and this is dependent upon the lev el o f con
sciousness o f the artist which is determ ined by the general lev el o f cu l
ture and civilization a t the tim e. The Idea does not appear to human
consciousness full blown but is attain ed though a series of sta g es. Through
out the ages, artists have struggled to express the aim o f art, and H egel
delineates three major sta g es which have been passed through on this
road. The first o f th ese sta g es he ca lls sym bolic and represents the
beginning o f art — a period when the a rtists are searching for a way
to express inchoate glim pses o f the Idea by m eans o f a rtisitic forms.
This stage is not very su ccessfu l, from Hegel's point o f view , and con
stitu tes what he ca lls a m ere search rather than a fruitful discovery
o f the proper sensuous form ulation o f the Idea. H egel ch aracterizes
pre-Greek art under this heading — i.e ., Egyptian, Babylonian, Indian,
e tc .
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The n ext stage he term s c la ssic a l. Here the human body, as the
bearer o f human spirit, has becom e the subject o f art. For H egel this
is a higher stage because spirit is identified with humanity and not ab
stractly associated (as in the previous stage) with anim als and objects
o f nature. N evertheless, the human form its e lf is still a natural object
and it is, for H egel, inappropriate to identify spirit solely with any natural
or physical ob ject. Thus w e arrive a t the third stage o f a rtistic developm ent
— the rom antic. Here, H egel inform s us, "spirit is the infinite subjectivity
o f the Idea, which as absolute inwardness cannot freely and truly shape
itse lf outwardly on condition o f remaining moulded into a bodily ex isten ce
as the one appropriate to it."

13

Rom antic art, th erefore, develops along

an inner spiritual path. Y et, since it is still art, it still needs to express
its e lf in sensuous form s. Only now it is not welded to the forms as in
the previous tw o stages. The spirit no longer id en tifies itse lf with the
physical creations o f art, but rather uses them as means o f better se lf
understanding.
Thereby the separation o f Idea and shape, their
indifference and inadequacy to each other, com e
to the fore again, as in sym bolic art, but with
this essen tia l d ifferen ce, that, in rom antic art,
the Idea, the d eficien cy o f which in th e symbol
brought with it d eficien cy o f shape, now has
to appear p erfected in its e lf as spirit and heart.
Because o f this higher p erfection , it is not sus
cep tib le o f an adequate union with the external,
since its true reality and m a n ife s ta ^ n it can
seek and ach ieve only within itse lf.

^

Ibid., page 79.

^

Ibid., page 81.
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Particularly interesting to students o f Caudwell is Hegel's position,
at the end o f the introduction, th at the highest and m ost universal art
form is poetry. Because poetry is the product o f the "beautiful im agina
tion" and im agination is a requirem ent o f all art form s, H egel maintains
that poetry is involved in a ll the other art form s and is thus the "universal
art o f the spirit." It is not to ta lly dependent on outward sensuous m ater
ials and rather functions in the inner realm o f mind and thought. And,
Hegel points out, it is just a t this highest lev el o f its developm ent that
art "passes over from the poetry o f the im agination to the prose o f thought."
It is important to note that while for H egel art no longer can play
the sam e role for humanity as it did in previous tim es, it is not "dead"
in any sense. It is still a living and vita l human accom plishm ent and
a ctiv ity ~ it is not y et in any sense com pleted - - i.e ., the Idea has not
yet fully m anifested itse lf with a co rrect correspondence to sensuous
forms - - the aim and function o f art, th erefore, w ill continue striving
towards this end, but, as H egel says, "to com p lete it w ill need the history
o f the world in its developm ent through thousands o f years."**’
We have now covered the major ideas which H egel advanced in
his "Introduction" to the L ectures on Fine A rt. We must now turn to
part one o f that work: "The Idea o f A rtistic Beauty or the Ideal."
B efore, however, proceeding further into H egel, a few propaedeutic
remarks, based on Georg Lukacs1 The Young H egel, are necessary. These
remarks are required b ecause I want to read H egel in term s o f an impor-

Ibid., page 89.
^

Ibid., page 90.
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tant interpretive method proposed by Lukacs. I want, for exam ple,
to equate certain basic H egelian con cep ts such as "the Idea," "the Abso
lute," "God," e t c ., with a term used by Marx in his 1944- manuscripts
— i.e., man's "species being." Lukacs suggests th at this is p erfectly
legitim a te and he bases him self upon a clo se reading o f Hegel's Pheno
menology o f Mind, esp ecia lly the "Preface" to that work. Lukacs main
tains (pages 468-470 o f The Young Hegel) that in this work H egel a t
tem pts to provide "a ladder" by which ordinary non-philosophical con
sciousness can mount to a philosophical outlook on life . This mounting
is to be done historically and not in som e abstruse or abstract manner.
H egel goes over the road o f human h istorical developm ent — "the road
o f human evolution in general" — and the Phenom enology thus becom es
a guidebook, as it w ere, to the in tellectu a l progress o f mankind. Hegel's
book, Lukacs sta tes, is concerned with "the acquisition by the individual
o f the experience o f the species."
I do not intend to g iv e a detailed analysis of the seven ty or so
pages denoted as "A Synoptic View o f the Structure o f The Phenom eno
logy o f Mind" — pages 466-536 o f The Young H egel — nor do I think
that my purposes require such a d etailed study. The follow ing quotation,
I suggest, is su fficien tly ex p licit to justify my citin g o f Lukacs in support
o f the equation o f the aforem entioned H egelian notions with the idea
o f "species-being." "The general con text," Lukacs w rites regarding
the Phenom enology, "makes it quite clear that what concerns H egel
here is the relationship b etw een the exp erien ce of the individual and
this historical experience o f the sp ecies. He refers ... to th e individual
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as 'incom plete mind, a co n crete shape in whose e x isten ce , taken as a
whole, one determ inate ch a ra cteristic predom inates, while the others
are found only in blurred outline' ... And in earlier discussions o f the
relation o f individual to th e sp ecies he refers to the la tter on one occasion
as 'the supreme being' (Jena Logic, page 1 58)." ^ We must bear these
observations in mind in th e follow ing discussion.
R eiterating ideas he has more fully developed in the Philosophy
o f H istory, H egel reminds us that the highest goal we are struggling
to attain is that o f Freedom . The human subject a ch iev es freedom when
he finds him self not lim ited or constrained by what he encounters, but
rather is the m aster o f it. This is Hegel's principle o f Subject-O bject
identity — Freedom being obtained when the Subject is finally aware
that it is at one with the O bject and is thus no longer constrained or
lim ited by it. The Subject, how ever, is initially only subjectively free
— in reality he is confronted by a h ostile and unfriendly ob jective en 
vironm ent which hinders the accom plishm ent o f his desires. This contra
diction, according to H egel, betw een su bjective freedom and objective
lim itation, must be overcom e. We find this sam e contradiction, by the
way, inside the Subject h im self. It is the opposition betw een reason
on the one hand, and the em otions and passions on the other. In the
realm o f Spirit man thus a ttem p ts to win Freedom by developing his
rational powers and guiding his w ill, d esires and action s by them . "Free-

Georg Lukacs, The Young Hegel; Studies in the R elations betw een
D ialectics and Econom ics, translated by Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1976). E specially see the remark "There can be no doubt,
then, th at the modern reader may everyw here read 'species' for 'mind'
or 'spirit' ('Geist')." -- page 534.
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dom in action issues ... from the fa ct that the rationality o f the w ill
wins actualization."

18

It is in the p olitical life o f the State, according to H egel, that
this highest actu alization tak es p lace. Here the n ecessity and constraints
which the Spirit confronts are o f its own making ~ are expressions of
its own w ill and understanding. The rational spirit comprehends that
this blending o f freedom with n ecessity is the highest attainm ent of
Freedom . H egel inform s us that the "ordinary consciousness" is incapable
o f understanding this contradiction (betw een "freedom" and "necessity")
in any other way than that o f to ta l opposition.' It is the philosopher
who ultim ately makes sense out o f this seem ing paradox. H egel w rites:
"But philosophy en ters into the heart o f the self-con trad ictory character
istics, knows them in their essen tia l nature, i.e., as in their one-sidedness
not absolute but self-d issolvin g, and it sets them in the harmony and
unity which is truth. To grasp this C oncept o f truth is the task o f philo
sop hy."^
Now, when H egel speaks o f "Truth" as the "absolute object o f
consciousness," I interpret him to be saying that this conception o f F ree
dom and its ultim ate fusion o f a ll contradictory form s o f constraint
and perm issiveness, o b sta cles and the overcom ing o f ob stacles, e tc .,
is, in fa ct, the "Truth." We have already seen how Lukacs, basing him self
upon the Phenomenology o f Mind, has equated Hegelian usage o f such
term s as "the Supreme Being," "mind," or "spirit" ("Geist") w ith the

18
^

H egel, op. c it., page 98.
Ibid., page 100.

108

term "species." I have found ju stification for my interpretation o f the
relations betw een the con cep ts o f "Freedom" and "Truth" in Hegel's
Philosophy o f Mind (third part o f The Encyclopedia o f the Philosophical
S ciences).
In the Zusatz to sectio n 382, for exam ple, H egel w rites: "The sub
stance o f mind is freedom , i.e ., the absence o f dependence on an Other,
the relating o f self to self. Mind is the actu alized Notion which is for
its e lf and has itse lf for ob ject. Its truth and its freedom alike consist
in this unity o f Notion and ob jectvity present in it. The truth, as Christ
said, makes spirit free; freedom makes it true."
Later on H egel also remarks (Zusatz to sectio n 440): "The principle
o f free mind is to make the m erely given elem en t (das Seiende) in con
sciousness into som ething m ental (S eelen h aftes), and conversely to make
what is m ental into an o b jectiv ity . Free mind stands, like consciousness,
as one side over against the ob ject, and is a t the sam e tim e both sides
and th erefore, like the soul, a to ta lity , and whereas in consciousness,
on the contrary, this to ta lity was divided into the 'I' and the object e x 
ternal to it, free mind or spirit, is to be cognized as self-know ing truth."
So, I interpret the conceptions o f "Truth" and "Freedom" in human
consciousness as essen tia lly the sam e, and for th e purposes o f my ren
dering o f H egel, I shall use th ese conceptions as virtually interchangable
depending upon the co n tex t. The Concept refered to is that once con
sciousness understands and lives according to its "species-being" it is
experiencing "Freedom." Thus, for econom y o f expression, I w ill h en ce
forth only use the term "Freedom."
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There are, according to H egel, three major realm s which attem p t
to arrive a t Freedom - - art, religion, and philosophy. We already know
how art attem p ts to arrive a t Freedom ("sensuous knowing"). Briefly,
religion and philosophy a ttem p t to arrive at this con cep t by means of
pictorial and free thinking resp ectively.
Religion em phasizes subjective feelin g s and the inner life o f the
individual — it is thus rem oved from the ob jective world o f art. Philo
sophy, by means o f "untrammelled thinking," by m eans, th at is, of con
cep tu al thinking is removed from the subjective pictorial mode o f thinking
as w ell as the sensuous mode. "In this way the two sides, art and religion,
are united in philosophy: the ob jectivity o f art, which here has indeed
lost its external sensuousness but therefore has exchanged it for the
highest form o f the o b jective, the form o f thought, and the subjectivity

20
of religion which has been purified into the subjectivity o f thinking."
It must be noted, how ever, that for H egel art and its reliance
on sensuous intuitions is not only a realm of pure externality - - but also
has internal presentation. Poetry is the primary exam ple because its
appeal is alm ost wholly to the im agination.
It is again im portant, I think, to stress that H egel was not a pro
pounder o f any "Art is Dead" school o f thought. "We may w ell hope,"
he w rites, "that art w ill alw ays rise higher and com e to perfection..."

21

We must now turn to Hegel's idea o f "Beauty." "Beauty," as I understand
H egel, is that which renders m anifest to us an understanding o f our

^

Ibid., page 104.

^

Ibid., page 103.
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own "species-being." The Idea o f beauty is nothing other than what
H egel ca lls "The Concept." The "Idea" he ca lls the "unity o f Concept
and R eality." But just what does he mean by "The Concept"? His u ltim ate
meaning is that "what we ca ll 'soul' and, more p recisely, ego is the Concept
itse lf in its free existen ce."

The "Concept o f Beauty" is thus derivative

of this prior Concept — in its free existen ce." Thus, the Idea o f beauty
as the unity o f Concept and R eality can only mean that we find beauty
in those objects o f sensuous apprehension which reveal to us asp ects
o f our own consciousness o f ourselves as sp ecies-b ein gs. Since H egel,
as an O bjective Idealist, b eliev es in the identity o f the Subject-O bject
he can find beauty both in nature (although only im p erfectly) and in
art (in its highest form). This is because man's consciousness o f him self
can be reflected back to h im self from nature as w ell as from art. "Every
thing ex isten t, th erefore, has truth only in so far as it is an existen ce
o f the Idea. For the Idea is alone the genuinely actual."

23

Remember

that the Idea = unity o f C oncept + R eality, and that C oncept = "soul"
or "ego." So what we find in "Beauty" is our own consciousness o f ourselves
reflected back to us, and since I have been m aterialistically reading
Hegel with Marx's category o f "species-being" — the "Beautiful" is that
which reveals to us the nature o f our own "species-being."
We have a problem, how ever, with Hegel's Subject-O bject identity
as no Marxist, Caudwell included, would a cce p t this equation. Lukacs
informs us that "the id en titica l su bject-object is the cen tral pillar o f

^

Ibid., page 108.

^

Ibid., page 110.
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ob jective idealism just as the reflectio n in human consciousness o f an
ob jective reality subsisting independently o f consciousness is the crux
o f m aterialist epistem ology."

2k

This means we cannot a ccep t the Idea as the unity o f the Concept
(species-being) and R eality if we think R eality (nature) is a product
o f the self-d evelopm ent o f our species-b ein g (or Hegel's word "conscious
ness"). This also means that we could not discover the beautiful (even
im perfectly) in nature, since there is no subject-object identity and
natural objects w ill not be reflectin g back to us the nature o f our own
sp ecies-being — only in the world o f art, man made creation s, w ill we
find the B eautiful as such. Paradoxical as it may seem for a m ateri
alistica lly inspired critique to deny beauty to nature, and w e shall have
to consider this assertion in greater d eta il when w e look a t Cherneshevski's a esth etic writings directed sp ecifica lly against Hegelianism from
a m aterialistic view point, it is n everth eless the conclusion o f the fore
going analysis. Let us return to H egel.
Art is a mode o f human a ctiv ity in which w e a ttem p t to understand
and comprehend our species-b ein g by means o f sensuous experience.
H egel w rites that "the beautiful is ch aracterized as the pure appearance
o f the Idea to sense."

25

What does H egel have to say about the beauty

o f Nature?
In order for human consciousness to win se lf recognition it must
first ex ist - - it must first find its e lf in Nature. Consciousness only ex ists

2k

25

Lukacs, op. c it ., page 270.
H egel, op. c it., page 111.
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fo r -itse lf when em bodied In individual organism s. The individual both
se ts him self o ff from nature (as a self-con sciou sn ess) and also sets him self
practically within nature by making it an object o f use for him self.
Life becom es aware o f its e lf, as H egel remarks, in "ensouled individuals"
- - the Idea thus finds its e lf in the world. And this recognition o f "ideality
is not a t all only our reflectio n on life; it is ob jectively present in the
living subject him self, whose ex isten ce , th erefore, we may sty le an
'objective idealism'."
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Now the individual consciousness sets itse lf

the task o f comprehending the extern al world, but at this prim itive
le v el consciousness has no idea o f the su bject-object identity - - it does
not find its e lf, therefore, in Nature. However, consciousness does have
a "sensuous perception o f natural forms." Nature begins to appear rational
— i.e ., there are laws as w ell as a rational appearing order betw een
the articulations o f the parts o f the physical organism and o f organisms
to one another. This leads H egel to conclude that:
nature in general, as displaying to sense the
con crete C oncept and the Idea, is to be called
beautiful; this is because when we look a t natural
forms that accord with the C oncept, such a
correspondence with the Concept is foresha
dowed; and when w e exam ine them with our
senses the inner n ecessity and harmony o f the
whole articulation is revealed to them a t the
sam e tim e. The perception o f nature as beautiful
goes no further than this foreshadowing o f the
Concept.
Now our sp ecies-being is anthropomorphizing nature - - anim als, e.g .,
are called beautiful or ugly not in th em selves (such a distinction makes

26 Ibid., page 123.
22 Ibid., pages 129-30.
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no sense) but only In relation to our in terests. We also find natural ob
jects beautiful because th ese produce within us moods and em otional
experien ces. Now our consciousness is exp licitly aw are o f its e lf ~ is,
as H egel says, an object to itse lf and is able to "m anifest itse lf to others."
Nothing in Nature is capable o f doing this. In anim als we only "surmise
a soul." Our species-being is not, th erefore, derived from an awareness
o f Nature, but from our own self-con sciou sn ess — i.e ., we can con tem 
plate Nature for an etern ity, and w e w ill never becom e ex p licitly aware
o f what we ourselves are - - for this we need both Nature and self-co n 
scious reflection o f ourselves. "This is the primary d eficien cy in the
beauty o f nature..."
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We are thus driven on from the im p erfect beauty

o f Nature to the world of Art. Here we w ill find the truth o f sp eciesbeing — i.e ., o f self-con sciou sn ess, o f freedom , o f "spiritual animation"
— here we will find beauty qua beauty and not, as in N ature, as a projection
o f consciousness on to som e other thing.
The third chapter of H egel’s L ectures on Fine Art (the last we
shall consider in the first volum e o f his work on a esth etics) is en titled
"The Beauty o f Art or the Ideal." It is divided into three parts the most
important points o f which are as follow s:
THE IDEAL AS SUCH. H egel te lls us th at only insofar as we can
find it in external reality does truth (i.e ., our sp ecies being and our con
sciousness o f it) have any real e x iste n c e . We find extern al reality divided
up into parts, disparate and separated e n titie s, y e t w e find a bit o f the
truth in every part — i.e ., w e can learn som ething about ourselves from

^

Ibid., page 132.

anything in nature which w e study and r e fle c t upon. This leads H egel
to declare that Art is a "middle term betw een purely indigent ex isten ce
and purely inner ideas"
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— since th e physically existin g work is both

a part o f the external world and y et has been called forth out o f the
human mind — it is an attem p t a t se lf knowledge by means not o f inner
reflectio n on the C oncept (philosophy) but by sensuous contem plation
o f natural objects which have been worked upon by consciousness. Art
"furnishes" us with the things th em selves, but out o f the inner life of
mind; it does not provide them for som e use or other but confines in terest
to the abstraction of the ideal appearances for purely contem plative
inspection."
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THE DETERMINANCY OF THE IDEAL. We have thus far concerned
ourselves with general ideas and arrived a t a fairly clear understanding
o f the major principles contained in Hegel's philosophy o f art and beauty.
Now we must consider more sp ecifica lly just how Beauty can m anifest
its e lf in "finite existen ce." H egel has already pointed out that the major
function o f art is "to make the Divine the cen tre o f its representations,"
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which is a Hegelian way o f saying that Art makes us aware o f ourselves
as self-con sciou s sp ecies-b ein gs. In this section o f his a esth etics we
should be mindful o f Feuerbach's contention that theology is really anthro
pology. For what we are as men first becom es m anifest to us (who,
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as H egel says, are view ing this developm ent philosophically not n eces
sarily to those who actually lived and experienced the particular moment
under consideration) in our religious and m ythological developm ent.
Thus, Art begins with representations o f the gods - - first p olyth eistically
and later m onotheistically. "For the whole human heart with everything
whereby it is moved in its innerm ost being, everything which is powerful
in it — every feelin g and passion, every deeper in terest in the soul -this con crete life form s the living stu ff o f art, and the Ideal is its representation and expression."
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At this le v el o f human developm ent, reli

gious them es dom inate the determ inancy o f Art because our self-under
standing o f species-being has progressed only to this lim it. Contem plation
o f th ese them es is only one asp ect o f the function o f art. As living
subjects with w ills and in terests we must also a c t. So the Ideal d eter
m ines itse lf also in artistica lly considering the great actions o f the gods
and heroes (and later men them selves).
Hegel now begins to consider the relationship betw een individuality
and universality in art. His point being that the Ideal is the universal
(species-being as we have been considering it is a universal common
to all mankind) but as art it is universal only so far as it is "configurated
for our vision and therefore still im m ediately one with particular individuals and their life."
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This is what Lukacs and other Social R ealists

mean by typical representations o f typ ical situations. H egel him self
stresses the im portance o f the situation to be a rtistica lly portrayed

^

Ibid., page 185.
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— it must be one which makes m anifest "the profound and important
in terests and the true con ten t o f spirit."

3h

There is no co n flict here

with eith er Socialist Realism or Caudwell.
H egel next turns his a tten tion to what he ca lls the external d eterminacy o f the Ideal. He rejects the view that the a rtist rem oves us
from the real world and tries to bear us o ff, as it w ere, to an inner mys
tic a l realm far rem oved from actu al life so that we can "disdain" the
reality of the everyday world. This is not, for H egel, the function of
real art. For him, the living individual ex ists only in the here and now
— his life consists o f struggling and fighting in a real, determ inate (and
historically formed) environm ent. And as this struggle "is to be appre
hended, not only as such, but in its determ inate appearance, by art,
it has to enter (i.e., the Ideal) ex isten ce on and in m aterial o f this (mundane) kind."
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For the artist does not ex ist simply for him self. He

must address h im self to the real extern al world, H egel says, because
this is where he finds his public:
Now the truly ideal (work o f art) is indeed in tellig 
ible to everyone in the universal in terests and
passions of its gods and men; y e t since it brings
its individuals before our ey es within a sp ecific
external world o f cu stom s, usages, and other
particular d etails, there arises the new demand
that this external world shall com e into correspon
dence not only with th e^ h a ra cters represented
but equally with us too.

^

Ibid., page 199.
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Ibid., page 246.
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Ibid., page 264.
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In line with this, H egel m aintains th at art never ex ists for a few avant
guarde souls, the litera ti or savants, or any sm all circle o f afficianados
— "but only to the nation a t large and as a whole." Im m edicate in tellig i
bility (also a Caudwellian and S ocialist R ealist demand) is som ething
H egel considers fundam entally im portant in any work o f art. He stresses
th at "what is valid for the work o f art as such is equally applicable to
the external asp ect o f the historical reality there represented. We too
belong to our tim e and our people, and this reality must be clear and
apprehensible for us w ithout wide learning, so that we can becom e a t
home in it and are not com pelled to remain confronted by it as by a
foreign and unintelligible world."
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S u bjectivistic idiosyncrasies, for

H egel, have no place in a work o f art.
THE ARTIST. The artist is nothing more, as artist, than what
he crea tes. The actu al work o f art is the thing itse lf. H egel rejects
the notion o f a hidden depth to the artist only a part o f which is revealed
in his actual creation. This is because art has a so cia l base and a uni
versal function as the reflection o f our sp ecies-b ein g a t a particular
h istorical juncture. The artist and his work, H egel m aintains, are u lti
m ately justified only by the rational elem en ts to be found in the subject
m atter. This rationality is ob jective in so far as it is an expression of
the universal species-b ein g — this also co n stitu tes the originality of
art. When the subjectivity of the artist is united with the objectivity
o f the situation or world m ovem ent in which he finds h im self — then

^

Ibid., page 273.
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and only then are great original works produced. "To have no manner
has from tim e im m em orial been the one grand manner, and in this sense
alone are Homer, Sophocles, Raphael, Shakespeare, to be called 'original.'"
Finally, I want to highlight som e passages from Hegel's chapter
on poetry. Since Illusion and R eality is primarily concerned with poetry,
it seem s appropriate to end our discussion o f Hegel's a esth etics on this
note as both he and Caudwell considered poetry to be the highest form
o f a rtistic production. Hegel's sectio n on poetry is three hundred pages
long, so I w ill only be com m enting on a very m inute portion o f his rather
exhaustive analysis. B ecause poetry uses words and addresses our in
tellectu a l selves (since we can read it as w ell as rec ite it) with the least
amount o f sensuous dependence, H egel se e s its function as primarily
oriented towards our inner rather than our outer reality. The subject
m atter is both more d irectly im portant in its e lf and more easily rendered
in an ob jective vein for the "spirit's apprehension." In poetry w e first
begin, in our ideas, to becom e ob jective to ourselves — inner im agination
as w ell as our intuitions becom e less dependent on sensuous m aterials
and approach, without ever really reaching, the in tellectu a listic con cep ts
which are the proper domain o f philosophy. "Consequently," H egel main
tains in what is surely one o f his m ost controversial and misunderstood
a esth etics pronouncem ents, "in the ca se o f poetry proper it is a m atter
of indifference whether w e read it or hear it read; it can even be trans
lated into other languages w ithout essen tia l detrim ent to its value, and

38 ]bid., page 298.
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turned from poetry into prose, and in th ese ca ses it is related to quite
d ifferen t sounds from those o f the original."

39

Poetry is the m ost com m on educator o f mankind ~ for to be edu
cated , or to educate, it is necessary to know what reality is and poetry
attem p ts, and in large m easure fu lfills, this function. Its subject m atter
is all that stirs in the human spirit - - its major task "is to bring before
our minds the powers governing spiritual lif e ." ^

H egel says that poetry

is older than prose — it is the original a ttem p t to present truth originating
in a tim e when abstract reasoning had not y e t separated the universal
from its em bodim ent in th e individual.
Poetry does not deal with the abstracted universal con cep ts o f
philosophy, but with em pirical, individualized m an ifestation s o f the
universal. Thus we find it particularized — i.e. French poetry, A ncient
Egyptian poetry, C lassical poetry, e tc . We can, n everth eless, relate
to a ll these d ifferen t types o f poetry (though it is more natural to identify
with the poetry o f our own tim e, in terests, and culture) since they all
have som ething in com m on ~ "namely universal human nature and art"
~ or, in our way o f interpreting H egel, man's sp ecies-b ein g is reflected
in them all. Caudwell's "genotype" is also a basic expression o f our
fundam ental human sim ilarities and can be used to replace Hegel's term
"universal human nature."

^

Ibid., page 964.
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We can now sum m arize the major points o f Hegel's philosophy
o f art as follows:
1.

A rtistic creation is an attem p t to express by sensuous pro

duction and apprehension mankind's m ost fundam ental self-understanding;
2.

This self-understanding enables us to recognize our true .

in terests and values as human beings;
3.

This attem p t is lim ited by h istorical conditions and the

general lev el o f cultural developm ent - - thus art must be approached
and studied scien tifica lly (philosophically) in order for us to comprehend
its meaning a t any one tim e and its general overall significance;
V

It is primarily by m eans o f the im agination th at art leads

us to the desired self-understanding.
5.

Art is not capable o f leading us to the goal o f self-com p re

hension, but it is a n ecessary stage on the road to this goal which, u lti
m ately, can only be reached by the conceptual understanding characteris
tic o f philosophy.
Let us now turn our atten tion to Caudwell's writings to see just
how far we can go in drawing parallels betw een his ideas and those o f
H egel. I w ill attem p t to show that Caudwell's position is fundam entally
in accordance with that o f H egel, although expressed in a very different
way. In the first place, how ever, it must be noted that Caudwell, as
a m aterialist, rejects the su bject-object identity ch a ra cteristic o f H egel
ianism . N evertheless, since he is a d ia lectica l thinker, his ideas, as
do those o f Marx, run parallel to Hegel's when discussing the developm ent
o f art. One o f the main reasons this is so is b ecause o f the clo se relation
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betw een the Hegelian d ia lectic and th e Marxian which is d erivitive from
it. Thus, in attem pting to arrive a t a Marxist philosophy o f art, we
can always turn to H egel for insights and a ttem p t to interpret him in
a m aterialist spirit.
I now wish to consider Caudwell's w ritings in light of the above
discussion o f Hegel. We are already fam iliar with Caudwell's basic view s
in Illusion and R eality (see Chapter 2) so I wish now to present his position
directly concerning "Beauty" as found in his essay "Beauty: A Study
in Bourgeois A esthetics."
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Caudwell begins with the sam e fundam ental question which we
find as Hegel's starting point as w ell ~ i.e ., "What is Beauty?"

He in

form s us that beauty appears independent o f our individual brains since
beautiful objects survive from generation to generation, and in so far
as we ascribe beauty to nature, seem s even to have ex isted before man
him self. How did mankind arrive a t the notion o f an independently e x is t
ing beauty? Caudwell te lls us th at in the past men began to think of
things objectively existin g in the environm ent as opposed to existing
only within their consciousness. He gives the exam ple of heat as opposed
to a feelin g such as happiness or joy. The unpleasant sensation produced
by a hot object can, for exam ple, be elim inated by removing ourselves
from its presence — happiness, or anger, or joy w e can carry around

Christopher Caudwell, "Beauty: A Study in Bourgeois A esthetics,"
in Further Studies in a Dying Culture, edited and w ith a preface by Edge 11
Rickword, republished in Studies and Further Studies in a Dying Culture
w ith an introduction by Sol Yurick (N .Y .: Monthly R eview Press, 1971).
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within us. From conceptions like th ese we arrived a t the idea o f an
ob jectively existing beauty. "Like h eat, beauty appears or disappears
in man's conscious field according as he m oves towards or from the
beautiful object in his environm ent, th e ob ject its e lf remaining unchanged
during the process.

h?

Caudwell, however, rejects his own analogy. This may be a reason
why men have fe lt that beauty is o b jectiv e, but there are fundamental
d ifferen ces betw een our exp erien ces o f h eat and o f beauty. Mankind's
experience, for exam ple, o f a hot or a cold ob ject tends to be universal.
A glowing hot coal w ill be perceived to be hot by anyone in any culture,
w hile beauty is relativized from man to man, age to age, and country
to country. Here w e have a contradiction. On the one hand we have
com e to think, as H egel does, th at beauty has an ob jective ex isten ce
(an environm ental property existin g independently) y e t unlike, say, heat
it is differently experienced:
We could only reconcile ... (this view ) if there
were a triadity in the su bject-object relation
o f man to b eau tifu l ob ject; if in addition to
naked subject and naked environm ent, we had
a third m ediating term , som ething which remained
unchanged while the subject changed and so
could stand to it as environm ent and account
for our projection o f Beauty outside ourselves,
and y et which changed while the bare environ
m ent remained unchanged, which would account
for the historic change in what p articu lar^ b jects
are found to be lovely or made b eautiful.

Ibid., page 84.
^

Ibid., page 86.
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We have, in fa ct, such a third term according to Caudwell ~ it
is so ciety . In relation to the idea o f beauty, so ciety plays the same
role for Caudwell as the realm o f the A bsolute Ideal plays for Hegel.
Thus beauty, Caudwell m aintains, just as religion or philosophy, has
an independent ob jective ex iste n c e (i.e., independent o f me as a particular
individual) — th ese values have an ob jective so cia l ex isten ce . Truth
is another exam ple he c ite s. Truth has no meaning independent o f true
statem en ts — human products — but it is independent o f the individual
— it is a product o f so ciety "a particular relation o f the individual,
via so ciety , to the rest o f the Universe."
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Now, it is im portant to recall from our previous discussion o f Illu
sion and R eality that the em otions, desires, e t c ., o f mankind are just
as much social products, in Caudwell's view , as are the scien tific theories
that are the product o f our common perceptual wold. We share "a com munity o f instinct as w ell as a com m unity o f cognition."
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The commun

ity o f hopes, fears, em otions and desires is the basis o f art just as the
com m unity o f cognition and perception is the basis o f scien ce. These
seem ingly disparate modes of responding to reality (art and science)
are really com plem entary products o f our human situation. There can
be no real contradiction b etw een them . Our a ffe c tiv e response to our
environm ent, based on our com m on hopes and desires as represented
in works o f art, is the basis o f beauty. Caudwell proposes the following

^
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Ibid., page 89.
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d e f i n i t i o n : w h e n e v e r the a ffe c tiv e elem en ts in socially known things
show social ordering, th ere we have beauty, there alone we have beauty."
It is, further, a product o f the labor process because, as Caudwell insists,
mankind must have u ltim ate agreem ent not only concerning the nature
o f the external world but also concerning the nature and role o f desire.
We must constantly mold and meld togeth er our desires along with our
in tellectu a l com prehension o f reality. These view s are fundam entally
the sam e as those we have attem p ted to ex tra ct from H egel. That art
is a reflection o f our sp ecies-b ein g and that its developm ent is a function
o f the developm ent (through history) o f the sp ecies. "The artist takes
bits o f reality, socially known, to which a ffe c tiv e associations adhere,
and crea tes a mock world, which ca lls into being a new a ffe c tiv e a ttitu d e,
a new em otional exp erien ce. New beauty is thus born as the result of
his social labour."^
Art, Caudwell stresses, functions to condition our in stin cts to
adjust to the social reality within which we find ourselves — in doing
so the instincts th em selves are changed. "Beauty is the knowledge o f
o n eself as a part o f other selv es in a real wold, and re fle c ts the growth
in richness and com p lexity o f their relations."
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However, neither Truth

nor Beauty are the goals o f the so cia l process. They are products, rather,
generated by the labor o f human beings in the developm ent o f the social
process. They can never be ends in th em selves since they are reflectio n s,

^
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alw ays, o f a more fundam ental reality ~ i.e ., the so cia l world. All of
th ese view s, as w ell as th e position o f Illusion and R eality outlined in
Chapter Two, are in fundam ental agreem ent with the five characteristics
o f Hegelian a esth etics listed above.
One o f the m ost recen t a ttem p ts to understand Marxist philosophy
o f art in term s o f Hegelianism is Henri Arvon's L 'esthetique m arxiste
ha

published in English by Cornell U niversity Press in 1979.

Arvon's

theories have already been partially discussed in our chapter on Socialist
R ealism . I now want to present his more sp ecific view s on the relations
betw een H egel and Marxist art theory. While Arvon tends to oversim plify,
and thus m isrepresent som e o f Hegel's view s, his work is, nevertheless,
an interesting introduction to som e o f current literature relating Marxism
to its Hegelian origins. To this end, I w ill discuss the first three chapters
o f his book — i.e ., "Marxism and Art," "Dialects," and "Form and Con
tent."
One im portant point that Arvon stresses is that neither H egel
nor Marx ever thought o f art as primarily a tool to bring about p olitical
or social change. This problem was previously discussed in our earlier
chapters and is esp ecia lly im portant in referen ce to the condem nation
o f Caudwell by Cornforth. We recall th at Cornforth was quoting Belin
sky's view s in his a ttack on Illusion and R eality. Belinsky (along with
N.G. Chernyshevsky) can be said to represent a radical m echanical ma
teria list (non-M arxist or pre-M arxist) trend in Russian literary history.

49

Henri Arvon, Marxist E sth etics (Ithaca: Cornell U niversity Press,
1973) translated by Helen Lane, introduction by Fredric 3ameson.
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It is this trend which sees art only in its instrum ental uses ("art can
redeem itself only by serving the p eo p le." ^ ) which is responsible for
the accretion o f dogm atism which is associated with certain phases
o f Soviet and Communist thinking on the arts during th e so-called "Stalin
era." We have already seen that H egel, Marx and Caudwell reject art
as being essen tially instrum ental (in the sense of being the object of
p olitical manipulation). Arvon points out that Plekhanov, as w ell as
Lenin, also shared this view . "Esthetics," Plekhanov w rote, "has no
orders w hatsoever to give art ... it is as ob jective as physics"^* — i.e.,
it only studies how a rtistic trends have becom e standard in different
h istorical epochs. Trotsky's view in Literature and Revolution (192*0
seem s to me to present th e co rrect Marxist approach to this problem:
It is quite true that a work o f art should never
be judged, accep ted , or rejected on the basis
o f Marxist principles. The products o f a rtistic
creation must be evaluated first and forem ost
on the basis o f their own laws, that is to say
the laws o f a rt. But only Marxism is capable
o f explaining why and how a certain orientation
o f art cam e about a t a certain period, th at is
to say the origin and the reason «£pr such an
orientation and not som e other.
The problem, how ever, goes deeper than just labeling tendencies
within Marxism to subordiate a esth etics to politics as "mechanical,"
"non-Marxist," e tc . Hegel's d ia lectic o f art leads to the view that art,
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as a reflection in sensuous form o f the Ideal (for us man's species-being,
for Caudwell the genotype m odified by the social realm ), has been re
placed functionally (as had religion) by philosophy. The Marxist d ia lectic
can quite easily lead to the view th at p olitical philosophy is the way
to the u ltim ate in tellectu a l self-understanding o f man and thus art,
as an alternative and more prim itive attem p t at this understanding,
is necessarily to be guided by philosophy. I think this is in fa ct true.
The point, however, cen ters on the word "guide." All th ese attem p ts,
philosophical and a esth etic, are, for Marxists, reflectio n s o f our external
environm ental situation (sp ecifica lly production modes and relations)
in consciousness. Once philosophical understanding has been attained
it is only natural to judge a ll other form s o f a ctiv ity by its standards.
It would be u n dialectical to think that the role art enjoyed in human
society in a period before philosophical understanding had been attained
would be the sam e as in a period a fter such attainm ent had been realized.
This is also a m atter o f degree — th e augm entation o f philosophy's leading
role in any period being correlated to a diminution o f the leading role
o f art, esp ecially since both a c tiv itie s have the sam e u ltim ate goal.
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Arvon sees this too, though not in quite the sam e way as I have ex 
pressed it in this chapter. He w rites, for exam ple, "In order for literature
to be recognized as the highest art, the theoretician must be persuaded
a priori that art itself, far from being the 'contem plation o f things that
do not depend on the principle o f reason' which Schopenhauer speaks
of, is simply the sensible appearance o f the Idea. This is, in fa ct, Hegel's
view o f art. The conclusion th at w ill necessarily follow from this vision
o f art is foreordained in his system . Just as in his system art is superFootnote continued on follow ing page.
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We have previously discussed this goal — Arvon supports our view s,
based on Lukacs, that by replacing the m ystical elem en ts in Hegelianism
with m aterialist elem en ts w e find that m ost o f Hegel's works lend th em 
selv es to a Marxist interpretation. For Marx, "The truth o f art then
becom es synonymous with self-aw aren ess o f the human species."
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This

is, as we have shown, equally true o f Hegel.
Arvon points out that since Marxism stresses the clo se relation
betw een man's developm ent through social progress and art, it crea tes
an a esth etics which stresses con ten t over form . This is d ifferen t from
H egel who stressed the unity o f con ten t and form . However, he does
not provide any docum entation for this claim and, sin ce the form al a sp ects
o f a rtistic creation seem to be just as much dependent upon the historical
situation as the non-form al elem en ts, I see no reason to make this d istin c
tion. Arvon him self suggests that to g et a b etter understanding o f our
subject we can "stand the H egelian d ia lectic 'on its head' and substitute
socia l reality for the Hegelian Idea."'5'5 But this substitution would not
be possible if Marxism and Hegelianism differed fundam entally on such
basic concepts as "content" and "form" and their "unity."

Footnote continued from previous page.
ceded first by religion and then by philosophy, so that it has rightfully
(sic!) been said that a ll o f his E sth etics is m erely a funeral sermon on
art, so the hierarchy o f the arts established by Marxist e sth e tic s on
the basis of their in telligibility can lead only to the subordination o f
art and the artist to the im peratives o f a philosophical, or o ften a purely
p olitical, doctrine." Ibid., pages 22-23.
^

Ibid., page 27.

^

Ibid., page 42.
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Arvon then goes on to te ll us o f what the "prime task" o f Marxist
a esth etics consists. Marxism, he says, distinguishes b etw een essen ce
(the internal workings o f a process) and phenomena (the external mani
festation s of the internal workings). The task o f Marxist philosophy
o f art is to "reestablish the d ia lectica l unity o f the essen ce and pheno
m en a" ^ —by so doing Marxist philosophers o f art w ill g et a truer picture
of the nature o f art and o f reality by clarifying the relations betw een
even ts on the surface o f so ciety and those occuring deep down (as it
were) within the hidden essen tia l inner structures o f so ciety and how
th ese two areas or lev els o f reality are reflected in works of a rtistic
creation.
While Arvon has fundam ental criticism s o f Marxist a esth etic prac
tic e (we saw som e o f them in the previous chapter) he does appreciate
its p oten tial to make new discoveries o f a th eo retica l nature in the
fields o f a esth etics and criticism . I have also presented his view s here
to show that the notion o f a Marxist philosophy o f art growing out of,
and being basically com patible w ith, an Hegelian approach is not an
ideosyncratic view but is a position th at is becom ing more and more
accep ted . The basic com patibility I have tried to establish betw een
a Caudwellian and a m aterialistically interpreted H egelian approach
to the philosophy o f art is a contribution to the developm ent o f this
position.
Caudwell, however, was not directly influenced by H egel, and
his critics have never taken him to task for this. They have, however,

^

Ibid., page 50.
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as we saw in earlier chapters, attem p ted to diminish his role as a Marxist
philosopher by accusing him o f being a "Freudian." We must now turn
our attention to an assessm en t o f the direct influence Freud e ffe c te d
upon Caudwell's work.
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CHAPTER VI
Caudwell, Freud and Marcuse

Caudwell discusses Freud both in Illusion and R eality and Studies
in a Dying Culture. Chapter Seven o f the latter work is, in fa ct, a major
study and critique o f Freud's thought. I hope to show in this chapter
that while Caudwell's critique may be a bit dated (form ulated as it was
in the co n tex t o f the a n ti-fa scist m ovem ent o f the 1930s) it is still,
essen tially, valid and should lay to rest a ttem p ts to brand Caudwell
h im self as a "Freudian" in the sense that he e c le c tic a lly and uncritically
attem pted to blend togeth er ideas from Marx and Freud. I have also
included a discussion o f Herbert Marcuse's Eros and C ivilization because
this work throws light both on Freud's own though as w ell as on Caudwell's
criticism . Caudwell in many ways anticipated som e o f Marcuse's view s
(such as the stress on the social background o f individuals with referen ce
to the type o f so ciety they live in) and Marcuse for his part has provided
an extension o f Freud's th eories, based in large m easure on Marxist
influences, which a reader o f Caudwell can w ell appreciate in large
part, even if not accepting many o f the more sp ecu lative conclusions.
Turning now to Caudwell's critique, w e see that he maintains that
while Freud is one o f the first o f the scien tific psychologists, he w ill
be rem embered more for his em pirical contributions than for his th eore
tica l. His scien tific d iscoveries have been presented in a "sem i-m agical

132

framework" and he rem ains confined within the "m ythical era" o f the
developm ent o f psychology. Caudwell, in fa c t, considers Freudianism
to be religious in its explanations o f the human mind. The com plex
workings o f the mind are sym bolized, for exam ple, as the Censor, Ego,
Id, e tc ., which, Caudwell says, are "mind-deities" analogous to the "wea
ther d eities who inhabited Greek Olymbus."^ Freud is, n evertheless,
credited (as in The Future o f an Illusion) for upholding the progressive
tendencies o f bourgeois m aterialism against earlier id ealistic and outright
religious (as in Christianity) form ulations o f human nature. Freud con si
ders him self a m aterialist, how then could Caudwell com e to ca ll him
a t heart religious? The key to understanding Caudwell's critique o f
Freud is to see that Freudianism is essen tia lly a bourgeois psychology.
For Caudwell this means that tw o crucial, and for Marxists fa lse, ideas
underpin Freud's theories - - th ese ideas are not uniquely Freudian but
ch aracteristic o f bourgeois thought in general. These ideas are "firstly
that the consciousness o f men is sui generis, unfolding like a flow er
from the seed instead o f being a prim arily so cia l creation , and secondly
that there is a source o f free action in the individual, the 'free will,'
the 'wish' or the 'instincts,' which is only free in proportion to the ex ten t
to which it is unrestrained by so cia l influences."

According to Caudwell,

Christopher Caudwell, "Freud: A Study in Bourgeois Psychology" in
Studies in a Dying Culture, reprinted in Studies and Further Studies
in a Dying Culture, introduction by Sol Yurick (Monthly R eview Press,
1971) page 159.
^ Ibid., page 161.
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th ese view s distort Freud's psychology "like buried magnets" and prevent
it from rising above the le v e l o f myth to th at o f sc ie n tific understanding.
The other idea, or fault, according to Caudwell, is Freud's use o f a form
o f the coherence theory o f truth — i.e ., Freud a ccep ts any logically
coherent connection which accou n ts for the "facts" as a valid scien tific
explanation. If the Oedipus Complex or the death wish or instinct can
be used to give such a logically coherent explanation o f phenomena,
then this fa ct is itse lf the evidence for the e x isten ce o f a death instinct
or the Oedipus Complex. This helps to explain the growth o f rival schools
such as Jung's or Adler's sin ce th ese psychologists also thought out logically
coherent system s (the c o lle c tiv e unconscious, inferiority com plex, e tc .)
to explain the sam e data with which Freud occupied h im self. All this
is, according to Caudwell, u n ch aracteristic o f the developm ent o f scien tific
thought. Note that this view o f Caudwell was less likely to be controverted
in the 1930's than it would be today.
S cien tific thought is characterized by "crucial tests." "If," Caudwell
w rites, "of tw o hypotheses one exhibits more com prehesively and less
sym bolically the structure o f th e determ inism o f the phenomena it e x 
plains and their relation to the already established structure o f reality,
that hypothesis w ill be more powerful as an instrum ent for predicting
the recurrence o f such phenom ena in real life . Hence arises the crucial
te s t, which decides b etw een one hypothesis and another."

^ Ibid., page 164.

This leads

Caudwell to conclude that: "No hypothesis, religious or scien tific, can
have any meaning unless it can give rise to a crucial te s t, which will
enable it to be socially com pared with other hypotheses."

tf.

It is precisely

because Freudianism and its o ff-sh o o ts are unable to com e up with a
crucial te st that Caudwell, w hile believing them to be scien tific in intent,
likens them to religions.
Oust what is it that Freud and his follow ers and rivals are a ttem p t
ing to understand? Caudwell gives us a brief description o f our m ental
life and what is of in terest in it. Mental even ts are the result of nervous
a ctiv ity . In the evolution of life a sm all, and com paratively recent,
se t of nervous a ctiv ity has becom e aware of its e lf and is called "con
sciousness." Of a ll the d ifferen t sets o f nervous a ctiv ity consciousness
appears as the lea st determ ined o f the se ts -- sin ce it is consciousness
in the form o f individual "egos" or "subjects" which is analysing and
studying all the other sets, including m yself. We may ca ll a ll the other
sets, not partaking o f consciousness, the "unconsciounsness." Instinct,
according to Caudwell, is a term we use to label sp ecific unconscious
patterns o f a ctivated neurons which, in conjunction with environm ental
stim uli, lead to autom atic and predictable behavior. He uses the term
memory (which need not refer to conscious behavior a t all) to describe
the mechanism by which the original instinctual behavior may be m odified
by interaction with the environm ent. He adm its that this way of talking

^ Ibid., pages 164-65.
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is not very rigorous — is, indeed, m ythological ("perhaps a t present un
avoidable") but is d ictated by th e le v e l o f the scien ce.
Comparing th e a ctivation o f neurons to the striking o f a chord
on the piano (where the unused strings are as necessary to the overall
tone, as is the wood making up th e piano, the atm osphere in the room,
e tc .) Caudwell asserts th at any neuronic a ctiv ity is conditioned by and
a ffe c ts the to ta l neuronic system as w ell as the rest o f the body. Con
sciousness thus stands on the ground o f the unconscious. It is also impor
tant to n ote, Caudwell insists, th at besides the se t o f recently evolved
neurons which seem to be the sea t o f consciousness (and which are able
to be m odified in their responses ~ are susceptable, that is, to education)
there is an older, more prim itive, se t o f neurons which we have received
as part o f our evolutionary h eritage. This set is less m odifiable and
seem s to be the seat o f th at type o f behavior we ca ll "instinctive."
In certain extrem e situations in which w e find ourselves (and also in
sleep) this se t of neurons is liable to predom inate and inundate our con
sciousness with urges th at lead to behavior which our more recent neur
onic se t would never have led to nor which our consciousness would
condone.
Caudwell credits Freud with the first pioneering studies to explain
the structure and behavior o f our m ental life and, w hile acknowledging
important em pirical contributions made by him, he rejects the th eoretical
integum ent in which th ese discoveries are contained. One o f the m ost
serious objections to Freud's view s, according to Caudwell, is their dualism.
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What kind o f "dualism" does Caudwell have in mind here? He
is not refering to the traditional m ind-m atter dualism fam iliar in philo
sophy a t least from the tim e o f D escartes. He means, rather, that Freud
uses tw o contradictory approaches in his method o f analysis — one method
in discussing the individual in relation to m ental illness, and another
in discussing social and h istorical problem s. Caudwell thinks this is
inconsistent and that the sam e focus should be used in discussing social
as individual developm ent. In the first approach, for exam ple, the point
o f view o f individual consciousness is adopted and the unconscious factors
in m ental life are referred to as "distortions," "mental illness" e tc .,
this, according to Caudwell, is a prejudicial catagorization o f the un
conscious by the conscious whose point o f view is here taken by Freud.
"3ust as m ythological and co n sisten t a psychology as Freud's might be
w ritten," Caudwell says, "from the point of view o f the 'unconscous,'
in which, instead o f the 'instincts,' the 'experiences' would now play
the part of en ergetic imprisoned demons distorting or inhibiting the
stability and sim ple life o f the innate responses."^ In this approach the
conscious and in tellectu a l is defended against the urges o f the uncon
scious. In the second approach, Caudwell m aintains, Freud does just
the opposite, i.e., he cham pions the unconscious over the conscious (hence
the unresolvable dualism within Freudianism as Freud developed it,
not necessarily unresolvable per se). Freud does this, as we shall see,

^ Ibid., page 169.
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when he turns his atten tion to the discussion o f the psychological factors
behind the developm ents o f history and civilization .
Caudwell's Marxism leads him to apply here the d ia lectica l principle
of the mutual interpenetration and identity o f opposites. Thus, he rejects
the "conscious" and the "unconscious" as tw o m ere abstractions used
incorrectly to sym bolize our m ental life.
Consciousness and unconsciousness are not exclu 
sive opposites, but in any hierarchy o f inner
vations forming the behaviour o f the m oment
we have a certain amount o f high m nem ic m odifiability and others with high innate predisposition,
and the proportion o f th ese may be varying.
But they are in mutual relations, like positive
and negative poles o f a battery a ctivatin g a
circu it, and it is only by abstraction that we
separate out th e com plex called consciousness,
as we might separate out the threads forming
the patterns in a tapestry.
In the sam e way th at h istorical m aterialsim has led to the notion
that the future w ill be a product o f both the present and the past —not
simply the present itse lf, so our future consciousness w ill becom e a
part o f our knowledge based on our present (the conscious) and our past
(the unconscious). Caudwell rejects the preem inence o f the one or the
other in favor o f an harmonious balance. The conscious and the unconscious,
being mere abstractions, cannot be pitted against each other. Freud's
dualism stem s from the fa c t that he on one occasion champions the
conscious and on another the u n co n sc io u s/ . This fiction al and un

^ Ibid., page 170.
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scien tific mode o f expressing his ideas resulted in Freud's being confounded
by other schools o f thought which broke away from his initial system
and raised th em selves up in opposition to it. There is no scien tific way
to judge betw een Freud on the one hand and, say, Adler or 3ung on the
other. No "crucial experim ent" could d ecide, for exam ple, betw een
Adler's self-preservation in stin ct on the one hand, and Freud's theory
o f the libido on the other as to which "really" could explain our observed
behavior b etter. They are both m ythological con stru cts used to explain
behavior which we are not y et in a position to describe by rigorous scien 
tific techniques.
In the sam e way th at the conscious and unconscious factors unite
to make a whole individual subject, the subject its e lf is united to its
environm ent. We cannot remain con ten t with just studying all o f our
innervations as if they w ere isolated and su fficien t unto th em selves.
Using a m usical metaphor, Caudwell likens the "harmony o f the psyche"
g
to a reflection "of the harmony o f th e body's being in reality." The
body and the external world are tw o poles o f an elaborate and interacting
structure. If psychology ignores, or plays down, the influence o f the
environm ent it can never arrive at a scien tifica lly valid description

7

"After showing how th e wicked com plex devils o f the Unconscious
distort and obsess the consciousness, Freud goes over to the other side
and paints the Unconscious as it would like to paint itse lf. He shows
us the Instincts tortured by the inhibitions o f culture, martyrs to the
present and to consciousness. Y et the scien tist ought in th ese m atters
to be im partial, otherw ise he w ill never synthesise th ese tw o opposites,
past and present, new and old." Ibid., page 173.
^ Ibid., page 175.
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o f man's m ental life. Caudwell also m aintains that the so cia l environm ent
is the most important (because m ost rapidly changing) sector of the
external world to influence our psyche developm ent. Psychology must
be grounded in sociology. Failure to ach ieve this grounding w ill lead
us to view psychic phenomena as constant over tim e and w e w ill end
up universalizing our own particular h istorically conditioned psychic
life as the psychic life o f man. Caudwell a sserts that this is just what
Q

has happened with all (the then) contem porary schools o f psychology.
The bourgeios myth o f freedom - - discussed earlier in the chapter
on Illusion and R eality — is at work here in Freud's thought. The "Rous
seauism" o f Freud con sists in the view that culture and civilization hinder
man's free instinctual developm ent. The view th at the causal laws of
nature and civilization hamper our free developm ent is the most impor
tant defining ch aracteristic of bourgeois thought for Caudwell. Contrary
to Jefferson's dictum that th at governm ent is b est which governs least,
Caudwell would champion the view th at that governm ent is best which
governs m ost - - with the reservation th at both d icta are functionally
dependent upon their own historical periods. In true Hegelian fashion,
Caudwell maintains that: "Man is a part o f reality, in constant relation
with it, and the process o f consciousness, in so far as it increases his

9

"As it happens, no modern school o f psychology has ever studied social
relations as primary, as conditioning th e consciousness which is generated
by them . None study con crete so ciety and its non-psychical basis. No
modern school o f psychology has ever y e t got so far as to form ulate
its basic approach to the environm ent o f the psyche it studies, continuous
interaction with which is the law of psychic life." Ibid., page 177.
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knowledge o f cau sality, increases his freed o m ." ^ For Caudwell the
developm ent o f culture and civ ilization increase, rather than decrease,
our potential freedom .
Caudwell rejects Freud's use of term s such as "repression" and
"inhibition" to describe th e m ental m echanism s which have developed
with the growth of civ iliza tio n in order to thwart the natural "free"
instinctive life o f man. Freud, according to Caudwell, com p letely by
passes the social environm ent when he describes the evolution o f c iv ili
zation as the byproduct o f the struggle o f tw o primary in stin cts — e.g .,
Eros and Death. Freud's discussion o f the role o f the father seem s protofa scistic to Caudwell. Freud m aintains that the danger o f so cia l discon
ten t is the result o f individuals within a group relating more to one an
other rather than to a "leading personality." Although Freud's view s
pre-date Hitler, Caudwell sees here an anticipation o f the Fuhrerprincip.
The irony is that facsism seeks to destroy Freudianism and a ll other
forms of n on -fascist ideology while Freudianism, and bourgeois thought
in general, cannot free its e lf from its own prem ises which, Caudwell
says, u ltim ately lead down the road to fascism . "Freudianism, attem pting

^

Ibid., page 179.
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to cure civilization o f its in stin ctive distortions, points the way to N az
ism."11
In what sense does Freudianism nurture fascism ? Caudwell tells
us that the consciousness o f th e bourgeoisie cannot assim ilate the new
world being created by socialism and thus begins to break up. A conscious
ness on the verge o f breaking up can eith er go forward and begin to
assim ilate the newer, larger consciousness (socialist consciousness) which
confronts it, or it can regress. S ocialist consciousness is seen by Caudwell
as "larger" because, in H egelian fashion, it both n eg a tes and overcom es
and preserves at a higher le v e l the basic ingredients o f the previous
conscious level. This is only another way o f saying th at the world outlook
o f socialism is "larger" than that o f modern industrial capitalism just
as the latter is more inclusive, higher, e tc ., than th at o f feudalism or
slavery. Socialist consciousness its e lf being the aw areness, based on
scien tific analysis o f the econ om ic structures of cap italism , o f the new
social forms needed to overcom e the contradictions and lim itations
o f our present bourgeois so ciety . Freud, according to Caudwell, as a
thinker essen tially unfam iliar with Marxism and unable to transcend
the consciousness of the bourgeois ca p italist world was incapable of
adapting his th eo retica l system to the new world outlook — thus his
view s represent a regression (since they do not go forward to assim ilate

11 Ibid., page 181. "Yet this is the irony o f a ll bourgeois culture, that
because it is based on a contradiction, it gives rise to the opposite o f
what it desires. It desires freedom and individual expression, but, because
it b elieves freedom is to be found in abolition o f so cia l organization,
it gives rise to a ll the tyrannies and blind crippling n ecessitie s o f the
modern world." Loc. c it.
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the newer forms o f consciousness) to more prim itive lev els o f the old
system o f consciousness.
Here Caudwell is using Freud's ideas on "repression" and "infantil
ism." To regress is, how ever, not the answer. Our current situation
(i.e., Caudwell's situation in the mid-30s) is en tirely d ifferen t from the
situation which was reflected in our earlier le v el o f consciousness -any
attem p t to resurrect an earlier form o f consciousness to deal with our
current reality is bound to fail. Freud, according to Caudwell, sees
this very w ell, but since he cannot adjust to the larger consciousness
he can o ffer no answer to the problem o f cultural regression which u lti
m ately leads to fascism . Thus, he concludes, Freudianism "after all
... is not a therapy, it is only a diagnosis."

12

The defense made o f Freudianism that it justifiably uses m ytho
logical term inology because it is dealing with em otion al problems and
this way o f expressing the relationships o f m ental phenomena has a
powerful therapeutic and em otion al e f f e c t on the p atient is to ta lly re
jected by Caudwell. It is precisely because Freudianism relies on myth,
precisely because it is u n scien tific (if not a n ti-scien tific) that it fails
utterly, as far as Caudwell is concerned, as a therapy. The Freudians
do not understand the true nature o f em otion. Emotion is not an indivi
dual thing, an individual force within the mind that g ets out o f control
and can be soothed by the psychoanalyst and made to behave. Caudwell

^

Ibid., page 182.

sees em otion as essen tia lly so cia l - - the product o f thousands o f years
o f cultural developm ent —th e em otional forces are "the dynamism o f
society." "Emotion, in all its vivid colouring, is the creation o f ages
o f culture acting on the blind unfeeling in stin cts. All art, a ll education,
a ll day-to-day social exp erien ce, draw it out o f the heart o f the human
genotype and direct and shape its myriad phenom ena. Only society
as a whole can really d irect this force in the individual."

13

The failure

o f Freudianism to recognize that so ciety , not individual therapists must
be th e instrum ent for the con trol o f em otion al forces v itia tes for Caudwell
any serious consideration o f Freudianism as eith er sc ie n tific or therapeutic.
Caudwell cla rifies his critique as follow s. He ca lls the "instincts"
purely m echanical innate responses that are capable o f being m odified
by experience — this includes both conscious and unconscious responses.
The psyche is the product o f the conscious and unconscious reflex es
which are m odifiable by our ex p erien ces, and it is grounded on, is a
developm ent out o f, the physiological foundations described above.
Social adaptation is brought about by consciousness. Individuals and
the environm ent (physical and social) have a mutual in teractive relation
ship. Every individual both a ffe c ts and is a ffe c te d by the environm ent
—how ever, this interaction is not equally balanced. An individual con
sciousness finds itse lf interacting with m illions o f other consciousnesses
which, like itself, have been produced by, and are subject to , the rules
o f culture, so ciety , language, e t c . The influence o f th e individual on
the mass is m iniscule compared w ith the influence o f the mass upon

^

Ibid., page 183.

the individual. "In psychology, as in m echanics," Caudwell w rites, "the
reaction o f a body on its cosm ic environm ent can be n eg lected , as com pared to the e f f e c t o f the world on th e body."

14-

The important thing to recognize in this co n tex t, the thing which
Caudwell m aintains Freud failed to recognize, is that sociology is not
to be founded on, or explained in term s o f, psychology, but rather psych
ology is to be understood only as resting upon the foundations o f sociology
— and the only truly scien tific sociology is th at of h istorical m aterialism
founded by Marx. We cannot understand the growth and evolution o f
the human psyche independently o f the environm ent o f social relations
in which it is enm eshed from the m om ent o f birth. Freud, on the con
trary, projects the etern al struggle o f the unchanging instincts onto
the screen o f culture and civ iliza tio n and explains the h istorical d eve
lopment o f mankind in term s o f th ese instinctual d esires and mechanisms
produced by the psyche to repress and distort their en ergies. Freud
is thus unable to explain th e growth and developm ent o f civilization
in any other but psychological term s. Caudwell likens Freud's enterprise
to that o f the men chained in Plato's ca v e and forced to deduce the
nature o f reality from the shadows ca st upon the w all. The true causes
o f psychic phenomena are as far rem oved from Freud's psychology as
are the true causes o f the shadows rem oved from the dw ellers in Plato's
cave.

^

Ibid., page 185.
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Caudwell ca lls Freudianism a preem inently "bourgeois psychology"
— one that can never "advance beyond the view point o f the 'individual
in civ il society."*'* The psyche, for Caudwell a creation o f the environ
m ent, is treated by Freud as a self-su b sistin g .en tity guided by m ysterious
inner forces and urges which alone determ ine its behavior and developm ent.
If we follow the pathway pointed out by Freud we w ill never arrive at
a correct scien tific understanding o f our m ental life. We must first
understand Marxism. "The psyche is the organ o f adaptation to social
relations, therefore for psychology the laws determ ining so cia l relations
are fundamental."

16

It is only within this fram ework, and upon this ground,

that we can hope to ach ieve a sc ie n tific understanding and discover
the true path to follow in constructing a psychology which w ill both
explain our psychic life, and lead to a therapy capable o f resolving the
psychic problems that overw helm individuals. "We ow e much to Freud
for his sym bolic presentation o f the discord b etw een the deep and recent
layers o f men's minds; but he cannot heal us, for he cannot even teach
us that first turth, that w e must change the world in order to change
ourselves."*7
Before turning to Freud's w ritings th em selves, in order to evaluate
Caudwell's analysis, I want to present the view s o f Herbert Marcuse

*** Ibid., page 187.
16 Ibid., page 188.
17 Ibid., page 192.

as contained in Eros and C ivilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud.
Marcuse is im portant b ecause, like Caudwell, he approaches Freud with
an understanding and appreciation o f Marxism and a ttem p ts to provide
the foundations for a theory o f so cia l change which Caudwell deem ed
so necessary and so lacking in Freud's thought.

18

Whether Marcuse's

em endations o f Freud's thought are reconcilable with Caudwell's outlook
is a question we shall deal with a t the end o f this chapter.
Marcuse sees psychological ca teg o ries as being primarily p olitical
categ o ries resulting from the developm ent o f what he ca lls "industrial
civilization" — a term which Caudwell would look askance upon, no
doubt, and replace with "monopoly capital." In any ev en t, term inological
questions aside, Marcuse m aintains that our current econom ic and poli
tic a l system has encroached upon what little privacy and independence
that our forefathers might have enjoyed as to render w hatever private
problems o f a psychologically im portant nature which we may be subject
to, in reality public problems and sym ptom s not so much o f personal

18

Marcuse notes, for instance, that "The im m ense cap ab ilities o f the
advanced industrial so ciety are increasingly m obilized against the u tiliza 
tion of its own resources for the p acification o f human ex isten ce. All
talk about the abolition o f repression, about life against death, e tc .,
has to place itse lf into the acu tal framework o f enslavem ent and de
struction. Within this framework, even th e liberties and gratification s
o f the individuals partake o f the general suppression. Their liberation,
instinctual as w ell as in tellectu a l, is a p o litica l m atter, and a theory
o f the chances and preconditions o f such liberation must be a theory
o f so cia l change." Herbert Marcuse, Eros and C ivilization: A Philoso
phical Inquiry Into Freud (New York: Vintage Books, 1955) page xi.
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distress as o f fundam ental disorders in so ciety as a w hole.

19

Marcuse begins his analysis by basing him self on what he considers
to be one o f Freud's principal postulates — that the human "instincts"
must be repressed in order for civilization to e x ist. Marcuse's argument
is that, while this p ostulate may be true o f hitherto existin g civilization s,
it may not necessarily be the ca se that civ iliza tio n qua civ ilization must
rest on repressive m echanism s. Within th e framework o f Freud's own
theory, Marcuse m aintains, the question o f the id en tification of repression
and civilization must be reevaluated. Marcuse su ggests that the d ia lectic
o f civilization and repression may "result only from a sp ecific historical
organization o f human existen ce."

20

Marcuse claim s that there is a "hidden trend" to be found in Freud's
thought which renders it much more revolutionary than Freud or his
follow ers thought. Freud thus appears to stand in relation to his theory
in much the sam e way as H egel stood in relation to his own philosophy.
In both ca ses the th eo retica l elaborations o f the thinkers provided grounds
for much more radical conclusions and departures than they them selves
were aware of.

19

"The traditional borderlines betw een psychology on the one side
and p olitical and so cia l philosophy on the other have been made ob solete
by the condition o f man in the present era: form erly autonomous and
identifiable psychical processes are being absorbed by the funciton o f
the individual in the sta te — by his public ex isten ce . Psychological
problems therfore turn into p o litica l problems: private disorder r e fle c ts
more directly than before the disorder o f the w hole, and the cure of
personal disorder depends more directly than b efore on the cure of the
general disorder." Ibid., page xvii.
^

Ibid., page 4.
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In order to arrive a t th e "hidden trend," Marcuse starts by drawing
up a table reflectin g tw o groups o f opposed aim s — one group character
istic o f man as a prim itive p re-civilized anim al, the other ch aracteristic
o f man in society — th e transform ation o f the first group into the second
is, in Freudian term s, the triumph o f the reality principle over that
o f the pleasure principle.
Pleasure Principle

R eality Principle

Pleasure

R estraint o f Pleasure

3oy (Play)

Toil (Work)

R eceptiveness

Productiveness

Absence o f Repression

Security^ *

C ivilization results from the repression o f the pleasure principle
- - the aim s o f the d efeated principle retrea t into the unconscious but
they continually seek to breakout into the conscious realm . Marcuse
holds that "the return o f th e repressed m akes up the tabooed and subter
ranean history o f civ iliza tio n . And the exploration o f this history reveals
not only the secret o f the individual but also that o f civ iliza tio n . Freud's
individual psychology is in its very essen ce so cia l psychology. Repression
is an historical phenomenon."

22

Freud h im self recognizes the econom ic

basis o f the developm ent o f civ iliza tio n — sca rcity renders it im possible
for men to live together by means o f the pleasure principle. Marcuse
points out that the view which holds "that a non-repressive civilization

^

Ibid., page 12.

^

Ibid., page 15.
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is impossible is a cornerstone o f Freudian theory."

23

Thus, Freud's view s

not only expose the repressive asp ects o f our civ iliza tio n , but justify
them and support them — a charge earlier made by Caudwell.
It is at this point th at Marcuse begins to uncover the "hidden trend."
He reminds us o f the role which memory plays in psychoanalysis. The
repressed individual liberates him self from his neurotic sym ptom s by
remembering his primal urges and destroying the repressive m echanism s
constructed by his rationalizing consciousness. Marcuse sees this as
a form o f liberation and maintains that the road to a liberated future
lies on the way o f concentration on uncovering and understanding the
past. He sees regression as essen tia lly progressive. Marcuse thinks
this insight o f his separates him from Freud, for whom memory was
m erely the mechanism for adapting us to our present — not the means
for attaining a new and b etter future. In order to b etter ex p lica te his
view s, Marcuse divides the mutually interrelated individual-societal
com plex into its two abstract com ponents, and proposes to first explain
the origin o f repressed individuals and then o f repressed civ ilization .
In this way he hopes the "hidden trend" in Freud's thought w ill becom e
m anifest.
As far as individual psychology is concerned, Marcuse con cen trates
on Freud's final sy stem a tic presentation o f his theory o f instincts. Man
is controlled by tw o basic in stinctual drives — life (Eros) and death.
At this point, Freud holds to "the fundam ental regressive or 'conservative'
23

Ibid., page 16.
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tendency in a ll instinctual life."

2h

He holds that man's instinctual life

is striving for equilibrium and rest — for a return to the inorganic world.
At this point, the concept o f the Nirvana principle is brought forth.
The pleasure principle is subordinated to this new principle comprising
a more general con cep t. The unconscious id en tifies pleasure with this
p eacefu l sta te o f inorganic return ~ thus melding togeth er the pleasure
principle with the death in stin cts. N everth eless, other instinctual drives
must be reckoned with — nam ely the instinctual drives relating to sexual
fu lfillm en t. Thus, Eros arises and a struggle betw een the life and death
instincts em erges. Which o f th ese tw o instincts is the m ost fundam ental
for Freud is a problem th at has not y e t been solved - - the tex tu a l e v i
dence to be found in his last works is vague. Marcuse thinks that it
is an open question just what Freud's final conclusions w ere.
Marcuse is interested in discovering the common source and begin
ning o f these tw o basic in stin cts. The dualism which many find in Freud
(e.g., Caudwell) is, in Marcuse's opinion, illusory. In his final works,
Freud's insistence on the con servative a sp ects o f a ll in stin cts coupled
w ith his view that it was d ifficu lt, if not fruitless to point to any drives
that were not ultim ately linked to Eros suggests to Marcuse the incor
rectness o f all dualistic interpretations o f Freud's final position. Indeed,
he thinks Freud's last form ulation has "a suspense and depth which make
it one o f the great in tellectu a l ventures in the scien ce of man. The
quest for the common origin o f the tw o basic in stin cts can no longer
be silenced."

25

'
If we look more clo sely a t the "death instinct" we see

^ Ibid., page 22.
^

Ibid., page 26.
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it is basically a flight from repression and an unhappy ex isten ce . "The
death instinct is destru ctiven ess not for its own sake, but for the relief
o f tension. The d escen t towards death is an unconscious flight from
pain and want. It is an expression o f the etern al struggle against suffering
and repression. And the death in stin ct its e lf seem s to be a ffe c te d by
the historical changes which a f f e c t this struggle."

26

The instincts as

historically determ ined, rather than as innate im m utable drives (cf.
Caudwell) w ill be b etter understood, according to Marcuse, by looking
at Freud's final view s on th e structure o f personality.
It is in his last form ulations o f the theory o f the personality that
Freud introduces the fam ous triad o f id, ego, and super-ego. These
three term s are su fficien tly w ell known as not to require any special
explanation — they should be kept in mind as referen ce points with regard
to the discussion which follow s.
Marcuse addresses h im self to one o f the major criticism s o f Freud's
thought. This is the position th at he has generalized the cultural restric
tions o f his own tim e into universal instinctual repressions and urges
valid for a ll tim es and p la ces. The developing Ego, Marcuse points out,
is faced with a sp ecific historical condition confronting it - - "an historical
world" — and the reality principle which underpins the Ego is thus o f
a sp ecifica lly historically conditioned nature. Freud's treatm en t of
th ese situations tends to transform historically con tin gen t conditions
into biologically determ ined ones. Marcuse holds th at this criticism

^
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is by and large just, but it overlooks a real truth that Freud was trying
to express — nam ely, th at h ereto fo re a ll form s o f the reality principle
have led to the repression o f man's instinctual nature. More simply
put, Marcuse says Freud "expresses the h istorical fa c t th at civilization
27
has progressed as organized dom ination."
Marcuse's position is thus based on Freud but reworks his notions into
an historical interpretation rather than a biological one. He maintains
th at what we discover when w e read Freud are historical developm ents
that have been "reified" into b iological developm ents. This must be
kept in mind as w e pursue our exploration o f Marcuse's thought.
He introduces tw o o f his own term s a t this point - - "surplus repres
sion" and "performance principle." Let us first look a t what he means
by "surplus repression." We know already that in order for men to live
togeth er in civ iliza tio n (or culture ~ neither Marcuse or Freud d ifferen 
tia te th ese concepts) their in stinctual drives must be repressed to the
lev el necessary for so cia l intercourse. We also know th at it is due to
scarcity that so ciety is organized in the way it is. Here is where Marcuse
separates him self from Freud. Repression is not alw ays the result of
scarcity per se as Freud would have it - - but rather, as Marcuse em pha
sizes, o f "a sp ecific organization o f scarcity." The influence o f Marxism
begins now to show in Marcuse's view s. D ifferen t civ iliza tio n s and d iffer
ent historical periods within the sam e civ ilization have organized the

^ Ibid., page 32.
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distribution o f scarcity in various w ays ~ as many ways, so as many
different form s o f the reality principle. Not only this, but "the sp ecific
historical institutions o f the reality principle and the sp ecific in terests
of domination introduce additional controls over and above those indispensible for civilized human asso cia tio n . These additional controls arising
from the sp ecific institutions o f dom ination are what we denote as surplus28
repression." The question which im m ediately arises is - - is it possible

to construct a so ciety in which human beings can freely a sso cia te, which
lacks domination and thus surplus-repression, and in which man and
civilization can be finally reconciled? We shall return to this question.
The other new term , "performance principle," denotes the sp ecific
form o f the reality principle which, Marcuse says, ex ists in modern tim es.
He says that "under its rule so ciety is stratified according to the co m p etitiv e econom ic perform ances o f its members."

29

The forces which drive

on Eros are harnessed towards th e goals o f modern industrial so ciety .
Man finds him self in an "alienated" s ta te , Marcuse says, since the major
portion o f his tim e is directed not towards his own ends but towards
the social ends determ ined by th e nature o f his so ciety and directed
by the dominant groups controlling power. Repression thus functions
to adapt the individual to th e needs of the status quo and to condition
him into their accep ta n ce. The super-ego thus a c ts as an internal repre
sen ta tiv e, not o f m orality or values as such, but as the sp ecific repre

^
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sen ta tiv e o f an historically conditioned perform ance principle. As so ciety
becom es more com plex the need for regim entation and repression in
creases. The balance betw een the life and death in stin cts becom es
upset. The ego's function o f controlling the fa n ta stic desires o f the
id becom es more com plicated as the super-ego demands ever more re
pression. Marcuse says the super-ego beom es ever more d estructive
vis-a -v is the ego as it orders increased psychic energy be expended to
deny the id its gratification s in order to sa tisfy the increasing demands
for conform ity and regim entation as so ciety advances along the road
o f tech n ical advance. Following Freud, Marcuse holds th at, due to its
life denying and repressive functions, the super-ego becom es the general
headquarters for the fo rces o f the death in stin ct. Thus a super destruc
tiv e p oten tial begins to build up within the individuals o f advance tech n o
logical so ciety . We are now no longer on the grounds o f individual psycho
logy but o f so cia l psychology. We must a t this juncture turn our attention
to the origin o f repressed civ ilization .
Marcuse begins by summarizing Freud's view s on the origin o f
civ iliza tio n as he presented them in Moses and Monotheism ~ the th eore
tic a l part o f which is based on his earlier researches into the field of
ethnology and published as Totem and Taboo.
Freud's position is th at present day civ iliza tio n is strongly a ffected
in its origins in prehistory because we carry about within us "memory
traces" based on the exp erien ces o f our an cestors. We thus have an
"archaic heritage." This h eritage is so influential th at, as it w ere, it
programs the later developm ent o f the ego. Marcuse remarks that Freud's
theory o f the archaic h eritage and his sch em atization o f the developm ent
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o f civilization ~ i.e ., prim al horde, clans, m atriarchy, e tc ., (we shall
return to this) has been, to put it mildly, strongly attack ed and finds
little present day accep ta n ce. "The d iffic u lties in scien tific verification
and even in logical con sisten cy are obvious and perhaps insurmountable."

30

Marcuse is only interested in its "symbolic value." We can trea t Fre.ud's
theory, then, as myth, rather like those we encounter in reading Plato
— its value does not lie in its h istorical veracity but in its heuristic
value alone.
In the beginning, then, was the primal horde dom inated by one
male who maintained exclu sive sexual rights with a ll the women and
kept the other m ales a t bay -- rather like a walrus colony. The dominant
.m ale (the father) thus se t up patterns o f restraint and subjection to
authority in the inchoate psyches o f the other mem bers of the horde.
This "primal patriarchal despotism" sets the course for all future c iv ili
zation. It doesn't last long, how ever, as the other m ales kill o ff the
horde despot and ea t his rem ains (to assim ilate his power and authority).
This is the point "civilization" begins. The victorious m ales rule jointly
by means o f the "brother clan" and by means o f "guilt feelings" in stitu te
prohibitions and taboos in order to consolidate and perpetuate the group.
With the death o f the despot and the sharing o f power within the brother
clan, the status o f women and their im portance in the regulation of

^
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comm unal life began to increase. Women did not share in the original
guilt o f the killing of the despot and w ere slow ly defered to in questions
o f child rearing and clan organization. The m atriarchate is established.
With the advancem ent o f tech n ical progress and the im portance o f war
and hunting gradually com ing to the fore, the m atriarchate is "replaced
by a patriarchal counter-revolution, and the la tter is stabilized by the
institutionalization o f religion."

31

It is important to em phasize th at Marcuse is not claim ing that
this sequence is actually h istorical. N everth eless, som ething more or
less sim ilar must have happened or a t least must be postulated to have
happened if we are going to arrive a t any understanding o f the origins
o f the type o f repression in civilized s o c ie tie s th at Marcuse is attem pting
to explain. This is primarily the repression o f the sexual instincts and
the placing o f them in the serv ice o f th e reality principle.
Marcuse remarks that Freud saw this paradigm — the overthrowing
o f authority and its reinstitution in orther form s - - as "re-enacted" in
each generation and in each individual in the course o f their developm ent.
It is on this basis that the hidden trend in psychoanalysis is to be under
stood, since Freud accounts for this perpetual recurrence in term s o f
the idea o f the "return o f the repressed."
But how can these repressed em otions, arising from a prehistoric
past, possibly be operative today? Freud's answer ~ th at we carry about
"memory traces" in our unconscious mind, seem s much too m ythical

^
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and u n scien tific - - it has been alm ost universally rejected , as Marcuse
points out. However, it may be possible to explain this con cep t o f "the
return o f the repressed" without resorting to innate "memory traces."
Marcuse suggests that this can be deduced from Freud h im self. The
reinforcem ent o f repressions against the innate drives and instincts
builds up over the generations and would, according to Marcuse, produce
the sam e e f f e c t s with or w ithout any "memory traces" from the primal
horder lingering about in the unconscious. More to the point, th e com 
p lete externalization o f th ese ancient even ts in term s o f poetry, m ytho
logy and the verbal traditions o f prim itive peoples allow s the "memory
traces" o f the even ts to enter into the psyche o f each new generation
without the need of postulating any g en etic carrier o f this inform ation.
Marcuse maintains that, as history has developed, the im age o f the primal
despot, or father, has merged "with duly con stitu ted authority. Domina
tion has outgrown the sphere o f personal relationships and created the
institutions for the orderly sa tisfa ctio n o f human needs on an expanding
scale. But it is precisely the developm ent o f th ese institutions which
undermines the established basis o f civ iliza tio n . Its inner lim its appear
in the late industrial age."
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In order to understand what all this m eans w e have to turn to Mar
cuse's chapter on the d ia lectic o f civ iliza tio n . Here Marcuse points
out that with the increasing com plexity o f civ iliza tio n the repressions
against our aggressive ten d en cies must becom e more intense — but

Ibid., page 70.
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this can occur only if the forces o f Eros can be increased, for only Eros,
"can e ffe c tiv e ly 'bind' the d estru ctive instincts."

33

And, Marcuse stresses,

it is just this increase in Eros which our civilization is incapable o f producing
since it is based on "intensified regem entation and control." From this
point on, in my opinion, Marcuse's discussion a ltern a tes betw een interesting
extensions o f Freud's theory and dubious specualtions o f his own mint.
While it is true that "late industrial civilization" has dram atically in
creased the powers of destruction and oppression and at the sam e tim e
provided by scien tific and tech n ological developm ent the possiblity
o f elim inating destruction and oppression, it is not so obvious that this
increased destructiveness and oppressiveness can be explained primarily
in term s o f "instinctual roots." While not ruling out en tirely the psycho
logical theories previously discussed, a reader o f Caudwell m ight, at
this point, ex p ect som e discussion along Marxist lines dealing with modes
o f production, the developm ent o f capitalism , e t c ., to round out the
picture. Marcuse, how ever, stick s to his psychological ca teg o ries. He
reitera tes his distinction b etw een regular and "surplus" repression, and
says that the civilization with the lea st amount o f surplus repression
is also the least repressive. If w e rem em ber that repression functions
to restrain our instinctual gra tifica tio n s in the in terest o f a common
p olitica l and social life, and that the increased demand made upon in
dividuals by the growing com p lexity o f civ ilization as it develops auto
m atically increases the amount o f repression required, we can see why

^
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Marcuse concludes that "the n ecessity o f repression, and o f the suffering
derived from it, varies w ith the m aturity o f civ iliza tio n , with the ex ten t
3a
o f the achieved rational m astery o f nature and o f society."
Surplus
repression functions solely on the side of the ruling cla ss as it is that
extra amount o f repression individuals must in tern alize in order to be
con ten t with the particular ruling group that is culturally in place -sin ce
this group lives by exploiting the m ajority, th e m ajority has a built in
accep ta n ce o f the status quo.
The still prevailing im poverishm ent o f vast
areas o f the world is no longer due ch ie fly to
the poverty o f human and natural resources
but to the manner in which they are distributed
and utilized . This d ifferen ce may be irrelevant
to p olitics and to politician s but it is o f d ecisive
im portance to a theory o f civ iliza tio n which
derives the need for repression from th e 'natural'
and perpetual disproportion b etw een human
desires and tj^ environm ent in which they must
be satisfied .
The question, then, is - - must repression and surplus repression
continue on into the future as they have in the past? Must civilization
becom e more and more repressive until the fo rces o f repression becom e
so oppressive that instinctual drives can no longer to ler a te them and
break forth in an orgy o f self-d estru ctio n and annihilation? The answer
is to be found in Part Two o f Eros and C ivilization . The question, as
Marcuse phrases it, is "whether the continued rule o f the perform ance
principle as the reality principle m ust be taken for granted (so that
the trend o f civilization must be view ed in the light o f the sam e prin-

Ibid., page 80.
^
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ciple), or whether th e perform ance principle has perhaps created the
preconditions for a q u alitatively d ifferen t, non-repressive reality prin
c ip le ." ^
Marcuse maintains th at Freud essen tially eq u ates the reality prin
cip le as such with what Marcuse has called the perform ance principle.
If Marcuse is right about th e historically conditioned nature of the reality
principle then, he says, Freud's "dialectic o f civ iliza tio n would lose its
finality." Marcuse also stresses that the historical nature o f the reality
principle would also h istoricize the instincts since the life and death
drives would be d ifferen t when operating in the co n tex t o f a d ifferent
reality principle. The g rea test argum ent against his view , as Marcuse
sees it, is Freud's position on the unalterable nature o f the basic instinc
tu al drives — if being d estru ctive is a "primary instinct" then the main
thrust o f Eros and C ivilization is "idle speculation."
Marcuse reminds us th at the death and life in stin cts work in tandem
and that as long as life is developing and growing it is the libido which
ultim ately governs our in stinctual drives. This being the ca se, the nature
o f the death instinct (and th e heretofore existin g nature o f human destruc
tiven ess) could be m odified if there were a q u alitative change in the
essen tia l ch a ra cteristics o f libido. Marcuse must now point out how
it would be possible, in the period o f la te industrial civiliza tio n , to bring
about a change in the libido so th at it would be free o f the repressive
structures with which it is now encum bered. The discussion now focuses

^
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upon that portion o f our m ental life which is relatively free from bondage
to the perform ance principle.
We find such an area o f* m ental life,7 Marcuse notes,7 as Freud him self
recognized in the realm o f phantasy. Phantasy is a pathway which leads
from the unconsious to one o f the m ost-developed areas o f conscious
life — that o f artistic creation . Here then is a bond betw een illusion
and reality which "preserves the archetypes o f the genus, the perpetual
but repressed ideas o f the c o lle c tiv e and individual memory, the tabooed
im ages o f freedom."

37

In the developm ent o f individuals the realm

o f phantasy com es to ex isten ce during th e process o f our early growth
when the reality ego gradually supplants the pleasure ego. Phantasy
and im agination represent the drives and goals o f the ego before the
triumph o f the reality principle in conscious life ~ before, Marcuse
says, the individual becom es cognizant o f h im self as a separate en tity
counterposed to other individuals. The truth to which the im agination
is com m itted is d ifferent from that to which the reality principle adheres.
"Imagination envisions the reconciliation o f the individual with the whole,
desire with realization, o f happiness with reason."38 ** *s’ to use Caudwell s
term , in the creation o f th e mock world o f art that the truths o f the
imagination m anifest th em selves and becom e a form o f knowledge.
The power behind our a esth etic understanding is the claim o f the im agination
for a "harmony o f sensuousness and reason" — it is "the eternal protest

3^ Ibid., page 128.
38 Ibid., page 130.
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against the organization o f life by the logic o f dom ination, the critique
o i th e perform ance principle."39 We must now remark- as Marcuse
that one o f the m ost im portant functions o f the perform ance principle
is to repress the pleasure principle in the in terests of society's needed
work, as exem plified by the length o f the working day. If the work day
could be reduced a vast amount o f repression currently applied by the
perform ance principle could evaporate leading to the overthrow o f that
perinciple itse lf as it is currently structured. If this could be accom plished,
a real growth in human freedom could be an ticipated. It should here
be noted that Marcuse thinks that this can only be accom plished by
reducing the living standards in the late industrial sta tes. This, how ever,
is arguable. The reduction o f the extravagant standards o f our ruling
groups (for which surplus repression ex ists) along with the concom itant
increase in the standards o f the deprived may actually bring about an
o ver-all increase in the living standards found in our civilization as a
whole. Be that as it may, Marcuse fails to mention that it is just this
reduction in working tim e, the overthrow o f the perform ance principle
if you like, in the interests o f developing human personality and freedom ,
that Marxist thinkers, Caudwell among them , have put forth as the th eo retica l
end result of the establishm ent o f com m unism .
The major objection, as Marcuse sees it, to his notion o f overthrow 
ing the perform ance principle is the argum ent that there w ill alw ays
be som e amount o f unpleasant work to be done in order to maintain
civilization and, since the basic in stin cts alw ays push for im m ediate

163

gratification , there w ill thus alw ays be the need for a certain modicum
o f repression. In order to overcom e this objection, Marcuse has to make
a case for ths substitution o f the term "instinctual liberation" for "in
stin ctu al repression" in the Freudian sequence o f represseion, necessary
labor, civ ilization . Marcuse reminds us th at, in his view , the repression
associated with the perform ance principle is really surplus repression
based not on the n ecessity o f labor per se but only on particular histori
cally conditioned form s o f its social organization. "If this is true, the
em ergence o f a non-repressive reality principle would alter rather than
destroy the social organization o f labor: the liberation o f Eros could
crea te new and durable work relations."

40

Marcuse, however, does

not com m it him self to the view that a new civ ilization w ill eventually
em erge based on th ese principles. It is enough to point out the p ossibilities
o f such an occurrence and to dem onstrate that even in the co n tex t of
the Freudian analysis o f human nature and civ iliza tio n the seeds for
such a transform ation can be discovered. Having uncovered the "hidden
trend" in Freud's thought is Marcuse's contribution to this task. We
w ill thus take our leave o f Eros and C ivilization with this final observation
on the possibility o f a non-repressive reality principle —one freed from
the n ecessity o f oppressing the free developm ent o f libido, and this
conception — Marcuse's major point — can im plicitly be discovered
in Freud's own writings and those o f som e o f his follow ers — this is the
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"idea o f civilization very d ifferen t from that derived from repressive
sublim ation, nam ely, civ iliza tio n evolving from and sustained by free
libidinal relations."

ill

Marcuse's interpretation o f Freud goes beyond what Freud him self
exp licitly form ulated — y et is reconcilable with his basic outlook. Caudwell's
Freud and Marcuse's Freud are not a t loggerheads. I hope the above
discussion o f Eros and C ivilization w ill throw som e light on what follow s.
Caudwell derived his understanding o f Freudianism from six basic
works (listed along with the C ollected Papers in the bibliography o f
Illusion and R eality) — th ey were The Interpretation o f Dreams, Introductory
Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Totem and Taboo, Group Psychology and
the Analysis o f the Ego, The Ego and the Id, and The Future o f an Illusion.
Let us rem ember that Caudwell held that Freud made great em pirical
advances in the scien ce o f psychology — such as are discussed in the
Interpretation o f Dreams ~ i.e ., the discovergy o f an ordered m ental
life within the unconscious — and the Introductory L ectures. N evertheless,
according to Caudwell, Freud's th eo retica l elaboration o f his em pirical
d iscoveries is not warranted ~ in the earlier part o f this chapter we

Ibid., page 189. Marcuse also notes that "Geza Roheim used Ferenczi's
notion o f a 'genitofugal libido' to support his theory o f the libidinous
origin o f culture. With the relief o f ex trem e tension, libido flow s back
from the object to th e body, and this 'recathecting o f the whole organism
with libido results in a feelin g o f happiness in which the organisms find
their reward for work and stim ulation to further a ctiv ity .' The concept
assum es a genitofugal 'libido trend to the developm ent o f culture' - in other words, an inherent trend in the libido its e lf toward 'cultural'
expression, without external repressive m odification. And this 'cultural'
trend in the libido seem s to be genitofugal, that is to say away from
the gen ital supremacy toward the erotization o f the en tire organism.
These con cep ts com e clo se to recognizing th e possibility o f non-repressive
sublim ation. The rest is le ft to speculation." Ibid., pages 189-90.
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have seen how he considers Freud's theory to be a form o f bourgeois
idealism . If we turn to Freud's works th em selves we see the justice
o f Caudwell's remarks. None o f Caudwell's criticism s o f Freud, how ever,
are related to Marcuse's developm ent o f Freud's basic ideas, nor should
we forget that Freud's works are full o f reservations which exp licitly
recognize the ten ta tiv e nature o f his conclusions. The later th eo retica l
works, which Caudwell found so untenable, Freud h im self acknow ledges
as speculative. N evertheless, Freud's theory labors under the restrictions
o f bourgeois individualism to such an ex ten t that it is understandable
why Marxists, esp ecially in the 30s when fascism was the major problem
o f the day, so heartily rejected it and why Caudwell's few appreciative
remarks were taken out o f co n tex t and his cr itic a l reservations overlooked
by som e Marxist thinkers (earlier chapters have d ealt with this). The
follow ing quote from The Future o f an Illusion (1927) w ill exem p lify
this:
It is just as im possible to do w ithout con trol
o f the mass by a m inority as it is to dispense
with coercion in the work o f civ iliza tio n . For
m asses are lazy and unintelligent: they have
no love for instinctual renunciation, and they
are not to be convinced by argum ent o f its inevitability;
and the individuals com posing them support
one another in giving free reign to their indiscipline.
It is only through the influence o f individuals
who can set an exam ple and whom m asses recognize
as their leaders th at they can be induced to
perform the work and undergo the ren u n cia tio r^
on which the ex isten ce of civ iliza tio n depends.
At first sight the c r itic s o f Caudwell, Freud and Marcuse are likely
to be reinforced in their n egative judgments - - "Aha, here is contem pt

^ Sigmund Freud, The Future o f an Illusion (N.Y.: W.W.Norton, 1961)
translated by 3am es Strachey, pages 7-8.
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for the m asses o f working people, an appeal to a fa scist notion o f 'leaders'
and a view that people are alw ays going to be the sam e and must be
subjected to coercion. What more need be said to substantiate the position
th at Caudwell by flirting, even critica lly , with Freud's ideas has departed
from Marxism?" In fa ct, this is just the criticism to which Caudwell
was subjected, as we saw in the chapter on the "Caudwell Debate."
A closer reading, however, o f Freud's book provides the grounds for
rejecting this first im pression. Freud claim s that the above ch aracterization is a "purely descriptive judgement"

43

based on "an investigation

for which our own long-consolidated civ iliza tio n affords us m aterial."

44

That human nature must remain the sam e, Freud adm its "I do not know"
— but by changing our so cia l environm ent (primarily by means o f education
— Freud is, a fter all, not a Marxist) he m aintains th at it would be possible,
perhaps, to "succeed in achieving a sta te o f things in which life w ill
becom e tolerable for everyone and civ ilization no longer oppressive
to anyone."
These quotations show the undercurrent in Freud's thought that
Marcuse put so much stock in and it also gives us som e idea as to why
Caudwell did not reject som e o f Freud's ideas out o f hand. A more detailed
discussion o f Freud is not warrented in a work primarily concerned with

43
44

Ibid., page 49.
Ibid., page 9.

^

Ibid., page 48.

^

Ibid., page 50.
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Christopher Caudwell, indeed, I may have spent too much space on Marcuse's
ideas in this chapter. There are three points, how ever, I hope to have
established. First, th at Caudwell, w hile influenced by Freud, was in
no sense a "Freudian" nor did he u n critically and e c le c tic a lly try to
blend together Marxism and Freudianism. Second, that Marcuse's a ttem p t
to interpret Freud in a Marxist manner is in no way contrary to the
spirit o f Freudianism and provides th e basis for a b etter Marxist understanding
o f both Freud's theory and Caudwell's criticism s o f it. Third, that Caudwell's
view s on Freud are due to his in itial reading o f Freud in the con text
o f the 1930s a n ti-fa scist m ovem ent and that Marcuse's em endations
allow us to b etter ap preciate both Freud and Caudwell.
We have traced Caudwell's major ideas and their interpretations
and evaluation from their inception nearly fifty years ago up to the
threshold o f the 1960s and 70s. The n ext chapter w ill present contem porary
evaluations o f Caudwell's a ch ievem en ts. Like the chapter on the "Caudwell
D ebate," a number o f a rtic les from journals w ill be discussed - - unlike
the previous chapter th ese a rtic les do not share a com m on them e -a
focus o f debate. N everth eless, the question o f Caudwell's "Marxism"
still seem s to be a t issue, and dom inates a rticles appearing in such disparate
publications as New L eft R eview and The British Journal o f A esth etics.
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CHAPTER VH
Contemporary C ritical A ssessm ents o f Caudwell

We have traced Caudwell's developm ent and the influences and
reactions o f and to his ideas over the past thirty or so years. While,
in general, journal a rticles and studies o f his work have been few and
far betw een, there have recen tly appeared, in the 1970s, several a rticles
dealing sp ecifica lly with Caudwell and a t le a st one related article which
deals with the problem o f constructing "a uniquely authentic Marxist
aesth etics" which sheds a great deal o f light on th e previously discussed
debate on Caudwell's "orthodoxy" or lack o f "orthodoxy." This particular
a rticle, "The Im possibility o f a Uniquely A uthentic Marxist A esthetics,"
published in the British Journal o f A esth etics in 1976 by Oa.mes P. Scanlan,
I intend to discuss a t the clo se o f this chapter.
The major portion o f this chapter w ill deal with three recent a rti
cles on Caudwell which I w ill analyse in d eta il and c r itic iz e point by
point in an attem p t to show that Caudwell cannot be understood if he
is divorced from his own co n tex t o f 1930s Marxism. All three o f these
artic les share a common them e which is th at Caudwell did not understand
Marxism and th at consequently w hatever p ersp ective underlies Illusion
and R eality it is not a Marxist one. Thus we see the 1970s repreating
the charges made against Caudwell in th e 1950s by Cornforth and others.
In the following discussion, in which I focus a great deal on the individual
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argum ents presented in th ese three articles, I want to show that by
failing to see that Marxism is the basic th eo retica l outlook and integu
ment o f Caudwell's position the critics do not understand him and that
attem p ts to show that Caudwell did not, in e f f e c t , understand his own
position are simply not warranted. It is from this p ersp ective, therefore,
that the following critica l assessm ents are to be view ed. At the close
of this chapter I w ill sum m arize just what I take to have been Caudwell's
contribution to a Marxist understanding o f the arts.
The first a rticle I wish to discuss is "The Marxist A esth etics o f
Christopher Caudwell," by Francis Mulhern, which appeared in 1974
in New L eft R eview .^ In this a rticle Mulhern first sum m arizes what
he considers to be Caudwell's major points and o ffers his own appraisal
and conclusions. Many o f the ideas Mulhern exp resses in the first part
of his paper w ill be fam iliar from my chapter outlining Illusion and R eal
ity . I am presenting som e o f them again sin ce,th ey function in the nature
o f a brief review o f Caudwell's a esth etics and it is im portant to have
them freshly in mind in order to properly appreciate Muihern's critica l
remarks in his appraisal.
Mulhern maintains that Caudwell's theory is based on tw o basic
th eses ~ an ep istem ological one and an h istorical one. In the first,
Caudwell contends that there is a d ia lectica l unity b etw een subject
and object, i.e., nature as object is confronted by a subject which works

* Francis Mulhern, "The Marxist A esth etics o f Christopher Caudwell,"
New L eft R eview , no. 85, May-3une, 1974, pages 37-58.
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on it and in this way cre a tes its e lf.

2

For Caudwell "concrete living"

com es before speculation and abstraction. In th e second th esis (the
historical one) we find th at history (or sociology) studies "concrete living"
and form ulates the laws regarding the transition from one type o f living
system to another. For Caudwell, the contradiction which drives on
econom ic developm ent is the struggle b etw een man and nature — the
aim o f a ll history and so ciety is liberation from th e powers o f nature.

3

These general remarks of Mulhern's are all right as far as they go, but
it must be remarked, contra Mulhern, that for Caudwell th ere is a more
crucial contradiction responsible for driving on econom ic developm ent.
Society com es into ex isten ce as a result o f the contradiction betw een
man and nature (i.e., "between in stin ct and cultural environment") but
this is not what drives on econ om ic developm ent. Caudwell clearly
sta tes, following Marx, th at "class divisions rend so ciety in twain, and

2

3

Ibid., page 40.

Christopher Caudwell, Illusion and R eality; A Study o f the Sources
o f Poetry (N.Y.: International Publishers, 1970): "This contradiction
betw een in stin ct and cultural environm ent is absolutely primary to so ciety .
Oust as the sp ecific form o f it we have been analysing drives on the
developm ent o f ca p ita list so ciety , so this general contradiction drives
on the developm ent o f a ll so ciety . In language this contradiction is
represented by th e opposition betw een the rational co n ten t or ob jective
ex isten ce expressed by words and the em otion al co n ten t or subjective
attitu d e expressed by the sam e words. It is im possible to separate the
tw o com p letely, because they are given in the way language is generated
-- in man's struggle with Nature. But scien ce (or reality) is the special
field o f the form er, and poetry (or illusion) the domain o f th e latter.
Hence poetry in som e form is as etern al to so ciety as man's struggle
with Nature, a struggle o f which association in econ om ic production
is the outcom e." Page 125.
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y et are the only m eans by which so ciety can pass to higher stages o f
if.
productive d ev elo p m en t..."
Mulhern further reminds us that in order to understand con tem 
porary ca p ita list so ciety from Caudwell's view w e must introduce a
third thesis - - th at of th e "Bourgeois Illusion" — i.e ., th at freedom con
sists in "individualism," in th e breaking o f so cia l obligations and ties,
in the notion o f "me" against the world, e tc . The bourgeoisie saw in
the market the freedom from feudal relations it sought for — it saw
only relations b etw een a man and things - - but Caudwell points out that
this is an illusion. The m arket is a blind relation b etw een men disguised
to look like relations b etw een men and things. This is also known as
"commodity fetishism ." Bourgeois so ciety thus destroys human togeth er
ness. Mulhern thinks th ese notions o f Caudwell's should be compared
to those o f Lukacs in his early History and Class C onsciousness - - but
Caudwell and Lukacs are both only echoing The Communist M anifesto
and th e first volum e o f C apital.'*
The idea o f the "Bourgeois Illusion," as w e have seen elsew here,
is the red thread o f Caudwell's criticism in many diverse fields - - he
uses it, Mulhern points out, against Freud (free the in stin cts from cu l
ture), D.H. Lawrence (the in stinctual self), Shaw (who avoided c o llectiv e

^ Ibid., page 37.
"* C f., Section k o f Chapter I o f C apital, "The Fetishism o f Com m odities
and the S ecret thereof" - - pages 71-83 in Karl Marx, Capital: A C ritical
Analysis o f C apitalist Production, Volume I (N .Y .: International Pub
lishers, 1967).
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thought for that o f the enlightened individual — "intellectual Samurai"
who would paternalistically educate the m asses), and Wells (the free
intelligence).^ Caudwell makes a distinction betw een the hero and the
charlatan -th e hero leads people, however dim ly, towards the future,
while the charlatan leads them back to old and hopeless solutions. Lenin
was the model o f the hero — he knew his job and what he could do -he
acted in accordance with Engel's idea o f "freedom" — i.e ., the recognition
o f n ecessity.
Mulhern further em phasizes that in Illusion and R eality Caudwell
tries to crea te a Marxist p o etics ~ this leads to a study of language
as a social con stru ct needing d ia le ctica l and historical m aterialism for
its exp lication . The Marxist approach allow s us to view both con crete
living and the ideological con stru cts o f a given so ciety . Caudwell, a c 
cording to Mulhern, hoped, upon this basis, to study poetry. Mulhern
deals with two asp ects o f Caudwell's theory: 1) the developm ent o f
language, and 2) the primordial function o f poetry.
Language is a product of so ciety — it uses words, and a word both
tries to name a reality and to carry an em otion al response to that reality.
The struggle betw een man and nature produces language so that language
not only pictures the world but describes an attitu d e towards it — it
has an ob jective and a subjective function. We are already fam iliar
with the term s Caudwell uses to ch a ra cterize th ese tw o functions of

There are separate studies devoted to Shaw, Lawrence, Freud and
Wells in Christopher Caudwell, Studies in a Dying Culture reprinted
in Studies and Further Studies in a Dying Culture (N.Y.~&"London: Monthly
R eview Press, 1971).
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language. Its ob jective function or role is to present the com m on per
ceptual world — a correct reflectio n o f m aterial reality - - its subjective
role is to present the common a ffe c tiv e world by means o f com m unicating
"feeling tones" based on a common so cia l exp erien ce. Science (reality)
and Art (illusion) thus develop. Man's consciousness o f the world is a
result o f the unification o f both th ese outlooks — th e result o f the dia
le c tic o f a ffe c t and cognition. Science tends towards a purely ob jective
description, free of em otion, while art stresses the em otional needs
o f the "I" - - each consciousness is made up o f both drives as it w ere.
To m eet this demand (for unification) scien ce introduces the mock eg o .
"Poetry's purpose," Mulhern w rites, "is to d efin e and transm it a ffe c ts ,
to so cia lize them by inclusion in the Common A ffe c tiv e World."'7 Poetry
thus constructs a mock world for us to share in.
All art is functional in a so cia l way according to Caudwell. "Only
those things are recognized as art-form s which have a conscious social
g
function." In dreams the im portance o f the "I" is first (not always
the ca se in waking life) and new ideas can be tested unbothered by the
actu ality of the m aterial world — thus the dream sta te can also release
tensions and so cia lize the individual. The transfer o f th ese functions,
Mulhern explains, from the d ream -state to the w akin g-state is the creation
o f poetry. The poet brings to consciousness new feelin g s, e t c ., and it
is his job to incorporate them by m eans o f art into the common a ffe c tiv e

^ Mulhern, op. c it., page 46.
g
From Studies in a Dying Culture, quoted by Mulhern, Ibid.
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world. "Thus poetry is the psychological agent in a general historical
m ovem ent: by harmonizing in stin ct and environm ent it fa c tilita te s
the struggle o f man against N ature. 'The change o f th e ego' for the
purposes of social production 'is the value, purpose and mode of generation'
9
o f poetry."
Mulhern mentions Arnold's view th at the notion that the Idea is
everything vis a vis poetry is wrong (a d irect con trast to what Hegel
maintained as we know from the chapter on Hegel) since poetry cannot
be translated due to the fa c t that sp ecific p o etic em otion is lost in trans
lation. This incidentally, is also a major d ifferen ce betw een H egel and
C a u d w ell.^ In translation poetry loses its untranslatable 'glow' or 'a ffective'
part — poetry is irrational with rep sect to the environm ent but riot so
with respect to the em otions. A sym bol is a transitive sign — poetry
is not sym bolic, it is con crete ~ it has no external only internal symbolism,
that is to say, unlike scien ce and its d ifferen t th eories, the works o f
art do not contradict one another ~ how ever, if w e w ere to see scien tific
theories as paradigms in Kuhn's sense they too would no more contradict
one another than would art works. * *

Along th ese lines it may be possible

to draw closer parallels betw een "science" and "art." At any rate, poetry
is con crete since em otions are u ltim ately tied to real o b jects. "Aesthetic
objects are such only 'in so far as they arouse em otions peculiar not
to individual men but to associated men.' Thus, the first person singular
o f poetry denotes not 'the individual in civ il society' but 'the "I" common

9

^

Mulhern, og. c it., page 47. Cf. Illusion and R ea lity , page 236.
Cf. our chapter 5 on H egel.

* * Cf. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure o f S cien tific R evolutions, 2nd
enlarged edition (Chicago: U niversity o f Chicago Press, 1970).
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to all associated men's em otion al worlds.'"

12

"In sum," Mulhern w rites,

"poetry is an untranslatable verbal structure, irrational, rhythm ic, fic tiv e
and characterized by condensed a ffects."

13

Caudwell's discussion o f the sociology of English literature gives
one exam ple o f the struggle betw een man and nature as reflected in
poetry. He divides modern poetry — i.e ., English modern poetry, into
three periods. Mulhern w ill refer to the first and last periods to illustrate
Caudwell's method. Three periods are: 1. P rim itive Accum ulation, 2.
Industrial Revolution, 3. The D ecline o f C apitalism .
The first period has Shakespeare (also Marlowe) as its greatest
representative — this period is marked in poetry and drama by unfettered
individualism. By the N ineteenth Century art had becom e a mere com 
m odity. Caudwell says that art pour l'art was a reaction to this develop
m ent but that this A estheticism itse lf was only th e com m odity-fetishism
peculiar to the tribe o f a rtists. Finally, Surrealism with its free a sso ci
ation retreated into private phantasy, becam e non-social, and therefore
art ceased to ex ist. Caudwell thought o f the Surrealists as the last
o f the Bourgeois revolutionaries. Thus, Mulhern reitera tes, all art e x 
presses a stage in the struggle b etw een man and nature. "We end where
we began, with the struggle betw een man and Nature, 'first and only
mover' o f the Caudwellian universe."

12

14

14

Mulhern, op. c i t ., page 48. C f., Illusion and R eality, page 135.

Ibid., page 51. We have already seen how inappropriate is Mulhern's
use of the word "only" in this co n tex t.
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Thus does Mulhern sum m arize Caudwell's ach ievem en t. How does
he evaluate it? He thinks Caudwell has made three major advances
over previous English Marxists. First, he broke with the traditions o f
English philosophy which had supported the p ositivist separation of Sub
ject and Object. Following Marx's lead in Theses on Feuerbach, Caudwell
rejected all such dualities. (I would like to add, how ever, this does not
imply that he had an id ealist view o f the unity o f subject and ob ject,
but rather that he was advocating the Marxist view o f their d ialectica l
unity within a m aterialist co n tex t.) Second,
Having restored the unity of consciousness and
reality, Caudwell was able to repudiate the
notion o f literature as object in favour o f the
more fertile idea o f literature as p ra ctice.
In Illusion and R eality, poetry is seen not as
reflectio n , but as a sp ecific mode o f form ulation
o f the real: it is in no sense a transcription either
o f individual subjectivity (expression) or o f 'R eal
ity' (representation); rather, it co -o p era tes in
the production o f historically necessary form s
o f social consciousness.
Mulhern points out that Raymond Williams has also advanced this view .
Third, poetry as p ractice d iffers from phenom enology (whose "I"
o f experience is central) because o f Caudwell's "I" being a socially con 
structed ego founded by th e common a ffe c tiv e world. H ence, "the artist
does not express him self in art form s, he finds h im self therein."

16

Mulhern

likens these view s to those o f the new tex tu a l S em iotics and to Lucian
Goldman's notion o f the "transindividual su b ject." ^

^

Ibid. C f., Illusion and R E ality, pages 152, 195-96.

16

Ibid., quoting page 43 o f Studies in a Dying C ulture. C f., Illusion
and R eality, pages 150, 220.
17

Ibid. Mulhern also refers to Lucian Goldman, The Human S ciences
and Philosophy, pages 27-28, 125ff.
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For th ese reasons, Mulhern considers Caudwell's view s to have been
a radical advance in term s o f Marxist theory.
Mulhern now turns his a tten tion to what he ca lls Caudwell's "Historicism ." He suggests th at no literary theory w ill be more adequate
than the notion o f historical m aterialism underlying it - - in Caudwell
(as Marx) this theory is im plicit in his works and not exp licitly form ula ted.

18

Mulhern m aintains that Caudwell's theory is h istoricist in A lt

husser's sense, and he gives the follow ing quotation from Reading C apital:
It constructs a so cia l whole that is 'reducible'
to an inner essen ce, o f which the elem en ts o f
the whole are no more than the phenom enal
forms o f expression, the inner principle of the
essen ce being present a t each point in the whole,
such that a t each m oment it is possible to w rite
the im m ediately adequate equation: such and
such an elem en t (econom ic, p olitical, legal,
literary, religious, e t c ^ in Hegel) = th e inner
essen ce o f the w hole.
However, Mulhern n otes that Althusser's critique o f historicism
is "generic" and is not a ll th at u seful when applied to sp ecific instances.
Caudwell's work cannot simply be dism issed because o f charges o f "his
toricism ." Mulhern continues:
For Caudwell, the 'subject' o f the historical
process is the econom y, which is con stitu ted
in the struggle b etw een man and Nature. This
polar contradiction reproduces its e lf a t every
so cia l level, in a series o f hom ologous, epiphen-

18

Anyone fam iliar with th e opening from the preface to Contribution
to a Critique o f P o litica l Econom y, would be less than en th usiastic in
calling Marx's theory only im p licitly stated .
19

Mulhern, op. c it., page 53. Cf. Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar,
Reading Capital (N.Y.: Pantheon Books, 1970), pages 186-87.
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om enal oppositions: su b ject/ob ject, a ffe c t/c o g n i
tion, a r t/sc ie n c e , Beauty /Truth. Together they
com pose a unitary so cia l p ra ctice, the historical
aim o f which is freedom from the fo rces of
Nature.
Much as Cornforth before him, Mulhern m aintains that Caudwell's
theory o f the "Bourgeois Illusion" w ill not stand the te s t o f em pirical
exam ination - - he c ite s as cou n ter-exam p les Hobbes and Arnold as w ell
as Rousseau, and suggests th at perhaps Rousseau never held the illusion
o f freedom that Caudwell ascrib es to him as a cla ssic proponent. Again
I can only remark with resp ect to this criticism what has already been
said on this account in the chapter on the "Caudwell Debate" — i.e .,
that Caudwell is generalizing and not m aintaining that each and every
bourgeois subscribes to the sam e theory — only for the m ost part this
is the trend o f bourgeois thought and one of its dom inant, indeed perhaps
its most dominant, ch a ra cteristics.
Mulhern continues in a Cornforthian vein, criticizin g Caudwell's
view s on the instincts and stressing his overdependence on Freud. "The
m aster-contradiction betw een man and Nature is registered psychologi
cally as the opposition b etw een in stin ct and environm ent. Frustratingly
'instinct' which lies a t the heart of Caudwell's psychologism is the most
labile o f a ll his con cep ts. Nowhere does he provide a conclusive d efin i..
„21
tion."

Nor should we be surprised, a fter having analyzed Caudwell's cr iti
que o f Freud, a t the lack o f a "conclusive definition" which so disconcerts

20 Ibid.
21

Ibid.

179

Mulhern. We have only to reca ll that Caudwell him self attributed this
to the "state o f the art" — to th e fa c t that psychology was just beginnning
to find its scien tific fe e t and th at many o f its term s, "instinct" among
them , were only provisional term s which indicated in a lam entable,
but necessary, way the real phenom ena being discussed. The continuing
advancem ent of scien tific knowledge in this field, Caudwell thought,
would eventually allow for a more p recise and "conclusive" notion.
A fter all, Illusion and R eality was a pioneering work, and to criticize
it for not being more "conclusive" than the scien ce o f its day is hardly
warranted.
Mulhern further says th at Caudwell introduces a non-Marxian
notion into the heart o f his theory - - which may show his having been
overly influenced by Freud a t the expense o f Marx and Lenin:
On the w hole, Cornforth was co rrect to argue
that Caudwell favors the notion o f a practically
unchanging in stin ctu al structure, what Caudwell
him self described as 'the unchanging secre t
fa ce o f the genotype which p ersists beneath
a ll the rich superstructure o f civ iliza tio n (IR:203).'
Two consequences follow from this. Firstly,
Caudwell's system introduces an elem en t alien
to Marxism, the notion o f a fixed human nature,
in this ca se a reca lcitra n t, u ltim ately unalterable
instinctual man. Secondly, this notion in jects
a fundam ental tim elessn ess into the core of
history: the form s and conditions o f struggle
may vary, but the struggle rem ains the sam e.
Furthermore, in a number o f passages this strug
gle is said to be b etw een instinctual and cultural
man (IR: 124-5). History thus becom ei^the
clamour o f an unending psychom achia.
What can be said about th ese a ll too fam iliar m isinterpretations
o f Caudwell's thought? 1 have already shown in a previpus chapter ('The

^

Ibid. page 54.
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Caudwell Debate') why Cornforth's interpretation is not warranted.
Mulhern's, based upon Cornforth, is equally suspect. Once it is shown
that Caudwell did not adhere to a con cep t o f unchanging human nature
(i.e., "unalterable instinctual man") Mulhern's two consequences m elt
aw ay. Mulhern sides with Cornforth on this issue but does not explain
how such concepts as "practically unchanging" (thus allowing for some
change it would seem ) and "fixed and unalterable" human nature are
to be reconciled. It seem s to me that Mulhern is guilty o f not using
the very forms o f d ia lectica l thinking which he claim s it was Caudwell's
great m erit to have practiced. Mulhern puts the "instincts" on one side
and "environment" on the other and explains that for Caudwell the former
lurks behind the latter as an unchanging foundation. Nothing could be
farther from Caudwell's mind. We have previously seen how Caudwell
criticized Freud (by whom he is supposedly overly influenced) for just
this lack o f a d ia lectica l approach to reality. The following quotation
from Illusion and R eality expresses p erfectly Caudwell's attitu d e towards
the "instincts." Here, in criticizin g Freud's notion o f "mentation" he
w rites that Freud fails to understand that
here ex a ctly , as in the field o f knowledge as
a whole, the sam e interprenetration o f environ
m ent and in stin ct takes p lace, and it is never
possible to separate any m entation as sp ecifically
instinctive and in no way conditioned by the
environm ent. The attem p t to do so, to discard
as 'additional' or 'sublimated' a ll m entation which
bears the stam p o f the environm ent, involves
excluding layer a fter layer o f consciousness
as secondary and unreal until one reaches as
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the only true psychic reality something„yague
and form less, a m ere name — libido
that Freudian reservoir o f the unchanging basic instinctual nature o f
man. Bearing in mind the com p lete interpenetration o f th ese tw o con cep ts
(instinct and environm ent) for Caudwell w ill go a long way in helping
to avoid overem phasizing one or the other when we read Caudwell and,
hopefully, discourage us from onesidedly view ing him as a Freudian
and as "un-Marxian."
Mulhern finds fault with Caudwell on other grounds as w ell. He
maintains that Caudwell's view s are related to sym bolist a esth etics
and that what Caudwell d efin es as poetry is true only o f a particular
period y e t he elev a tes this d efinition to a supra-historical category
as a result of his view s on language and p oetic function. Caudwell's
view , according to Mulhern, is th at "the function o f poetry is to e f f e c t
the psychological adaptation in the genotype which w ill equip it for
its changing tasks in the struggle against nature."

2 ci

Mulhern cr itic iz e s

the fa c t that Caudwell alw ays reverts to prim itive exam ples (the harvest,
e tc .) when making his point. This is because, Mulhern asserts, Caudwell
sees historical change as a surface change only (we have already seen
Mulhern's error on this score) basically his co n flict is tim eless and ah istorical,
he therefore confuses the function o f poetry with a function historically
conditioned by prim itive so ciety . Mulhern suggests that Caudwell fails
to see that today poetry has many d ifferen t functions which his theory
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cannot account for. U nfortunately Mulhern does not discuss any o f
th ese "many d ifferent functions." Of course, if Caudwell really maintained
that poetry was nothing more than the prim itive harvest song so that
once we understood the function o f prim itive poetry w e understood
poetry qua poetry and needn't bother ourselves anym ore, Mulhern's critiques
would be both cogen t and illum inating. A clo se exam ination o f Caudwell,
however, dispels this idea. Mulhern has confused the function o f prim itive
poetry as a mode or expression o f a more general function inclusive
of other forms o f poetry, including those o f "today," with the function
o f poetry in general. Caudwell, how ever, did not deduce the "function"
o f poetry from that o f prim itive poetry, but rather saw prim itive poetry
as an exem plification o f a function much more general in nature. It
is true that Caudwell does se e a general function to poetry which relates
all sp ecies o f poetry to one another. "Poetry," he w rites, "colours the
world o f reality with a ffe c tiv e tones ... Poetry soaks extern al reality
— nature and so ciety — w ith em otion al significance." The poetry of
today, like that o f prim itive tim es, still has th e function to "give us
new em otional a ttitu d es to a new social environm ent."

25

Mulhern, I

think, has confused the many d ifferen t sub-functions o f poetry (as ep ic,
lyric, educative, com m em orative, e tc .) and failed to grasp the larger
function with which Caudwell was dealing - - i.e ., o f em otionally colouring
our world. Mulhern's misapprehension stem s, I think, from his insistence
on the incorrect notion that Caudwell only se e s h istorical developm ent
as a "surface change" — a view I have criticized many tim es before.
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According to Mulhern, Caudwell's view o f language is a dualism
o f a ffect/co g n itio n . "Science," Mulhern w rites, "utilizing the cognitive
dimensions o f language, in v estig a tes the environm ent; poetry, utilizing
the a ffe c tiv e and aspiring to the wholly non-rational condition o f music,
aim s to know and e f f e c t transform ations o f the instincts."

26

This forces

Caudwell towards a quasi-sym bolist a esth etic.
What is a t issue is the th eo retica l failure (sic)
th at brought him to this pass. Marx insisted
on the crucial distinction betw een general and
historically sp ecific con cep ts. A theory o f poetryin-general is th e pre-condition o f an understand
ing o f determ inate form s o f poetry; and v ice
versa, but this, p recisely, is a distinction which
historicism is unable to grasp; if the sp ecificity
o f an h istorical even t is finally absorbed into
a tim eless 'essen tial principle,' such a ^ s t in c t io n
is a t best unreal and a t worst a snare.
However much Mulhern may like to think otherw ise, Caudwell
does not appear guilty o f any such absorption. He gives many sp ecific
exam ples o f p o etica l developm ent from prim itive tim es to past and
present English poetry. Mulhern appears to con cen trate overly on "speci
ficity" and the historically sp ecific con cep t. He is certainly correct
in warning us against molding the historically sp ecific in such a way
to a general theory that w e pervert and falsify it, but Caudwell has
made no Procrustean bed for poetry. If we take th e historically sp ecific
to be so uniquely sp ecific that w e cannot subsume it under general prin
cip les at all w e might as w ell abandon any hope o f arriving a t overall
theory o f any kind and simply d evote ourselves to cataloging art works.

26

Mulhern, op. c it ., page 57.
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Mulhern also says that Caudwell cannot point out what is sp e c ifi
cally a esth etic in poetry. He eq u ates art and em otion and m aintains
that a esth etic objects appeal to associated and not individual man.
According to this view , for Caudwell language is used to express a ffe c ts
and contains a ll the em otion known to the so cia l world — there is no
non-social em otion capable o f linguistic expression. Thus, Caudwell
cannot distinguish betw een a esth etic and n on -aesth etic e f fe c ts . "Art
is em otion. Poetry is a psychological instance, and Caudwell has failed
in his stated project (sic): the provision o f a knowledge o f art that was
not psychology or politics."

28

Mulhern bases this evaluation on Caudwell's

statem en ts on pages 11 and 12 o f the "Introduction" to Illusion and R ea lity .
Are Mulhern's criticism s warranted? I think a carefu l reading o f the
Caudwell tex t in question gives grounds to suspect that they are not.
Caudwell never simply equates art with em otion when he discusses the
em otional function or role th at art has. One might as w ell bring the
sam e charge against A ristotle's theory o f catharsis and equate tragedy
and em otion. Nor did Caudwell have as his project providing a knowledge
o f art free from psychology and p olitics - - although he did want such
a knowledge that was not simply psychological or p olitical. In the term s
in which he him self stated his project he did not fail. How did he sta te
it? "As regards this study o f poetry," he w rote, "we reject from the
ou tset any lim itation to purely a esth etic ca teg o ries. If anyone wishes
to remain entirely in the province o f a esth etics, then he should remain
eith er a creator or an appreciator o f art works ... The criticism o f art

differs from pure enjoym ent or creation in that it contains a sociological
component."

29

Caudwell intended to appeal to many field s o f knowledge

to arrive at his ideas o f art "without falling into ec le c tic ism or confusing
art with psychology or politics."

30

We have seen that Caudwell has

been very precise as to what he means by art and its so cia l function.
This does not preclude him from discussing p o litical, social, historical
and even psychological factors involved with the functions o f art, but
this does not mean a la Mulhern, that Caudwell's view s are simply psychological
and p olitical view s and nothing more. Caudwell's project, a fter all,
was to provide an historical m aterialist.view o f the sources o f poetry
and not to crea te and "aesthetic." We cannot, th erefore, a ccep t Mulhern's
conclusions as in any way d efin itive.
Three years after the appearance of Mulhern's article "Caudwell's
Theory o f Poetry: Some Problems o f a Marxist Synthesis," by S.V. Pradhan
appeared in the British 3ournal o f A esth etics.

31

In this a rticle, Pradhan

outlines what he takes to be the major ideas o f Caudwell's theory, a ttem p ts
to show how he integrates a ffectiv ism with cognitivism , and com m ents
on the synthesis. Caudwell, as w e know, b eliev es that men in purposive
action discover the "common perceptual world" and the "common a ffe c tiv e
world." Freedom equals the recognition o f n ecessity in th ese worlds,
and art equals the recognition of n ecessity in the em otional world.
These two worlds have a d ia le ctica l relationship:

29
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S.V. Pradhan, "Caudwell's Theory o f Poetry: Som e Problems o f a
Marxist Synthesis," British Journal o f A esth etics, Volume 17, no. 3,
Summer, 1977, pages 266-74.
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These tw o worlds are not separate and divided.
They in terp en etrate, with the result that the
'emotions are only found in real life adhering
to bits o f reality
(IR page 153). This peculiar
interdependence o f the tw o worlds is reflected
in language, which is the product o f the c o llectiv e
human struggle 'to make environm ent conform
to instincts.' (IR page 134). Caudwell says:
'Always, given in the word, is a certain subjective
attitu d e (em otion) towards a certain p iece of
reality.' (IR page 152).
Pradhan points out that for Caudwell com m unication depends
on the common a ffe c tiv e world and only therein is individuality and
p oetic creation possible. The poet tries to bring to new levels the com 
mon a ffe c tiv e world for everyone. Experience must be related in a social
form ~ the "I" o f poetry is the "I" o f the common a ffe c tiv e world. Prad
han quotes Caudwell's contention that "A esthetic objects are a esth etic
in so far as they arouse em otion peculiar not only to individual men
but to associated men. From this arises the d isinterested, suspended
and ob jective character o f a e sth e tic em otion."

33

Pradhan has the following

com m ent to make on Caudwell's assertion. "The common em otional
world," he w rites, "is a co n crete world o f instincts shared by a large
group o f people whose lives are governed by certain relations o f production
which in turn determ ine their so cia l relations. The poet must recognize
th ese social relations and com e to term s with them in order that his
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individual experience may evoke the com m on em otion al world successfully
and thus becom e accessib le to others."

3*i

Rhythm induces com m on feelin gs - - '"Herd com m onness1brought
about by rhythm returns men to the 'genotype,1 i.e ., 'the more or less
common set o f instincts in man which is changed and adapted by outer
reality in the course o f living.'"

35

The com m on a ffe c tiv e world is really

experienced and leads us to the genotype ~ the illusion o f art resides
in the cognitive world o f art — in an idealized 'mock world.' Pradhan
follow s this observation with a quotation from Further Studies in a Dying
Culture ("Beauty”): "The a rtist takes bits o f reality, socially known,
to which a ffe c tiv e associations adhere, and cre a tes a mock world, which
calls into being a new a ffe c tiv e a ttitu d e, a new em otion al experience."
Caudwell, Pradhan says, b eliev es th at poetry is made out o f words not
out o f ideas or external reality — if we tran slate poetry we lose em otions
— i.e ., the meanings associated em otionally w ith just th ese words (and
rhythm)."

36

In the sam e way th at dream s equal veiled sa tisfa ctio n ,

so does poetry equal sa tisfa ctio n by expression.
Pradhan says that stress on the common a ffe c tiv e world is bourgeois
while the stress on the com m on perceptual world is Marxist and suggests
that these two com penents may not 'cohere' in Caudwell's thought.
He then turns to Caudwell's ideas on language. Language, he says, for
Caudwell com es about from the transform ation o f the cry into a word.

^
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This is a major differn ce from H egel.
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In the beginning the value o f the cry is in stin c
tiv e, and it results from 'the relation o f the
genotype to habitual environm ent.' Later the
value of the cry becom es arbitrary for it results
from the relation o f m odified genotype to a rtifi
cia l environm ent in econom ic production. Thus
as a result o f 'association for econom ic produc
tion' the cry becom es the word. The word th ere
fore has an in stin ctive as w ell as a perceptual
a sp ect, both a sp ects being 'more p recise and
com plex' than they w ere for the original cry.
These ideas on language are Caudwell's answer to I.A.Richard's
view (which we discussed in an earlier chapter) th at a ll language has
an environm ental asp ect o f referen ce — but whereas Richards' view s
com e from his notion o f the "Symbol" as related to R eferen ce and R efer
en t, Caudwell gives a Marxist tw ist to th ese ideas. Caudwell says the
illusion o f poetry leads to a Mock World — unlike Richards who says
the poem te lls us nothing. Pradhan points out that Caudwell's view s
are "only a short step away" from "the in sisten ce o f the New C riticism
*2 0

on the autonomy o f the art wold."

A view , how ever, that Caudwell

as a Marxist would never ascribe to.
Many think, Pradhan w rites, th at a ffectiv ism and cognitivism
cannot really go together - - but Caudwell, who follow s the m im etic
view o f art, sought to strike a balance b etw een th ese two view s.
He s a y s : '... the em otion al co n ten t does not
flo a t about fluidly in the mind; it is fim ly a t
tached by a thousand interw eaving strands to
the m anifest con ten t — a p iece o f external
reality' (IR page 216). Thanks to th ese 'thousand
37
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interw eaving strands:' 'Poetry soaks external
reality - - nature and so ciety ~ with em otional
significance' (IR page 217). In this interesting
synthesis of environm ent and em otion the a f f e c 
tiv e aq^ cogn itive view s o f art are held in ba
lance.
Pradhan maintains, how ever, th at Caudwell's actu al criticism
does not live up to his theory — that he cr itic iz e s art as if it w ere a
reflectio n o f reality — good or bad — and not a Mock World at all. Per
haps, Pradhan says, this shows that one cannot blend bourgeois a esth eticism (a ffe c tiv e theories) w ith Marxist socio-econom ic criticsm . Prad
han sta tes that Caudwell
did not rea lize, for instance, th at the philoso
phical im plications o f his theory of illusion or
aesth eticism are id ea listic and therefore incom 
patible with th e m aterialism o f his so c io -e c o 
nomic analysis. Nor did he realize that such
a 'synthesis' would be unacceptable as much
to a m aterialsit as to an id ealist. It would be
unacceptable to an id ealist because its Marxist
com ponent con fers prim acy on m aterial reality;
and it would be unacceptable to a m aterialist
because its a esth eticism m inim izes the impor
tance of-the a rtistic world as a reflectio n o f
reality.
These criticism s of Caudwell are not, to my mind, correct. There
is no contradiction in Caudwell betw een "reflection" and "Mock World."
Caudwell's "Mock World" is not som ething purely illusory with no relation
to reality as such. It is an em otion al world created out o f language
and r eflects the realities o f our em otions which are th em selves products

^
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o f the m aterial world. There is no "unacceptable synthesis" going on
here a t all. We need to have a proper idea of what Caudwell, as a Marx
ist, means by reflectio n . Then we can understand why Pradhan's s ta te 
ment regarding Caudwell's "aestheticism " m inim izing art as a reflection
o f reality and thus being unacceptable to m aterialists (sp ecifically his
torical m aterialists but Pradhan does not make this specification ) m isses
the point. Pradhan, based on his analysis, thinks that Caudwell had
an "unsure grasp o f Marxism."*^ I hope to show, rather, that it is Prad
han's grasp that is unsure.
It is only if w e think o f "reflection" as som e sort o f mirror held
up to nature and reproduced alm ost photographically that it makes sense
to say that Caudwell's "Mock World" is n on -reflectiv e or that Caudwell
m inim izes art as a reflectio n . Pradhan is using, it seem s to me, a m ech
anical m aterialist notion o f reflectio n , not a notion which is essen tially
Marxist and certainly not one applicable to Caudwell. Caudwell him self
is partially responsible for this confusion. On page 145 o f Illusion and
R eality, for exam ple, he says that "percepts" are "photographic memory
— im ages o f bits o f reality" — but this one statem en t should not be
taken out o f co n tex t and isolated from his general discussion o f "the
reflection in men's heads o f the real world." A ctually, rather than photo
graphic im ages, the "percepts" and the words used to describe them
are "symbols" o f external reality — this is Caudwell's real position.
In this sam e discussion (pages 145-46 o f Illusion and R eality) Caudwell
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maintains that the world reflected in our heads - - i.e ., in consciousness
"is always and necessarily a reflectio n which has an a ctiv e and significant
relation to the object, and it is this a ctiv ity and sign ificance, and not
the projective qualities o f the reflectio n , which guarantee truth." This
rules out, I think, any idea th at Caudwell held a passive mirror im age
concept o f reflection . In fa c t, this conception is thought by Caudwell
to be decidedly bourgeois. In his discussion o f language, Caudwell says
that the idea of language (and by extension this applies to his theory
o f poetry since poetry is constructed out o f language) as picturing the
world like a mirror is to be found among his contem poraries in Russell
and W ittgenstein. W ittgenstein's ideas (in the T ractatus L ogico-Philosopicus) about creating a "perfect" language which only asserts or denies
fa cts, which is a "picture" o f the world, is thought by Caudwell to be
fundam entally wrong. It ignores one o f the major functions o f language
~ nam ely that if "reflects" the relations o f men as "feeling men and
perceiving men in association for econom ic production."

42

This historical function o f language, explains
why existing languages are so far from the 'per
fect' language postulated by W ittgenstein. Such
a p erfect language would be p erfectly useless.
It would be a picture o f the world, standing
in the sam e relation to external reality as a
m irror-im age to the thing mirrored. But then
it would be an inferior thing to the thing imaged
and would be a u seless con stru ct. It would have
no hidden power over the world or the subject
... Language exp resses not m erely what reality
is ... it expresses also what can be done with
42
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reality ~ its inner hidden laws, and what man
w ants to ^ with it - - his own unconscious n e
cessitie s.
The m istake that Caudwell thinks he has here exposed is, he says,
the result o f the separation o f the subject and the ob ject which, he main
tains, is a result of class so ciety . This separation ends up view ing thought
as nothing but contem plation. Caudwell rejects this notion since he
view s man's asso cia tiv e struggle with nature as the real source of con
sciousness, language, and art, a ll three o f which strive togeth er to develop
each other in even higher and more com prehensive form s. Marx, Caud
w ell w rites, was the first to see this relationship and to renounce the
view o f thinking as m erely contem plation. Even H egel in the "Preface"
to The Philosophy o f Right says that philosophy "is its own tim e appre
hended in thoughts." Marx overcam e this view point, how ever, in "those
hastily-scribbled eleven Theses on Feuerbach th at marked the beginning
o f a new era in human thought: 'The philosophers have only interpreted
the world in various ways; the point, how ever, is to change it (Illusion
and R eality, page 197)."
Pradhan view s Caudwell as a theorist divided b etw een bourgeois
aesth eticism (the mock world) and Marxist realism . "As we have already
seen," he w rites, "art, according to Caudwell, rem oulds external reality
to the likeness o f the genotype's in stin cts

nil

and thereby enriches itse lf

Ibid.
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Caudwell says just the opposite — "art adapts the genotype to external
reality" — Ibid., page 263.
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in addition to making the reality more true and interesting."

4-5 However,

"the emphasis on so ciety as the great m atrix, while ch aracteristic of
Marxist a esth etics, is foreign to a ffe c tiv e theories o f art."

Pradhan,

I think, m isinterprets Caudwell's thought because he is continually divid
ing it into tw o parts -- one dealing with m aterial reality and the other
dealing with the a ffe c tiv e world — the world of illusions for Caudwell.
But Caudwell does not say th at poetry and the em otional com plex from
whence it derives is circum scribed by the eith er/or of the real world
and the a ffe c tiv e world. Nor does he mean, when Pradhan says that
art remoulds the world to the genotype's instincts, th at th ese instincts
are "biological givens." The environm ental com plex th at produces art
is neither simply the m aterial reality nor the ideal illusions o f artists.
He calls it rather a so cia l reality. "These in stin cts have generated these
em otions just because they have not blindly follow ed the n ecessities
o f the germ plasm, but have been moulded by the o b jective n ecessities
of c o lle c tiv e action to a common econom ic end. The phantasy o f poetry
is a social im a g e." ^ Caudwell's "affectivism " is not a sp ecies o f bourgeois
a ffectiv ism , but a Marxist account o f how a ffe c ts function in the to ta l
integration o f human ex isten ce , em otion al and non-em otional, within
a social co n tex t. It is not so much that art remoulds reality to suit

^ Pradhan, 0£. c it., page 272.
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the instincts o f man as that "It changes the em otional con ten t o f his
consciousness so that he can react more subtly and deeply to the world."

48

From our previous chapters w e know th at Caudwell ruled out any
role for art as an instrum ent o f propaganda. Propaganda is a "persuasion
to action , a pressure to be or do differently" and this is not art. Pradhan
says in this Caudwell appears to be in agreem ent with Marx and Engels.
Y et sin ce, according to Pradhan, for Caudwell the a ffe c tiv e reality
is all - - the cogn itive reality a mock world ~ he d iffers from Marx who
would never have adm itted this d istinction. But a clo se reading o f Caud
w ell dispels this so-called bifurcation o f reality. "The genotype and
the external reality ex ist sep arately in theory, but it is an abstract separation."

49

All th ese "separations," "distinctions," and pidgeon holeing

o f Caudwell's concepts stem from a failure to understand what Caudwell
h im self ca lls "the d ia lectic of co n crete life." Art has both a ffe c tiv e
and cogn itive com ponents - - as does scien ce.
"Finally," Pradhan te lls us,
the thrust o f Marx's theorizing is not in the
direction o f som e ab stract human p oten tial
such as Caudwell's con cep t o f the genotype
im plies. Marx would have considered such 'ab
stra ct human p otential' to be a p etty bourgeois
d evice for glossing over class struggles and
the angularities o f cla ss ch aracteristics in an
effo rt to cherish the myth o f etern al, unchanging
'human nature.' One must conclude, th erefore,
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that Caudwell's view o f art is far too em o tiv e
to square w ell with th e environm ent-orientetjg
a esth etic, such as it be, o f Marx and Engels.
I think it is fair to say, from our presentation o f Caudwell's theory,
that he neither supported the myth o f an unchanging human nature nor
has he ignored the role o f the environm ent, as Pradhan suggests. One
must conclude, therefore, that Pradhan's interpretation o f Caudwell
is not entirely correct. He sums up his position as follow s:
Caudwell d efin itely adopts a few outstanding
a ffe c tiv e view s and seeks to assim ilate them
to the historical m aterialist fram e o f referen ce.
However, the attem p ted synthesis reveals itse lf
to be a m ixture rather than a fusion o f the view s
that are, in the u ltim ate analysis, inspired by
the contrary philosophies o f idealism and m aterialism .
Moreover, contrary from what one would ex p ect
from his a ffe c tiv e th eo retica l stan ce, in his
practical criticism Caudwell argued like a good
historical m aterialist teth er than an a ffe c tiv e ly
oriented a esth eticia n .
Pradhan's critique, like Mulhern's before him, fails to hit the mark
and for basically the sam e reasons as we have previously pointed out
-- ch ief among them the tendency to polarize Caudwell's con cep ts and
the failure to see that he uses them in a very fluid manner.
The year following th e appearance o f Pradhan's a rtic le saw another
study devoted to Caudwell published by the British Journal o f A esth e tics.
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This was Robert Currie's "Christopher Caudwell: Marxist Illusion, Jungian
Reality."

52

This is in many resp ects an interesting a rticle, but it leads

to conclusions which are not supported, in my opinion, by Caudwell's
tex t.
Currie w ill argue that Illusion and R eality, while having a Marxist
"cast," nevertheless g ets its cen tral doctrines from Jung's an alytical
psychology. One o f the reasons this has been overlooked, Currie im plies,
is that many o f Caudwell's notions go back to cla ssica l German philosophy
-- notions not only important to Marxism but also to analytic psychology,
which likewise can be traced back to cla ssica l German philosophy. Caud
w ell, Currie tells us, turned to psychological theory to elucidate his
ideas about poetry as an econom ic a ctiv ity .

53

While influenced by Freud,

Currie continues, Caudwell thought th at he lacked any "material causes"
in his explanations, thus Caudwell turned to the psycho-anthropological
theories of Jung. Curries's position does not follow from a reading o f
Caudwell's tex t — why would Caudwell turn to Jung to find "material
causes" absent in Freud, when Caudwell him self says with referen ce
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Robert Currie, "Christopher Caudwell: Marxist Illusion, Jungian
Reality," British Journal o f A esth etics, Volume 18, no. 4, Autumn, 1978,
pages 291-99.
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N ote, however, that Caudwell, in supporting A ristotle's theory of
m im esis which he says "is fundam ental for an understanding o f art,"
adds that "Aristotle ... was more in terested in the created thing, e.g .,
the play — than in the man who was influenced by it or who produced
it. Thus his angle of a ttack is a esth etica lly correct; he does not approach
literature like a psychologist or a psychoanalysist." Op. c i t ., pages 48-

49.
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to both Freud and Jung th at, "Their therapy is a therapy o f will-pow er
and m ystic m ind-controi. In neither do m aterial, i.e ., environm ental
causes o f m ental disease figure candidly and openly ..."

5k

Currie, however, continues:
Jung argued th at what Levy-Bruhl called a parti
cipation m ystique marked prim itive man's social
being, his 'c o llectiv e personality' as Jung saw
it. In th ese conditions, man's surplus o f 'psychic
energy' could give rise not to organized econom ic
a ctiv ity but only to the 'natural phenomena'
o f sem i-anim al life. According to Jung, two
sim ultaneous psychological developm ents trans
formed this prim itive man into the econom ic,
social man o f history. On the one hand, the
em ergence o f certain a ttra ctiv e sym bols, begin
ning with the religious sym bols o f agricultural
fertility cu lts, 'canalized' surplus psychic energy
into productive labour; and on the other, the
psychic functions which were m ost highly adapted
to productive labour (esp ecially 'thinking') were
developed, and others (esp ecially 'feeling') were
suppressed into consciousness as 'inferior func
tions.' Man thus attained an individual d ifferen 
tiated conscious personality, which was organized
about 'ego-consciousness,' and expressed to
so ciety , no longer within the participation m ys
tique, but through the relationship o f one m a^s
determ inate, socialized 'persona' to another.
The persona, Currie continues, was "nothing real" but an outward
socially determ ined mode o f relating. The problem for Jung is that
the inner person is replaced by the persona. Jung said w e must be related
to others and be whole men — to this end we must return to our own

Caudwell, o£. c it., pages 166-67. He w rites also that "Freud is repre
sen ta tiv e o f em piricism with its reductive m ethod, while Jung tends
towards a more e c le c tic and m ystical point o f view." Ibid., page 160.
55

Currie, 0 £. c it ., page 294.
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individual consciousness and "to th e 'archetypes' th at contained, in the
co lle c tiv e unconscious o f a ll individuals, the springs o f psychic energy
which flowed so freely in the c o lle c tiv e personality o f prim itive m an ." ^
Art for Jung, Currie concludes, could be a therapy to attain this end.
Currie's position is that the major view s o f Illusion and R eality
are based on these doctrines of Jung. Caudwell, he says, postulates
as a common base for a ll men, the 'genotype' which is adapted by history
into a 'social ego.' The individual can be pressed into a mould and made
into a type econom ically determ ined by the needs o f so ciety , i.e ., a
lawyer, a miner, e tc ., th e role co n flicts with the to ta l personality and
thus a form o f unease and neurosis can develop. "Thus Caudwell con
verted the Marxist theory o f the developm ent o f cla ss-so ciety through
the division of labour into a Jungian theory o f the psychologically-problem a tic a l evolution o f personal and ego-consciousness."
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Currie further sees tw o a sp ects to Caudwell's view s on Freedom:
Since the so cia l-eg o is necessary for modern
man, his freedom must con sist in 'consciousness
o f the determ inism o f the environm ent and
o f man,' and 'of the so ciety which expresses
their mutual struggle.' But since the 'type,'
the persona, arises solely from a dysfunction
o f social d ifferen tia tio n , nam ely class so ciety ,
a rectifica tio n o f th at dysfunction raises man
to a consciousness o f a higher n ecessity , so
to speak, in which the type may be superceded
by full realization o f 'the genotype stam ped

Ibid., page 295.
^

Ibid., page 296.
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with aU the possibilities and grandeur o f man
kind.'58
Currie maintains that the above view s are the foundation o f Caudwell's
aesth etics. The genotype as an in stin ctive elem en t a ffe c tiv e ly represented
by art -- poetry appeals to an 'instinctive, em otional elem en t in man,'
and this view , Currie says, is not Marxian — it is Jungian. The idea
o f a "feeling tone," Currie says, attach ed to words was borrowed from
Jung as w ell. Besides rational laws, Currie continues, derived from
external reality, man also has A ffe c tiv e laws due to a basic instinctual
make up. This is the basis for the com m on ego whereby we can a ffe c tiv e ly
com m unicate with our fello w s through art. As a result o f th ese ideas,
Currie says, Caudwell has m odified the ep istem ology o f art away from
a Marxist view point to a Jungian, and com p letely abandoned Marxism
in his functional analysis. Currie continues as follow s: "David Margolis
stated that 'Caudwell's outstanding contribution to Marxist a esth etics
is his theory o f the function of literature;' y et that theory is derived,
in d etails as w ell as in outline, from Jung. For Caudwell argued that
art both can alizes individuals' en ergies or em otions into socially productive
channels, and individualizes those individuals' personalities on a properly
individual, properly c o lle c tiv e basis."

59

Currie further w rites that "Caudwell claim ed that 'change of ego
is the value, purpose and mode o f generation o f art works:' a strikingly

58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., pages 297-98.
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unMarxist doctrine."

Currie thus traces back Caudwell's "common

ego" to Jung's "collective unconscious" — but it tak es more than a surface
sim ilarity o f term s to make a Jungian out o f Caudwell. Caudwell by
reading Jung, as he did Freud, Richards, and numerous other major "bour
geois" thinkers, and a ttem p tin g to rework som e o f Jung's ideas into
his own Marxist outlook, naturally borrowed som e o f the term inology
from the subject m atter he was investigating. He h im self gives his
own evaluation o f Jung's work and ex p licitly rejects Jung's prem ises
and conclusions, while also saying he, Jung, has made som e particularly
good observations which m ust, how ever, be reform ulated in Marxist,
not Jungian term s. Beginning on page 232 o f Illusion and R eality, Caud
w ell evalu ates his relations to Jung's ideas. This occurs in his chapter
on "Poetry's Dream Work" w here Caudwell has discussed psychology
and m ental illness under C apitalism and refers to Jung's book Psycho
logical Types. How, Caudwell asks, does his own discussion o f this them e
differ from that o f Jung? He enum erates three major d ifferen ces which
he has with Jung. First, Jung "does not allow for the d ifferen ce betw een
a th eo retica l and p ractical approach to life , and the ex isten ce o f some
fields in which a man is th eo retica l, others in which he is practical,
and others where he shows a balanced unity." Second, Jung "regards
sensing and intuiting as in som e way unconscious form s o f feelin g and
thinking, although he uses th e word irrational." Caudwell rejects the
idea that feelin g and thinking can both be subsumed under the concept

^

Ibid., page 298.
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of the "irrational." Third, "3ung has no adequate definition o f conscious
ness and unconsciousness ex cep t a reduction o f 'psychic energy' which
makes the unconscious con ten ts sink below the threshold."

61

Caudwell

ca lls this a "crude and unhelpful theory" and says that his own view
that the tensions o f life lead to the "desocialization" o f ideas in our
consciousness which results in their becom ing unconscious is more to
the point. N evertheless, though differing sharply with 3ung and, as
with Freud, rejecting th e th eo retica l foundations o f his view s, Caudwell
still has praise for som e o f his accom plishm ents. Within the co n tex t
o f the bourgeois world view , Caudwell says, 3ung has produced "the
deepest study o f the psyche possible" with regard to th e question of
how men attain or fa il to attain self-rea liza tio n and freedom in the
world o f "concrete living." This is a long w ay, how ever, from being
a "3ungian."
The last a rticle I want to discuss does not bear directly on Caudwell
but has an important indirect bearing on our previous discussions, esp eci
ally with regard to the question o f Caudwell's Marxism or lack o f Marxism
in his a esth etics. This a rticle is 3am es P. Scanlon's "The Impossibility
o f a Uniquely Marxist A esthetics."
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This was a paper read a t the Con

ference o f the British S ociety o f A esth etics, Septem ber, 1975. Scanlan
points out that neither Marx nor Engels ever elaborated a theory of
art. Interest in their early works cen tered around the notion that evidence

Caudwell, op. c it., pages 234-35.
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3am es P. Scanlan, "The Im possibility o f a Uniquely Marxist A esthe
tics," British 3ournal o f A esth etics, Volume 16, no. 2, Spring 1976, pages
128-36.

202

for a theory o f art would be therein d etected , but Scanlan says this
exp ectation has not been fu lfilled . "Socialist Realism" constructed
o u tp f historical m aterialism , and incidental com m ents by Marx and
Engels, by Stalin and Gorki is one possible construction o f a Marxist
a esth etics — but we are not forced Scanlan says to maintain that this
version is the only possible con stru ct con sisten t with Marx and Engels'
w ritings. Scanlan, while suggesting that som ething like Socialist Realism
is no doubt logically implied from the works of Marx and Engels, w ill
n everth eless argue that "a single coherent Marxist a esth etics is not
possible.
Any theory o f art based on h istorical m aterialism m ust, Scanlan
w rites, be com patible with the follow ing three th eses: 1) Economic
D eterm inism : "the view th a t s o c ie tie s are shaped primarily by econom ic
forces, o f which cultural phenomena such as art are relatively in efficacious derivatives."

64

This is, o f course, wrong on the part o f Scanlan

who seem s at this point to ignore the strictures against "economic determinism"
(a bourgeois theory) which w ere made by Marx and Engels — who were
also, by the way, far from seein g art as in efficaciou s. What we are
seeing here is Scanlan's idea o f what historical m aterialism "must" imply,
but we are not seeing what it does imply according to Marx and Engels
— this v itia tes an im portant part o f Scanlan's a rticle. 2) A esth etic Parti
sanship: "The a ctiv ity o f a rtists is inherently and essen tially partisan,
in the sense o f representing particular econom ic class interests." This

^

Ibid., page 129.
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may be true o f som e Marxist th eories, but it is not, as Scanlan him self
points out, a logical inference or necessary conclusion from historical
m aterialism . 3) A esthetic h istoricism : art is class-bound — a class "deter
mines the character of an age, produces its own a esth etic values and
preferences, which have no broader h istorical applicability." Since Scanlan
h im self maintains that Marx and Engels did not th em selves hold this
view , his theory o f what historical m aterialism "must hold" seem s poor
— but it is more obvious that since Marx and Engels did not share these
view s, that Scanlan is not warranted in holding that they are views which
necessarily derive from, or are fundam ental in som e sense to, historical
m aterialism . The view s o f Marx and Engels on art, such as they may
be, must be taken into account in arriving a t an adequate view o f histor
ical m aterialism — not put to one side and then contrasted to an historical
m aterialism form ulated w ithout their insights in the first place.
With referen ce to partisanship, Scanlan points out that Marx and
Engels thought it was con sisten t with art, but not an essen tia l feature
as Scanlan's own presentation o f h istorical m aterialism would have it.
And by partisanship, Scanlan appears to mean boldly asserting your view 
point — which is o f course not a t a ll necessary. Scanlan thinks Engels'
w ell known praise for B alzac is in contradiction not just to som e versions
o f socialist realism , but to h istorical m aterialism per s e . "Marx and
Engels' unwillingness to identify the a e sth e tic with the function o f pro
moting a cause may be a t odds with Marxian h istorical m aterialism ,
but it is entirely con sistent with and indeed rec eiv es a th eo retica l justi
fication in Marx's early w r i t i n g s . W i t h referen ce to a esth etic histor
icism , which Scanlan says com m its h istorical m aterialism to the view

204

that the art o f one age has no applicability to another age, he points
out that neither Marx nor Engels th em selves held any such view . Instead
o f abandoning his own view o f h istorical m aterialism (a view that is
not even to be found in the Gorki version o f Socialist Realism as we
have seen, let alone in Marx and Engels) Scanlan uses the d ifferen ces
betw een his interpretation o f h istorical m aterialism and the positions
of Marx and Engels' as evidence that their view s are in contradiction
to historical m aterialism with referen ce to art. Scanlan thinks the them es
for an a esth etics in keeping with the view s o f Marx and Engels are to
be found in the Paris manuscripts.
Scanlan points out th at in the manuscripts Marx deals with aliena
tion which perverts the true human essen ce: "That essen ce, as w e also
know from The German Ideology, con sists in crea tiv e, productive a ctiv ity :
the true life o f man is a life o f free production, o f transforming or 'work
ing u p '... his environm ent in accordance with his own conscious con cep 
tions. Emanating from man's own inner or natural needs, such productive
a ctiv ity is spontaneous and uncoerced."
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Marx also discusses the "laws

o f beauty" or a t least refers to them in the Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts according to Scanlan. He draws tw o conclusions from all
this regarding Marx's view s on art. "First, that Marx in th ese passages

^

Ibid., pages 132-33.

66 Ibid., page 133.
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envisioned genuine a rtistic a ctiv ity as an end in its e lf, free o f partisan
and every other 'interested' or functional consideration. Second, that
man the artist as envisaged by Marx is neither a prisoner o f his own
anthropocentric vision nor confined to his own region or epoch..."
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Scanlan continues, "Man can crea te according to the 'standards o f every
species' - - a standard which m oreover is 'inherent' in the object. The
laws o f beauty, then, grounded in th ese standards — w hatever ex a ctly
they may be — must have been thought o f by Marx a t this point as tim eless
and universal."
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Scanlan m aintains that:

The argum ent of the Paris manuscripts is not
that communism w ill introduce new a esth etic
standards but that capitalism , by dehumanizing
human a ctiv ity , has subverted the a esth etic
standards tim elessly appropriate to mankind:
it has dulled the senses and turned a tten tion
from the intrinsic character o f ob jects and pro
ducts to their use value. Communism w ill restore
man to him self and reestablish the cat^gpry
o f the a esth etic with its enduring laws.
Finally, Scanlan concludes his observations with the following:
If we are to have a Marxist a esth etics we must
construct one, since none com es ready made
in the writings o f Marx and Engels. But two
con flictin g starting points are available for
such a th eo retica l construction. We may, with
the Soviets, develop further the im plications
o f the general theory of history and so ciety
to which Marx and Engels gave their enthusiastic
blessing. Or we may, with the French Marxist
Roger Garaudy and others, take our start from

^

Ibid., page 134.

68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
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the a ctu a l sta tem en ts about art found in the
Paris manuscripts and other works. Both starting
points are genuinely 'Marxist,' but the tw o lead
in opposite directions. Hence to con stru ct a
Marxist a esth etics w e must develop certain
Marxist th em es and ten d en cies a t the expense
o f o sie r s; we cannot con sisten tly develop them
all.
Garaudy or Marx? I think Scanlan's a rticle goes a long way in
explaining the basis o f so much o f the controversy surrounding the works
o f Caudwell. Aside from th e downright m isinterpretations o f his position
which we have discussed, there has alw ays been a reluctance on the
part o f som e Marxists who do understand his position to credit Caudwell
with having w ritten a 'Marxist' work. H istorically, those Marxist critics
o f Caudwell w ere, a t the tim e o f their criticism , follow ing a rather
rigid interpretation o f "Socialist Realism" and "Marxism" which devleoped
in a period which has since becom e known as the "Stalin Era." At the
present tim e, Caudwell's work has begun to a ttr a c t a m odest amount
o f in terest. With the passing o f rigid "super-orthodox" view s on what
is and is not Marxism, with the expansion o f various d ifferen t starting
points for Marxist analysis (as pointed out by Scanlan above) Caudwell's
contribution to Marxist thought should, in the years to com e, becom e
more widely resp ected and more influential. N everth eless, it must be
em phasized, th at Scanlan's a rticle has not established, in my opinion,
the position th at a uniquely Marxist a esth etics cannot be form ulated.
Scanlan's conclusions rest on a rtificia lly settin g up a version o f "historical
m aterialism " which no one calling h im self an historical m aterialist has,

70 Ibid., page 135.
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to my knowledge, ever seriously held, and then contrasting this a rtificia l
version to som e ideas gleaned from Marx's early note-books — som e
o f them w ritten before Marx him self adopted a con sisten t m aterialist
view point. The question, th erefore, o f a uniquely con sisten t Marxist
a esth etics is, I think, still open.
Another reason I think it still open, in addition to what has been
said above, is that I cannot a cce p t Scanlan's th esis that the "two starting
points" (the Paris manuscripts and the theory to which Marx and Engels
"gave their enthusiatic blessing") are both "genuinely Marxist." Of course,
if you defend both of th ese approaches as such, then it follow s (on Scan
lan's reading) that a uniquely authentic Marxist a esth etics is im possible.
If, on the other hand, you see the Paris manuscripts as the youthful
writings o f Marx as he first attem p ted to work out his philosophical
position (even before he had h im self adopted a con sisten t m aterialist
stance) then there is no ground for contrasting th ese writings to the
later works of Marx and Engels (the mature works) and it becom es simply
m eaningless to say that both approaches are "genuinely Marxist." This
is not to say that Scanlan's position on the vita lity of d ifferen t starting
points for a Marxist analysis is necessarily wrong.
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CONCLUSION

One o f the striking things about Caudweil's work is the way in
which its appreciation has been shaped by the p o litica l even ts surrounding
it. When Illusion and R eality was first published it was warmly received
and favorably reviewed ~ this was a tim e o f p olitical cooperation b e t
ween com m unists and non-com m unists in the fa ce o f the fa scist threat
to European civilization . In the la te ^0s and early 50s, Caudwell began
to be attacked (especially by the le ft, although som e o f his m ost ardent
defenders a t this tim e w ere also from the left) — this was a tim e o f
"cold war" and isolation and non-cooperation betw een com m unist and
non-com m unist forces. Also, in a growing clim a te o f fashionable in tel
lectu a l anti-com m unism , Caudwell's works were ignored by n on -left
in tellectu als and studies about him even began to be d eleted from tex ts.
In the 1960s, a tim e of "thaw" and im provem ent in international relations,
Caudwell again began to receiv e sym pathetic treatm en t from n on -left
as w ell as le ft points of view . In the '70s, when anti-S ovietism and an ti
communism once again becam e in tellectu a lly fashionable, articles once
again appeared critica l o f Caudwell's m ethods and ach ievem en ts. I
have attem pted to show that a ll o f th ese various evaluations o f Caudwell,
while illum inating many som ew hat obscure d etails o f his work, do not
succeed in establishing that he was anything other than what he claim ed
to be — i.e., a Marxist art th eorist. As I have suggested in the body
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o f this dissertation - - th ese various interpretations and critiques stem
from the fa c t that Caudwell has attem p ted to in tegrate som e o f the
great discoveries o f so-called "bourgeois" scien ce and philosophy into
a Marxist framework. This led to a tw o-fold a ttack upon his ideas - from the le ft that his use o f non-Marxist sources led him away from
Marxism, and from the right that his use o f Marxist sources only disguises
his true (non-Marxist) philosophy — be it Freudianism, Jungianism, or
what have you.
Both groups o f critics were agreed, how ever, on one thing — Caudw ell was not a "real" Marxist. His defen se was based on tw o points:
1. th at a close reading o f his tex ts showed that his opponents had not
fully understood his position, and 2. that many insights gained from
"bourgeois" scien ce are p erfectly leg itim a te for Marxists — had not
Marx him self availed h im self o f "bourgeois" econom ic con ceptions, not
to speak o f Engels (Anti-Duhring, etc.)? The second d efen se, though
tim ely in the 1950s when dogm atism was running high on both sides
o f the M arxist-non-Marxist fen ce, has becom e today basically outmoded
and unnecessary. It is in fa ct a sign o f progress and in tellectu a l m aturity
on the part of le ft critics that they no longer react negatively to the
mere use o f non -left sources per s e . Today, th erefore, an evaluation
of Caudwell must be determ ined in the first way — i.e ., a clo se reading
o f his tex ts.
In attem pting to give such a clo se reading, I have found it useful
to com pare Caudwell's view s with those o f Socialist Realism to see

210

if any critica l d issim ilarities could be determ ined which might have
justified som e of the n egative evaluations o f Illusion and R eality on
the score o f its supposed relationship, or lack o f relationship, to what
was considered, in the 1940s and 50s, th e only proper Marxist philosophy
o f art. Without attem pting to determ ine whether or not Socialist Realism
is the only, or m erely one o f may a ltern ative, Marxist philosophy o f
art, I have shown that nothing in the te x t o f Illusion and R eality co n flicts
in any essen tial way with th e ideas o f S ocialist R ealism as propounded
by its major spokesmen, esp ecia lly Gorki.
Since most of the criticism o f Caudwell, in my opinion, stem s
from a tendency to view his a n a ly tica l ca teg o ries in rigid and one-sided
term s (and thus fails to appreciate the subtle ways in which they interact
and influence one another) I though it would be interesting to com pare
Caudwell's philosophy o f art with th at o f H egel. While there are som e
major d ifferen ces betw een a few o f Caudwell's and Hegel's conclusions,
there are no major d ifferen ces in m ethod. Caudwell does not seem
to have been a close student o f H egel, judging by the bibliography o f
Illusion and R eality; n everth eless as a clo se student o f Marx and Engels
as w ell as Lenin, he had learned to think and w rite in a d ia lectica l man
ner. Discounting the d ifferen ces b etw een the Marxist d ia lectic and
the Hegelian from which it evolved , I have attem p ted to show that dia
le c tic a l thinking (so w ell exem p lified by Caudwell) is a prerequisite
for any Marxist philosophy o f art. Another major point I have supported
is that, due to the "identity in difference" (if I may so ca ll it) o f the
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Marxist and Hegelian d ia le ctics, a m aterialist reading o f H egel can
fruitfully illum inate many areas in philosophy ~ not only the philosophy
o f art — and serve as a guide to thinkers in terested in Marxism who
are attem pting to work in areas where no sign ificant Marxist in vesti
gations have previously been made.
Two other chapters are devoted to clo se readings o f Caudwell.
The first deals with Freud and Marcuse. Here an a ttem p t is made to
dem onstrate that only a clo se reading o f Caudwell's works w ill perm it
us to see that the charges leveled against him o f being a m ere follow er
of Freud (and an uncritical follow er a t that) are com p letely unfounded,
as is the view that since Freudianism is a to ta lly reactionary philosophy
any in terest in it a t all on th e part o f Caudwell must be re fle c tiv e o f
his underlying non-M arxist philosophy. By analyzing Marcuse's revision
o f Freudianism in term s o f som e o f the ca teg o r ies o f Marxism, and show
ing that Caudwell's critique o f Freud foreshadowed som e o f the asp ects
o f that of Marcuse, I hope to have dem onstrated th at Marcuse's opinion
concerning the revolutionary p oten tial o f Freudianism not only escaped
Freud, but also escaped many o f the critics o f Caudwell.
Finally, in the second o f the tw o chapters m entioned above, I have
turned to som e recent evaluations o f Caudwell published in academ ic
journals. As my bibliography shows, Caudwell has never been a popular
subject for the professional journals. N everth eless, several a rticles
did appear in the 1970s concerning his philosophy o f art. In the last
chapter o f my dissertation I have analyzed them in an a ttem p t to show
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that recen t c ritica l work on Caudwell has failed to dem onstrate either
major in con sistencies in his outlook or th at his work can be divorced
from the Marxist tradition. That the authors o f th ese articles, namely
Mulhern, Pradhan and Currie, could have arrived a t the conclusions
I have co n tested is due not to ca reless reading (with the possible ex cep 
tion o f Currie) but to a tendency to ignore the d ia lectica l interactions
of Caudwell's ca teg o ries. This tendency m anifests its e lf by one sidedly
analyzing a particular con cep t ~ such as "instinct" or "nature" — and
then taking this analysis as the fundam ental asp ect o f Caudwell's view s,
drawing forth contradictory consequences or attem pting to dem onstrate
incom patibility eith er with other o f his con cep ts or with the author's
particular interpretation.
I have tried to show that Caudwell if read in this manner cannot
be fully understood, that his ca teg o ries are fluid and can be used to
ca st light on obscure areas o f Marxist philosophical in terest, but that
they are really only guides to be used in attem p tin g to arrive a t a sa tis
factory understanding o f our subject m atter. Caudwell would have been
the last to have m aintained that Illusion and R eality or his other works
provided a d efin itive answer to all the questions of a Marxist theory
o f art. I hope I have shown, how ever, that the path Caudwell has hewn
out before us is, when correctly follow ed, leading in the proper direction
to a fuller and more satisfyin g understanding o f the relation betw een
Marxism and the philosophy o f art.
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